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

MAN,

IN HIS RELATIONS TO SOCIETY.

BY ROBERT MUDIE,

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"THE BRITISH NATURALIST," &c. &c.

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PREFACE.

ALTHOUGH this volume is one, the preparation of which has been attended with more labour, and more necessity of guarding against error, than some others of the series, yet I am not sure but some may regard the title of it as, in part at least, a misnomer; and therefore the few prefatory remarks which I mean to offer, may perhaps be most usefully directed to a little explanation on this point. The mistake, if it should arise, will probably be occasioned by the subject of the book being the adaptations of Man to society, and not the conventional regulations which societies of men establish, as they suppose, for the general weal, or, at all events, for the weal of the parties making the regulations. But, with all due submission to the authorities, I must be permitted to state, that codes of laws, whether civil, criminal, or of any other denomination, are not and cannot become matters of any kind of philosophy. They are mere inferences from the nature of Man, and his adaptation to society; and therefore they can be good and true only in so far as the contrivers of them understand their subjects, and act in conformity with them. Nor is this all; for even admitting the regulation to be good at the time when made,

and put in execution, society is in itself so mutable, and this mutability constitutes so important a quality of it, that, in a very short time, the best law, or combination of laws or other regulations, that can possibly be made, must become antiquated, and the continuance of it a bane to society, and not a blessing. Any one who looks at the system of regulation in an old country, more especially if that system is complicated, will find abundant proofs of what has now been stated, as well as of the pertinacity with which mere habit induces, and, indeed, compels even sensible men to cling to old customs and regulations, after the spirit and usefulness of them are gone, and their corrupting carcases are spreading pestilence through the social atmosphere. We name none of them, but there are few reflective readers to whom many will not occur, in which not only the sins but even the virtues, or, at all events, the virtuous intentions of the parents continue to be visited upon the children after the lapse of many generations,—rendering the war which the present generation has to wage against the absurdities of antiquity far more serious than the whole physical evils with which the present generation have to contend.

Feeling the unphilosophical nature of this subject, and the impossibility of dealing with it, without a constant warfare against absurdities and evils which ought long ere now to have been exploded, I have studiously avoided all analysis of the conventional regulations of society, and, indeed, all allusion to principles upon which these regulations ought to be made. Society is a perfect Proteus; for while one

attempts to seize it in one form, it instantly changes to a very different one. Therefore, Man himself, the component part, by the multiplication or aggregation of which society is formed, is the only subject with which we can deal in a matter which can bear the test of philosophic scrutiny. To Man, therefore, the attention of the reader of this volume is directed. In the first chapter, I have endeavoured to point out and to illustrate every man's original relation to society, his obligation to it, and the duty which that imposes upon him; and in this I have made the illustrations as copious and as original as I possibly could. In the second chapter, I have treated of the reciprocal duties of Man, and the society of which he is a member; and I have illustrated the general principle by a few instances which appeared to me as being at once the most popular and the most striking.

This may be regarded as the general statement of the case; and from this I have proceeded to what may be called the elements of useful society, as founded in Man himself. In doing this, I have first considered the social adaptations of Man in a general point of view; and then through the medium of the immediate, the retrospective, and the prospective emotions,—endeavouring to point out the consequences resulting from the proper and from the improper management of all the leading ones. In doing this, I have had occasion to examine some of the favourite theories of moral good and evil with some attention, but not, as I flatter myself, with any bitterness, or any desire but for the truth. I have endeavoured to make the work true in prin-

ciple, moral in tendency, and as plain and simple in expression as possible; and with the statement of these my endeavours, I leave my success or failure to the candour of that public to which I am under so many obligations.

ROBERT MUDIE.

Winchester, July 1, 1839.

ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

Man's original relation to society—Obligation thence arising—Length of every man's pedigree—All men equal at birth—Man has no original *rights*—Man's claim on society in equity—Relative obligations in different countries — Extent of the primary obligation and duty thence arising—Man independent and alone—Milton's Adam—The real first man—Man's original ignorance—Man and society—Laws are not philosophical—Religious and political disputes and their evils—Probable cause of holy rancour—State of the argument . . page 1—43

CHAPTER II.

RECIPROCAL DUTIES OF MAN AND SOCIETY.

Duty to God—Its real nature—Its infantine display—Its progressive displays—Duty to be mentally active—Agitation and its corrective—Our primary obligation—Education—Our second obligation—Love and self-love—States of society—True and false guides—Character and reputation—Negative duties—Justice—Passive loyalty—Distinctions of ranks and their duties—Resident and non-resident proprietors—Corn-laws—Duties of landlords—Claim of society on landlords—Duties of society—Public institutions—Public opinion . . . 44—91

CHAPTER III.

SOCIAL ADAPTATIONS OF MAN.

The solitary—The social principle not instinctive—Various meanings of society—Society not generally definable—Sections of

society—A man of the world—An outcast—Attachments and idolatry of classes—Stealing a march on society—Duty of society—Limitations of the study—Farmer and manufacturer—The arts—Quacks—Parson and clown . . page 92—115

CHAPTER IV.

THE SOCIAL EMOTIONS OF MAN—IMMEDIATE EMOTIONS.

General definition of the emotions—Social emotions—Moral physiognomy—Necessary caution—Emotion of beauty—Importance of the emotions—An infant thief—Feeling a virtue—Use of law—Relation of virtue and beauty—Young emotion—Sympathy, its power, use, and benefit—Despair—Magical power of sympathy—Sympathy with nature and its effects—Love and hate—Pride and humility—Honest pride—Haughtiness—Vanity—Its contrast with pride—Reflection . . . . . 116—164

CHAPTER V.

SOCIAL EMOTIONS—RETROSPECTIVE EMOTIONS.

General nature of such emotions—Several kinds of them—Gladness — Regret — Gloom — Contrast of character — Stimuli to thought and action—Conscience and consciousness—Influence of conscience—Moral feeling—Error respecting moral feeling—Bad men have moral feeling—Gratitude and anger—Motive for gratitude—Its real foundation—Its effects—Its regulation—Causes of anger—Evils and uses of anger—Public indignation—Furor of the mob—Restraining of anger. . . . 165—201

CHAPTER VI.

SOCIAL EMOTIONS—PROSPECTIVE EMOTIONS.

Dangerous error on this subject—Animal life knows neither past nor future—The human body is in the same predicament—Connection of the past and the future—Nature and regulation of the prospective emotions — Nature and regulation of desire — Erroneous education—Ennui—Process of desire and reasoning—Uncertainty and variableness of desire—Habits and their influence—Contrast of the over-tended and the neglected—Self-formed characters—Physical good—Desire of life—Desire of long life—Moral good and evil—Differences of profession—The

cobbler and the thief—The heathen gods—London abominations Idea of moral good—The divine-right theory—The Tory principle —The hypocritical theory—Illustration of a thieves' attorney— Theory of the fitness of things—Utility and utilitarians—Utility no virtue—Fallacy of Hume—Moral feeling—Important influence of moral feeling—Misery of the mean-spirited—Contrast of the vicious and the virtuous—The sympathetic hypothesis—Absurdity of the selfish system—The sacerdotal hypothesis—Fallibility and the fall of Man—The error of Dr. Paley, and its destructiveness of all virtue—Relation between virtue and religion—True religion and its counterfeit—State of the social mind—State of the public mind—Religion and politics— Various desires and fears . . . . . 202—280

CHAPTER VII.

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

Idea of social institutions—Difficulties of social regulation—Intentions and law-making—Difficulties in making wholesome laws—Illustrations—Law-makers—Conclusion . 281—292

MAN,

IN HIS RELATIONS TO SOCIETY.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

As concerns the foundation of morals, and the eternal well-being of Man, the relation in which he stands to his Maker is unquestionably the highest in importance; and, viewing Man as a being who must act upon knowledge of his own acquiring, the relation in which he stands to physical nature, as an observer of the properties of its substance, and the laws of its phenomena, so that he may turn the one and the other to his use and comfort, as occasion requires, is also of such importance, that it is indispensable to his very existence.

But, although these two relations are so important to every member of the human race that they may be said to be his all for eternity and for time, yet they are to the individual only,—to every one of the race singly, and by and for himself; and if, in the latter relation—perhaps even in the former, if he were to be thrown as completely and exclusively upon himself

for his means as he is for his end, his condition would be mean, wretched, and miserable, as compared with the condition of even the least comfortable of those we see around us in such a country as England. Therefore, in a practical point of view, the most important branch of the knowledge of Man is that of the relations in which he stands to society. This is general, and applicable to the whole race, in so far as they are known to, or have any influence upon, each other; and its importance is not, in any, measured by the deserts or by the knowledge of the individual. So far, indeed, is this from being the case, that a man's faults always, and his deficiencies in knowledge generally, are crimes against that society of which he is a member.

Thus, before we can come fairly and fully prepared to the consideration of the simple and temporary relation in which a man stands to society, to their respective mutual and reciprocal duties, and to the means which they have or ought to have for the right performance of those duties, there is a preliminary question, of far more consequence than any which is met with at the threshold of our other inquiries concerning Man, and one which demands our attention at some considerable length. For the sake of a general point upon which the several parts of the inquiry may be concentrated, the preliminary question may be enunciated in these words,—"In what relation does Man, that is, every man, stand to society at the moment of his birth?"

When put in these general terms, the question does

not admit of a direct answer; and before we can get an answer which shall be precise and definite, we must narrow it to the case of some one individual of the human race, a foundation so narrow that no reasoning could be founded upon it. No doubt this is the very form in which every man ought to put the question to himself; and not merely put it, but get a full and clear understanding of it, otherwise, he will not be able either to do his duty to society as he ought, or to live happily in it. A very large proportion of the misunderstandings, discontents, broils, distractions, squabbles, and absolute outbreaks and wars, which disturb the peace, retard the improvement, and destroy the comfort of society, have their source in ignorance of this question, and in nothing else; and we hesitate not to say that, if it were generally understood, and habitually acted upon, men would be at peace with each other, and all would be prosperous and happy.

But this result, delightful as it would be in itself, and simple as the means of its accomplishment appear, is, we fear, to be classed among the desirable only, and not in any wise among the expected. At least, as society and the means of schooling society in knowledge stand at present, there is nothing mooted which in the least tends to its accomplishment. Indeed, though the school of pupillage and of the world were as good as they are confessedly—no, not "confessedly"—demonstratively bad, we know not in what manner they could introduce this question as a part of their system. That is a hopeless sort of teaching

in which the pupil has all the necessary information and the teacher none; for the teacher, let him be as gifted as he may, cannot tell how the information—the elements of that which is to be taught, ought to be applied, unless he first is made acquainted with what they are; and this is all the knowledge that is wanted in the present case.

No man can, indeed, bring the question into such perfect apposition to his own individual case, as that he can see the full weight of obligation which the relation may impose; because he cannot know all the circumstances which led to the condition of the society in which he was born, or to the states, the characters, and the habits of his parents, and those others who may have been about him, and have had an influence in the formation of his character, and in opening up a way in the world for his reception. Even if he knew all this perfectly, it is only one link of a very long chain, and a chain which branches out into many parts at each link. We cannot tell who or what influenced those who were immediately about us, and far less who and what influenced their ancestors in every one of the numerous generations, the majority of which were, in as far as this world is concerned, gone to oblivion before we saw the light. A Welsh pedigree is proverbial for its length, but the longest of these is a mere span to the moral and social pedigree of the humblest man of the most obscure lineage in England. The most laborious and lynx-eyed antiquary in the country cannot trace his ancestry backward to the time when his progenitors were at the

very depth of savage ignorance, or even upon what spot of the earth's surface they existed when they were in that condition; and as little can he detail the means by which they escaped from that state, or the number of alternations of savage and demi-savage through which they were compelled to vacillate before civilization had become a plant of such permanence and vigour in their horde, as that it was able to maintain its place, and continue its growth, despite the wars of chiefs, and the turbulences and broils of vassals.

Yet has every man reason to believe that, by some means or other, the race or the family to which he belongs, how long and how illustrious soever its flourish may be in the Heralds' College, as Right Worshipful, or Most Noble,—by some means or other they have come from such an origin, and through such vicissitudes as those which we have named; and, for every advance which they have made, in this long and varied chain of succession, the man who is now born of the race or the family, is a debtor to some party or some circumstances or other, how ignorant soever he may be as to who or what they were.

Thus, we cannot possibly know the position in which society must have stood to us at the moment of our birth; and this ignorance, of which we never can get rid, is enough to reprove us in the sharpest manner when we feel inclined to boast of our own independence and importance. But, though we do not know the conditions on which society met us when we virtually entered into the social compact with our

nation or our tribe at our birth, we do know, by observation, though not by personal knowledge, the condition in which we ourselves were to this same compact. We came to it in utter ignorance, not only of all that had been done by men to prepare society for our reception, but of the existence of the world and every thing in it, and even of the fact of our own existence. This is true of the natural condition of all men, whether they are born at a time and in a country when and where the light of science is in its greatest splendour, and all the arts, useful and ornamental, are in the highest degree of perfection, or whether we are born in a land in which the inhabitants have not yet learned to frame a canal, form a spear, or kindle a fire. And, as it is true of the distinctions of nations and hordes, so it is true of the distinction of ranks in society, whatever the grounds of the distinction may be. The son of the most profound philosopher is in as utter ignorance at the moment, as the son of the most demented idiot to whom a son can be born; and the son of the proudest monarch that ever lived, is in as total ignorance at his birth, and in himself as unfit for the acquiring of any knowledge, as the son of the houseless beggar that passes his nights in the shelter of a bush upon the common. Then, as in knowledge, so in strength and resource, they are all utterly and equally helpless; and, if left to themselves, the one and the other would alike perish, as a matter of nature and necessity.

Therefore, one and all of us come to the social compact, enter into society at the moment of our

birth, upon what may be called a perfect moral equality. None of us has any ground to reproach another afterwards upon any inequality; and though some foolish individuals do boast of their *high* and *honourable* birth, they are little aware how the real case of the elevation and honour stands, or, assuredly, they would be very silent and humble upon the point.

When men boast of their high birth, or of the rank and fortune prepared for them at their coming into the world, to what, in truth and reality, does the boast amount? Why, simply to this, that they are under greater obligations to society, and have more important and imperious duties to discharge to that society, than men who have no such advantages of birth. We do not in the meantime inquire into the manner in which the title, the rank, or the fortune was obtained. It may have been in the most honourable manner, or it may have been the very opposite—for we have examples of both kinds and all degrees; but, however it came, is a question for those by and to whom it did come, and not for their children. The descendant of a really great man has no share whatever in the greatness; and the descendant of a successful villain is in no wise answerable for any share of the villany. The plain question,—and it is so plain that nobody can possibly mistake it,—is, "What claim can the individual ground upon his *own* merits at the moment of his birth?"—and the universal answer to this question—the answer which admits not of one single exception, is "*None*,"—"Naked they" all "came into the world;" and this nakedness—this

utter destitution, is the only claim that they, or any of them, originally have upon society. Therefore, when a man boasts that, in the estimation of the world, his father was "a great man," the personal truth of the boast is, that he is himself "a great beggar,"—or "great debtor," if the words are preferred, but the meaning is the same.

This is the natural condition of the whole human race, with reference to society. They come into the world utterly helpless and incapable; and, therefore, they are indebted to society, or to some part of society, for the simple fact of the preservation of their lives, during that period when they are incapable of doing any thing for themselves. If there is any thing more —if, in consequence of his birth being in one country and of one parentage rather than in another country and of another parentage, a man shall derive any distinction or advantage in society, that advantage, whatever it may be, is not a *credit* to him,—it is a *debt*. The common phrase runs that a man is "creditably born;" but this is the very reverse of the truth; for the man is really the more a debtor, the greater the advantages of his birth; and therefore the expression ought to be "debitably born;" for the more he is born to, the more he is a debtor to society.

It must not be supposed that, in these observations —observations which have their foundation in the original truth of the case, and cannot be shaken by sophistry, how much soever they may, like all truths, be liable to be beaten down by the rod of authority— it must not be supposed that we are in any way quar-

relling with the conventional arrangements of society, or even in the slightest degree hinting that men should not inherit thus or thus, according to whatever the custom and the law,—which is only custom supported by authority, and ought not to be made amenable at the bar of abstract justice,—may rule or direct in the matter.

We shall probably have occasion, in a future chapter, to say something about conventional customs, and when the time comes, we shall endeavour to do it as fairly as possible, though with what approbation we need not now say. But in the meantime we have nothing to do with such matters, our object being simply to see the grounds upon which society and any individual man meet each other at the very first, because that is the only true foundation upon which any argument can be built.

In this view of the matter, all men come into society equal in themselves, and with no equivalent which they can presently give for the trouble that it may take to save them; and thus they are all debtors to society from the very outset, and that in the exact ratio of their advantages, whatever those advantages may be.

It may be supposed, and even said, that the gratitude of the child is to its parents, for personal or hireling attention during the period of its nonage, and we should regret the statement of any thing that would tend to lessen the very proper feeling of filial duty. But, in reality, the attention which a parent bestows upon his children — apart altogether from

the pleasure with which nature has endued the office, is not so much a credit to the parent, as the discharge of an obligation which he himself has lain under since the time of his own helplessness, during which he also received the attention of his parents. This paternal duty ought not, therefore, to be mixed up with the question of a man's obligation to society; for it is a sort of debtor and creditor matter which balances itself, the debt owing to the parents of the individual being naturally payable to his children. There are some other of the domestic duties which compensate themselves in a similar manner; and consequently they, too, ought to be omitted in the argument.

The original state of the social compact, with regard to every individual of the human race, is, that the man brings nothing into society, for that most plain and cogent of all reasons, that he really has nothing to bring. To talk of the "Original Rights of Man," is therefore to talk of that which, in the nature of things, can have no existence. Man has no original right except the right of discharging what he owes to society; and there are perhaps not many, in any country or age, who discharge those debts to the full extent. It may so happen, however, that the conventional laws and institutions of society may give a man what appear to be natural rights. Whether they may be so intended or not, is not the present inquiry; but it is certain that enacted laws rarely, if ever, affect all the members of society with that equality of adaptation which strict justice between man and man re-

quires. Now, if the burden of the conventional law press too heavily upon any one member of society, that member has a "right"—a natural right if you will—a right far more sacred than any mere fiscal regulation, or any mere matter of government, to be released from the extra pressure. Depriving the man of this right is a very serious wrong; for the crimes which the law commits are always far more injurious to the welfare of society than those which are committed in violation of the law. This is the reason why nations which are governed by legislation are sometimes more unjustly treated than those which are governed by despotism; but the point is a nice one, and belongs not to this part of the argument.

The conclusion at which we must arrive, therefore, is, that society owes nothing to Man at the outset; but that Man owes everything to society; and the remainder of the inquiry, in the case of any individual man born of any nation during any age, turns upon what this "every thing" may amount to. The general answer is, "Every advantage which being born of that nation and during that age may give him."

This general answer is, however, exceedingly vague; and we cannot give it much precision without destroying its general applicability. There are some obvious points, however, which will give us at least some shadowy notion of it. The more civilized the country is, and the more equitable and just all its institutions are, the greater the obligation which a man is under for being born in it. A man owes more for being born in New Zealand than in the Australian

bush; more for being born in the Sandwich Isles than in New Zealand; more for being born in the American States than the Sandwich Isles; and more for being born in Britain than perhaps in any other country. Of course there are both national and individual opinions on these points, which are founded on feeling, not on fact; and therefore, though they are quite unfit for argument, they ought to be respected—as it is very difficult for men to alter their feelings, however wrong they may be. Again, a man is under obligation for being born in a district where the inducements to virtue predominate over the allurements to vice; and, *cæteris paribus*, it is an obligation to be born in a populous and well-informed district, where the natural and the artificial means of acquiring knowledge, and employment, and the necessaries of life, are easily accessible. If however, we pursue this part of the argument, or the investigation rather, too far into details, we are apt to come to conflicting circumstances, where the good on the one side and the evil on the other are not very easily balanced.

Being born in an old country, that is, in a country having a long history, and containing many memorials and monuments of successive ages and their events, and which has, in the lapse of those ages, produced a numerous succession of illustrious men, lays a man under very considerable obligations. There are some persons, smit with admiration at what are called *Utilitarian* doctrines, but with no very clear perceptions of what "utility" really means, that affect to ridicule the influence of such recollections as those to

which we have alluded; but such is the influence of our feelings, for good or for evil as may be, that it is doubtful whether any man ever became truly great without beginning his career with the admiration of some other men, who were then, or had formerly been, great in the very matters in which he became great himself, or in matters very nearly allied to them. So true is this, that it is highly probable that the memories of the illustrious men who have been connected with the Universities have probably more effect upon the students than all the prelections of the existing tutors. For the same reason, probably, great men appear in constellations in particular places, with blanks of dulness or mediocrity between, proportional in length to the natural want of stimulus in the place.

As being born in an old country, where there are many stimulating recollections, lays him who is so born under an obligation, so does it when a man is born at an advanced stage of the world in general civilization. Lord Bacon is right in urging that, in point of mental advantage, we are the "ancestors" of those who lived in the early ages of the world. Of course he alludes to the advantage of greater experience; and had he himself lived in the present age, he would have been far greater, great man as he unquestionably was.

The fact is, that we are under obligations, and obligations which we shall never be able to discharge, to all the men who have had any active part in the advancement of any one branch of knowledge, or any

one department of the useful or the ornamental arts; and also to all who have been in any way the means of promoting the views of them, or of preserving the record, or even the simple memory, of what these men have done.

Take what subject we will, and look in what direction we may, we cannot fail to see that we are under obligations to society, not only greater than we can have any hope of discharging, but greater than we can sum up. View it as we will, people of all ages and nations, not only since the commencement of history, but for long before the record begun—for mankind must have done much in many departments of science and art before they were able to compile a history,—people of all ages and nations have been observing, and discovering, and doing for us and for our benefit; and it avails nothing to say that they did it for themselves and not for us; for we have the advantage without giving any equivalent for it; and therefore the burden of the obligation is upon us exactly the same as if they had had our interest and accommodation solely in view. We have it, without having done any thing of ourselves to deserve it; and therefore the obligation upon us is the same, in whatever way, or from whatever motive, it may have been done.

They prepared our fields, planted our orchards, improved our breeds of animals, and contrived all our implements of husbandry. They made roads and bridges for us, they cut canals, they opened mines, they established manufactures. They founded cities

and towns, and built palaces, and ornamented the country for us with great labour and taste. They built our churches, and founded and endowed our colleges. They contrived for us the arts of reading, writing, and printing; wrote books for our amusement and instruction; and established libraries, where we might consult the treasures of knowledge which they had collected for us. To please us, they composed poems, painted pictures, and made statues; and, in a word, in order that we might not be in ignorance or in want, they examined all the substances in nature, and spent their days and their nights in labour, finding out in what way they could be useful to us, or in any way contribute to our comfort and happiness. There is not, in fact, a single subject that we can name, but which has been most laboriously scrutinized by men of first-rate ability, and this as much for our benefit as if they had been our hired servants. Far more, indeed; for these were not menials, who worked only for the reward of their labour, and, having their whole affections set upon the reward, endeavoured to make the labour as light as possible. They went heart and hand to the work, honest enthusiasts, and as able as they were enthusiastic;—and we have the full benefit of it all, without money and without price.

This is the debt which we owe to society—the obligation which is upon us the instant that we come into the world; and for which we find we have no means of giving an equivalent. And is there nothing demanded of us for all these advantages? What we have

said of the successional duty of parents, and of a man repaying to his children what was due by himself to his father, holds good in this general case as well as in that of any one individual. Societies and nations follow, in their obligations and discharges, exactly the same law as individuals and families. We cannot repay personally to the men of former times the kindness which they have left in legacy for us; but we can take a lesson from their example. This is the only return which is demanded of us; and we should be worse than ungrateful if we did not give it, and give it cheerfully, readily, and with all our ability. They did not spare themselves, so that we might be well-informed, well-appointed, and comfortable; and shall we degrade their memory, and despise their bounty, in not following their example? We are their offspring; and shall we be unworthy and ungrateful children to those kind parents whom we never saw? Have we the feelings of men in us; and dare we, in violence and outrage of these feelings, render ourselves so very mean and contemptible? We are the followers of many generations; and a generation, dear to us by the most sacred ties of human nature, will succeed us, and inhabit the earth, and continue the succession, when of us all that is mortal shall be mouldering in the grave. The former generations have, one and all, laboured for our good; and we have to transmit the good work only to one generation. Can we be so unworthy of those from whom we are descended, and who have done so much for us, as to refrain from making all the little addition in our

power, and handing down to posterity the original stock, with this small and easy addition? It is impossible: we would not surely stand out, among the whole human race, as the only generation that had brought disgrace upon the name.

Such is the obligation which one and all of us are under to society; and such the only and the easy means which all of us have of discharging the obligation. But there is another view of the matter which, if it does not address itself to our feeling of gratitude, comes much more closely home to our selfishness; and which view, when impartially taken, and fairly and duly considered, is calculated to impress us more deeply with the sense of our obligation to society, and to stimulate us to the performance of our social duties, from a love of mankind, which is more than filial,—a love which is called, and which should be, universal philanthropy. In entering upon the consideration of this view, we must not suppose ourselves to be led away by any narrow speculations about the motives of those from whom we derive the benefit. Motives are in no case matters fit for philosophical inquiry, because we have no means of getting fairly at them. Even in the most trivial affairs of human life, those daily actions of routine, which are so indifferent to the actors and to every one else that we never take the trouble of considering whether we ought to class them with the virtues or the vices,—even in them, we do not see—neither could we ascertain by the most scrutinizing investigation that we could institute, the motives of the action; and often,

.ndeed generally, those parties themselves cannot tell their motives. If the emotion is quite momentary, there is really no mental motive in the case; and when it is the result of deliberation—of an intellectual process antecedent to the emotion, and giving rise to it—this process is often so complicated that neither the party himself nor any one else is able to analyze it. Hence, there is an imperfection in all criminal law, which, though it is unavoidable, yet very often makes the result such as to merit the equivocal name of *criminal* justice. The law affects great lenity to the ignorance, or rather the turbulent passion of the party offending, and, therefore, it does not come down upon them in the full measure of its vengeance, unless there has been a motive, or *animus*, as it is called, in the case, as that which prompted the committing of the fact. Now, there can be no evidence of this animus except constructive evidence, inferred from circumstances; and this is considered illegal and oppressive in matters of fact. We suppose the usual plea is allowed in justification of the law here; the parties feel that they cannot do exactly what they ought to do, and therefore they do—the best they can. This is sufficient to show us that we ought not to mix up motives with first principles in matters of philosophy, how necessary soever they may be in the practical concerns of life.

With this precaution, let us return to the obligations which Man is under to society, and consider what would be his state if he had not these. To simplify this, we shall pass over the early stage, and sup-

pose that the man is so far advanced as that he can use the organs of his body, and, in some degree, the faculties of his mind. This is conceding much more than we ought to concede; but we can afford the concession, and so we shall make it.

Suppose, then, that a man is in perfect possession of all of what we may call the powers and faculties of his body and his mind—that he is healthy, and strong, and vigorous, well-sinewed in all his limbs, acute and quick in the perception of all his senses, and ready and well-willed, as the saying is, to the use of them; but that he has not yet used them, or any one of them; for that supposition would mar the whole matter, by putting him in possession of the very matters which it is to be his business to acquire. We suppose that he has a perfect body, the use of every part of which he knows; but which has never once been used for any purpose whatever.

Then as to his mind, let that be — as in truth it is, from the very first moment of its conscious existence, and for how long before we do not know,—let the mind be every way worthy of the perfect body. Let it be such that it can instantly feel and comprehend any and every impression on the senses; that it can make its comparisons and arrive at its conclusions, and further, that it can direct its emotions, all in the very best manner of which human nature is capable. But, like the body, which, in relation to its own functions, is equally perfect, it must not have exercised any one of its capacities upon any subject or in any manner whatsoever.

Here we have then a perfectly formed man, who has come thus matured into a world, of which, and of every thing in it, he is utterly ignorant; and the point for our consideration is, how he would conduct himself in it.

The world, too, into which he is to come, and "do the best he can for himself," must not be such a world as that to which we were born, or even such a world as the savages of the most wild and ignorant horde on the face of the earth are born to. That would be giving him those very gifts of society, of which, according to the hypothesis, he is to be perfectly independent. The world must be one in which no man has ever performed even the smallest work, —some Juan Fernandez, where no Robinson Crusoe has ever been; and our Robinson must not be a shipwrecked mariner, but a man who, with all his faculties about him, and with nothing more, has sprung up out of the earth, or dropped down from the clouds,— seeing, hearing and scenting, all around him, and capable of seizing whatever he can reach, and doing all of which his strength is capable, and nothing more.

What are to be the productions of the locality in which he is to make the first essay of his powers, we must not say; for there is no such thing as a general assemblage of the productions, the spontaneous productions, of the earth, which would suit equally every spot upon its surface. But, as it might seem a hard matter to put a being totally unexperienced in an absolute desert, where even a man who had had all the

advantages of society would be sadly put to his shifts, and might have no alternative save dying of want, we shall suppose that he is in a land of savage fertility and the means of fertility,—a land of streams of water, of plants, and of animals,— a land wherein there is "the fruit-tree bearing fruit, and the herb bearing seed, with cattle after their kind, and fowl to fly in the open firmament of heaven." All this we shall suppose, for all this might exist in nature, and without the previous labour of any other man; but to go beyond this it would be unjust, and destructive to the argument.

Here, then, on the one hand, is the man, fully qualified in his body and his mind for taking upon himself the dominion of the world; and there, on the other hand, is the world, quite rich and ready for being taken possession of, and not another human being to dispute the possession with our original and independent candidate. What is the man to do? How is the possession to be taken?

These are questions which no man can answer in a proper and satisfactory manner, even hypothetically; because no man can carry the analysis of his feelings backward to a period at which he was in such a state of independence,— there being, in fact, no such state as applicable to any human being. No one can deny that we have put this case fairly, in as far as both the man and the world are concerned, and indeed we have given the man a very large advantage, to which, in equity, he is not entitled. The impossibility of saying what the man would do in the case we have

Adam knew that he had been in a perspiration, and that the beams of the sun had dried up this perspiration; and this evaporation is a matter about which physical philosophers are not quite agreed, even to this day; so that, in sober philosophy, a man newly created could not of his own knowledge have had the least information about it. Then the landscape which he describes is as graphic as if he had been a close observer and warm admirer of nature for many years: and his description of the beasts and birds, though brief, is quite worthy of a naturalist. Not only this, —for Adam found himself in possession of language, which is a conventional matter, and can be obtained in no way but by a certain number of the human race agreeing to use the same sounds to express the same common meaning, as previously understood. Then he has a dream, too, and a vision; and in the dream he is taken to the garden of Eden, and shown what he may eat and what not. But it would be a waste of time to pursue the analysis farther; for the man here described is not a man who comes to take possession of the world with nothing to assist him but his natural powers,—he is a man of great education and acquired resource—Milton, in short, and not Adam. He is represented, in short, as a man, to find an equal to whom, even among those who have had the advantages of being born and educated in civilized society, we should have to cull the choice of the learned.

We must, therefore, return to our original man, without the smallest assistance from the delineation of the Poet, who was either indisposed or unable to view

the case as it ought to be viewed, in the representation of Man as entering upon the study and enjoyment of the world in his own unaided strength, and without a single example of experience to guide him. It is very likely that, by a man so circumstanced, the first painful sensation would be hunger,—and be it remembered that, from all that we can observe of mankind in those very early years, painful sensation is their chief inducement, if not their only inducement, to action of any kind. How he would go about the satisfying of his hunger, whether with a pumpkin or pebble, it is not easy to say, and it is just as difficut to say whether his first essay to the quenching of his thirst would be by the water of the brook, or the rock over which that brook rippled in its course; for, as yet, he has no knowledge of any substance, or of any quality of any substance. We cannot even say that he would go to school to the animals around him, and learn to eat and to drink from their example; for, independently of a creature so omnivorous as man making up his mind as to whether he should join the lion, the lamb, or the monkey, at breakfast, there is a previous question, namely, whether he should think of eating or drinking at all as the means of relieving the painful sensation. That he should see the animals eating and drinking would be no instruction to him; for we do not know as an original fact that animals eat to satisfy hunger, or drink to quench thirst. That they do this, is an analogy founded on our own case; and brought near to demonstration by much observation and long ex-

perience; but still not absolutely demonstrated as an independent fact resting upon its own evidence. In our lax modes of believing, and expressing ourselves on common occasions, these analogical deductions pass current as if they were established truths; and we have no reason to doubt a good many of them, and this one among the number; but still they are not demonstrated upon their own showing, as we demonstrate the simple fact that the animal does eat and drink, without any allusion to the purpose.

There is no doubt, however, that our man would soon learn to eat and drink, and to know the substances best suited for those purposes; but he would not do even this much without many trials and errors in the way of gaining experience, just as we see all men—educated and uneducated—do, when they come to cases which are perfectly new to them, and have nobody to tell them how they are to proceed.

In like manner there is no doubt that, in time, the man would *learn* the distinctions and the properties of things about him, but he would require a very long time; and it is very doubtful whether, in the course of an ordinary life, he would advance so far as to bend a bow, or even to form a spear. Time and experience would, however, bring him to this length; and the same process, repeated through many ages by many races of men coming into contact with each other, might bring Man up to the degree of intelligence and enjoyment which he at present possesses, in his most enlightened state; but this is the progress of *society*, *not* of Man as an individual.

How far the individual might advance, in the ordinary term of human life, and in a country of average natural fertility, it is impossible for us to ascertain, for there is no actual record of the experiment, and it is one which we cannot possibly make for ourselves; but, from the analogy, we have no reason to believe that he would get beyond the condition of the savage, in the very lowest state in which he was ever found by civilized man upon visiting a land of savages for the very first time. Indeed, by the analogy, he would never get even their length; for they have all, to some extent or other, the benefit of society and of the succession of ages. Thus, all the little arts and contrivances which are found even among them are to be attributed to society, and not to the individual man; and as all savages have a language, or jargon of some sort, in which they can communicate with each other, it is highly probable that society must be formed, and a language agreed upon, invented, and made use of, before the very simplest contrivance of art is so much as thought of.

Such, then, is as near an approximation as we can possibly make to what Man could do for himself, and independently altogether of the society of other men; and the amount of it is so very little, that we can scarcely imagine greater misery upon earth than the condition of the man who had this and no more. But we have taken the most favourable view of the case,—a view far more favourable than the average would warrant us in taking. We have supposed the man to be in the highest state of health and vigour, and to

continue in this state all the days of his life; and this can be predicated of the average of men in no state of society with which we are acquainted. We must make allowance for sickness, and for the decay and decrepitude of fading life, which, upon the average, sooner overtakes men suffering privations than temperate men who are in advanced society, especially if their minds are so well cultivated, and so active, as to take the lead in their characters, and lift them above those gross indulgences of the body which, when the activity of the body begins to slacken, prove so often fatal to mindless men in easy circumstances.

With all the statutory provisions, and all the charities, public and private, of civilized society, those natural evils fall heavily on men who have no resources of their own,—so heavily, indeed, that the pressure of old age and sickness is often apparently far heavier than the pressure of guilt. But if this be the case where there is some statutory provision, some charity, and, generally speaking, a little sympathy in some quarter or other, which can soothe, if it is not able to relieve, what must be our feeling—we cannot say fancy, for no fancy can paint it—of the state of one who, under such circumstances, is alone in the world, and as destitute of resource and mental hope as he is of the means of physical relief? It is well that we cannot draw the picture even in imagination; for the very feeling that there could be such a reality as this picture would represent, is horrible.

Yet such is the condition to which one and all of us would have had to come, if death had not interfered

to relieve us, had it not been for the circumstance of our being born, and educated, and living in society; for which advantages we are solely indebted to society, without any means or merit, on our part, towards the procuring of them. That we live in England, and in the nineteenth century, are probably greater advantages than we could have obtained by living in any other country at any other time; but we ourselves have not the slightest merit in either. A very large portion of the human race have been studying, and planning, and executing, during the long period of some thousands of years, to make England what it is in the nineteenth century; and assuredly, we who live in the nineteenth century, have no share whatever in the merit, whatever we may have in the enjoyment. We are, one and all, obligees to the full extent of the whole advantages that we derive from having been born, and for living, in a civilized country during an enlightened age,—at least what the majority of us have done, for ourselves or for anybody else, is so small, in comparison with what we have received, that it is not worth counting. It is true that they who prepared these advantages for us did not *intend* them for our good; but we have and enjoy them exactly the same as if the intention had been expressly for us, and therefore the obligation upon us is exactly the same. Among the men of the same age, we may have relative merit or demerit, according as that which we have discovered or done may be above or below the average of that which has been done by all who are in similar circumstances; but still, whatever we may

have done, even the most meritorious of us, is so little, in comparison with what we have received without any doing, that the position in which one and all of us stand is that of debtor to society, and debtor to an extent which we can never liquidate, so as to bring us up to an equality, far less place us upon any vantage ground of which we can boast.

This is the proper understanding and feeling with which we ought to come to the examination of the relations which subsist between man as an individual, and that society of which he is a member; and this ought to teach us that we must come with meekness and humility, and not as the headlong asserters of any claim of personal merit. But here there arises another preliminary question, which must be examined before we can rightly understand and apply the one which we have hitherto been considering:—

Where are the parties between whom the relation is to be traced and the reciprocal duties adjusted? We can find the one party—MAN, the individual—in ourself, or in any other member of the race. But where shall we find the other party—that SOCIETY, between which and the individual man the relation is to be traced? The members of this society have lived in many countries and in all ages, and the majority of them, we may almost say the whole, are in their graves—mouldered, lost, even as memorials of what has once been; so that they are incapable of entering into compact with us, or of receiving any service in gratitude at our hands.

The men who are now alive and active around us

are indeed *our* society, but they are not *the* society to which we are under so many obligations. All of them are in the same predicament with ourselves, in being under obligations to the very same society, to that society which is now, in as far as it was mortal, mingled with the common mass of material elements. They are of us, and we of them; or rather the whole of us together form one temporary portion of that chain or succession of society which runs onward through all ages and generations, and the present portion of which is always under obligations to all that have gone before it.

In this question of the primary and fundamental relation between Man and Society,—the very foundation upon which their mutual and reciprocal duties ought to be built, as their only sure foundation—we find we are in a curious position—a position to which we are rarely, if ever, driven in any other science. We wish to establish, as the basis of whatever we may have to conclude respecting the matter, a general relation between Man in his individual character and capacity as the one party, and Society as the other party. We can, in part at least, bring Man to the comparison; and we can also discover the relation—the only general relation, in as far as he is concerned—namely, that he is under very great obligations to society. But when we turn and seek the other element which is absolutely necessary to the making of the comparison in such a way as that we can deduce any logical conclusion from it, we are unable to find that element. Man certainly has to society that relation which we

have examined at some length, but *the* society to which he has this relation does not exist. Therefore, we have no logical or satisfactory basis upon which we can establish any thing like a regular and philosophical science of "Man in Society."

In none of the sciences of material nature, or the other branches of the science of Man, do we at the outset encounter any such perplexity as this. In studying the physical organization and adaptations of Man, for instance, he certainly appears an anomaly as compared with the other animated races; for though his adaptations are more numerous than those of any of them, there is a vagueness about them all, which renders it impossible for us to assign to Man any definite place in the scale of merely animated nature. But, when we take the whole of Man into consideration, and view him as consisting of a physical and mortal, and an intellectual and immortal part, and consider that the body of Man is not organized so that it may take a place among the merely physical animals, but that its adaptation is two-fold—for its own maintenance as physical, and for the service of the mind as intellectual, the apparent anomaly vanishes, and Man appears, as he is in reality, the most elaborate, and at the same time the most perfect, of all the works of creation. In like manner, when we contemplate Man in his intellectual and immortal character, and his relations to the acquiring of knowledge, and the acting upon that knowledge for his well-being and improvement, we meet with no anomaly, nothing which in any way

perplexes us. It is true that there are some points, such as the reciprocal action of the body and the mind, in the case of mental perception following bodily sensation, and of bodily action following mental affection, which we do not understand, and of course cannot explain; but this incapacity of ours does not make the fact the less certain, or the performance of it the less beautiful.

In the partial difficulty which is found in the reciprocal action of the body and mind upon each other, we can in so far see why there should be a total difficulty in the relation of Man and Society. In comparing the body and mind with a view to find out the relation between them upon which their reciprocal action depends, we find that they are not subjects capable of logical or philosophical comparison. The body is material and mortal, the mind is immaterial and immortal; and thus the two have no property in common, in terms of which they can be compared. In this case, therefore, we are unable to obtain any relation which can be made the basis of knowledge, because the two elements are not in their nature capable of comparison, though each of them singly may be made the subject of knowledge, to any extent we may carry our rational examination of it. In the case of Man and Society, the elements are of the same kind; and the relation on the part of one of them can be known, but we cannot bring the other one to the comparison; and therefore we fail in fully understanding both the reciprocity and the result.

In the elementary moral relations of Man, also,

whether in the high and solemn relations in which, as an immortal and responsible being, he stands to his God, or in that which he stands to his own happiness, as a moral and immortal being, we have some foundation on which to rest our inquiries. God and Man have the element of eternal future existence, and they are both spiritual beings, neither of them directly apparent to the senses of the human body. They are known from their works,—God as a Being infinite in every attribute of goodness and greatness; and Man as a being of very limited and erring powers. God as self-existent from all eternity, and the Maker of all that exists or that can exist; and Man as the creature of God's making, owing his being and all else to the love and gracious bounty of his Maker. God is omniscient, possessed of all knowledge through infinite extent, from and to all eternity; and therefore all His laws, and the law of man's nature among the rest, are infinitely holy, just, and good. Man has no knowledge but what he acquires by his limited powers of observation and of thought, and therefore he cannot, of his own strength, keep the law of his God; but that God, in mercy to the frailty and fallibility of Man, has provided the means of pardon for offences, according to certain conditions of a gracious covenant which He himself has seen meet to reveal. These are wide differences certainly, infinitely wide in our natural consideration of them; but revelation comes in where human reason and philosophy fail, and Man, naturally estranged from his Maker, is brought near by the gracious goodness of that Maker

in the new covenant. Therefore, by means of revelation, the relation between God and Man, which otherwise rises far above the reach of all human philosophy, is made plain to persons of ordinary understanding.

In the case of the imperfection which arises in the relation between Man and society, there is no such assistance. All the men who are, at any time, living in society, are in the same state upon the general principle; and, therefore, upon that principle, —the only one which can be made the basis of reasoning,—no man has an original right to demand, and none has a right of this kind to enforce, compliance on the part of another. Therefore, all the laws, and regulations, and customs, and observances, which are made for the pointing out of the reciprocal duties of Man and the immediately existing society of which he is a member, are conventional, made by men for their mutual advantage, in the same way as language is made for mutual intercourse. Like language, these differ in different countries and in different ages; and although some may be more advantageous to the majority of the people, or for the general welfare and improvement, there is not, for the reason that we have stated, any whole code, or even any single enactment of human legislature, which rests upon a philosophical basis, a basis of justice and equity, as between the aggregate of the society and every individual member of it. We must not blame the framers of any one of the enactments for this, for it is the necessary consequence of the want of knowledge of a general law of reciprocity between Man

and society; but, at all events, it should make those who have the means a little careful how they do legislate.

In all probability, we shall have occasion, in some future chapter, to enter a little into the details of those human regulations which define or enforce certain lines of conduct upon Man in society, both as regards the merely temporal part of the business, and as regards the connection of religion with civil government,—a connection which is as completely human and conventional, and therefore, in reason and philosophy, as foundationless, as that merely temporal regulation of which it forms part. But, in the meantime, and as apparently essential to our entering upon the main subject without mistake or prejudice one way or the other, it is important to know how utterly foundationless these conventional matters are in a philosophical point of view, however necessary they may be for practical order and prosperity in matters in which mankind have no well-established logical principles to guide them.

We make these remarks with no desire to undervalue human legislature, or the union of human regulations with the formal or ceremonial part of religion; for if, as we know the truth to be, there is no philosophical foundation to be had, it would be very obvious injustice to blame those who frame these matters for not having it. There is one practical circumstance, however, which must not be overlooked, as it tends very forcibly to corroborate, by evidence, that truth which we have deduced from first principles.

It is the following; and it is well worthy of the serious attention of every one who wishes to understand the foundations upon which the structure of civil society rests.

Disputes upon political subjects, and upon the human adjuncts to even the Christian religion, are more frequent, and carried on with less reason and temper, than disputes upon any other subjects whatsoever. There are disputes upon many other subjects, but such are, in general, terminable, and they do not continue, and disturb the peace, and mar the happiness, and retard the progress of society, unless they get entangled in the one or the other of these. And why do disputes on subjects of science, of art, or of general philosophy, generally terminate, and are carried onward to their conclusion in a temperate manner? Clearly for this reason,—that there is in each and all of them some fixed principle to which the matter at issue between the disputants can be brought; and when they once come to see and understand this principle properly, and can institute a fair comparison between it and the opinions which they have held during the dispute, the one who was in the wrong is compelled, of his own conviction, to give way to the truth as established by the appeal to this standard. Or if, as is often the case,—for though men who know that they are in the right adhere firmly to it, they never bring it into discredit by wrangling and disputation,—they are both in the wrong, if they can come to the established principle, that sets them both right;

and thus they make mutual concessions, and are both wiser men than they were before.

But political and religious disputes are never carried on with temper, neither do they come to a rational termination in either of these ways. The more that such disputants argue the more they disagree; and whether their controversy is carried on orally or in writing, they make use of language so intemperate as to convince any man who is in his sober senses that both parties must be in the wrong. Further to prove the truth of this, it is matter of common observation, that the longer any political or religious dispute or argument is protracted, the parties not only get the more angry, but they get the wider apart from each other, so that that which at the outset appeared to be a mere difference of opinion, becomes in the end a most rancourous feud.

Nor does it, in the one kind or in the other, stop at the most intemperate and unseemly language which one human being, even of the lowest moral feeling and the rudest class, can bestow upon another; for, even in men who, when they are not agitated by these most important subjects, are accounted wise and good, it stirs up the very worst passions that could by possibility actuate the very dregs of society, when they are in the frenzied act of committing the most atrocious crimes. No matter for the most intimate relationships — the dearest bonds of society, as they are accounted among rational men. By these unseemly disputes, brother is set in rancourous array

against brother, parent against child, child against parent, and so on, till all that is good and estimable in society is destroyed.

If the matter were to stop with any attempt to refute an argument or controvert an opinion, in the only way in which that can be done, that is, by words, be the words of what tenor soever, one might be, in some sort, reconciled to it, however repugnant to good taste, and that feeling which, as common debtors to the goodness of God, and the kindness which antecedent society has bestowed upon them, mankind ought, in common decency, to have for each other;—if it were to stop here, one might charitably cast about to make excuses for it. But when we find that, upon such grounds, mankind go openly about to do each other every temporal injury which the law of the society whereof they are members will allow; and not only this, but, if they have the power of the law in their hand, they convert that which ought to be the safety of all men into the means of vengeance and death, by the most excruciating tortures against those who are guilty of no offence whatsoever, save that of differing from their persecutors on some point of politics or religion, which is of no earthly consequence to their welfare one way or the other.

These are no fanciful delineations, introduced for the purpose of effect, but plain though melancholy truths, which make up the blackest pages of the human annals, and the natural enormity of which no words can heighten; and they have not been confined to one party or one set of opinionists, but have been per-

petrated by those who have been diametrically opposed to each other upon the points at issue, which points, be it remembered, have never been of very great importance, or very closely connected with the moral worth or the real welfare of human beings, one way or another.

There is no doubt that the worldly views of mankind, and the very worst means which the most depraved of mankind can by possibility put in practice for the furtherance and accomplishment of those views, have mingled in these disputes—both kinds of them—and made their enormities more inhuman and revolting. But still the question arises, "Why should political and religious disputes be the only ones with which such enormities are blended?" Political institutions and proceedings profess to be established and carried on solely for the temporal good of mankind—not of certain individuals, but of the whole of societies and nations; and the political, or human-institution adjuncts of religion have, in all their varied forms, been attached to it for the pretended purpose of rendering the spiritual and essential part more effective in promoting the eternal welfare of mankind. Yes, the sword has been drawn, the dungeon has been crowded, the torture has been instituted, and the faggot has been kindled, all for the glory of the God of mercy, and the salvation of the souls of men!

We ask again, to what strange anomaly these things, so outrageous to all the ordinary principles of human nature, and so impiously in violation of all that has been revealed by the God of Heaven, could or can be

owing? And the only answer that we can find is, that, in these matters, there is no fixed or general principle to which mankind can refer as the standard of right and wrong.

Then, if there is no human standard attained or attainable, to which we can with reason make an ultimate appeal in these matters, why should we not seek help where alone it is to be found? If the Almighty saw meet of his own free grace to send his only-begotten Son into the world to make an atonement for our sins, and deliver us from that eternal punishment which one and all of us have incurred, and must, but for the tender mercy of our God, undergo, why not adopt towards each other that rule of intercourse which He recommended:—"A new commandment I give unto you, *that ye love one another?*" This is the commandment of Him who is equally omnipotent to pardon and to punish; and how can we expect to escape the full measure of *His* vengeance if we fail to obey it? In all ordinary matters in which our misunderstandings can be conducted with reason, and brought to a standard of human judgment—as they can be in common science, the arts, and the simple and equitable transactions of man with man, we do not need to call in the aid of this beautiful precept. But where we have no human standard, as we have none in the conventional regulations of society, we ought never to lose sight of this. We are all equally indebted to the free grace of our God for pardon and mercy, to say nothing of the debt which we owe for our simple existence; and we are

all indebted to that society to which we can make no return, for all the comforts and distinctions which we have and enjoy as members of civilized society: and, as we are all, with the exception of accidental difference, in which we have no merit, exactly in the same predicament; surely the easiest, as well as the most natural line of conduct which we can adopt, is to obey the commandment of Him to whom we owe every thing, by "loving one another?"

If the reader has attended, with understanding, and with a desire to know and to follow the truth (for both are necessary) to the strain of argument in these preliminary remarks, which we have endeavoured to make as plain as possible, he must be aware that there is not to be obtained from the study of man and of society any fundamental law, according to which these reciprocal duties to each other can be regulated: and, therefore, it behoves us to take this "law of laws," which was made known and enforced by God himself, as the only sure foundation upon which we can build, and the only guide that will keep us from iniquity and error.

Keeping this constantly in view, we may proceed with our inquiry, only it must be gone about with much mildness and humility, as compared with the course which we might follow in any matter in which we had a foundation of our own. This inquiry will naturally consists of three principal parts: first, a brief outline of the leading duties which Man and Society mutually and respectively owe to each other; secondly, the means by which Man, in his own nature as an

individual, may either perform those duties, or fall short or err in the performance of them; and, thirdly, those laws and regulations of society by which Man is understood to be encouraged and protected in the performance of his duty, and repressed and warned, and, if need be, punished, if he deviates from it. On the first of these we shall not enter into any minute particulars; and thus it will not detain us long; the second is of much more importance, and will require a little more consideration; and with the third we shall deal as fairly and tenderly as possible.

CHAPTER II.

RECIPROCAL DUTIES OF MAN AND SOCIETY.

As every man who is born, or who lives in society of any kind, however rude, and in a station in that society however humble, enjoys, in consequence of being so born and so living, some advantages which he otherwise could not, by possibility, have enjoyed; so every man, let him be who and what he may, is naturally under an obligation for all the advantages which he thus possesses. If he has the honest and independent feeling of a man in him,—if he is worthy of the place which he holds in society, whatever that place may be—he will feel the tie of this obligation upon him, and will desire to act upon the feeling, and not merely desire, but use all diligence in putting the desire into execution, according to the best of his ability.

Although, as we have shown, there is no direct relation to which the reciprocal duties of Man and Society can be referred, yet, what with religion, what with knowledge, what with an inherent love of society, and a virtuous feeling towards it—which seems to be also inherent in human nature unless it is corrupted

by vice, there seems to be enough to guide us in this matter, unless we suffer ourselves to fall into wranglings and disputes; and if we do so, we destroy the moral and practical effects of these secondary relations, and foster that unmanly and unsocial spirit, of the effects of which we took some slight notice in the preceding chapter.

It must be allowed that the law of God—the relation in which we stand to that Almighty Being as our Creator, as the free-will bestower of all our powers and feelings, and of all the means of their exercise and enjoyment, and as our deliverer from that eternal suffering and misery to which, without his gracious interference, we are obnoxious by the very constitution of our nature, without the slightest power or means of our own by which we can either escape from it or mitigate its severity;—it must be allowed that this is the most powerful stimulus and inducement to us, both in the knowledge of our duty to society and in the performance of it. So much is this the case, as may be theoretically understood from the relation itself, and practically confirmed by an examination of the conduct of mankind, that if we do not make our duty to God the grand and primary foundation of our duties to society, then those duties can neither be rightly understood, nor performed with the proper feeling and in the proper manner. The very nature of this most powerful, this indissoluble and eternal obligation, which is upon every human being, and which is equally binding upon him in its present strength, and in its future and eternal consequences,

whether he understands it or not,—the very nature of this duty points out where alone it can be paid; and the Word of God himself is explicit as to the means and the mode of performing it:—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy soul, with all thy strength, and with all thy mind," are the express and very intelligible words in which our duty to God is set forth in the volume of inspiration. But, in the same record of everlasting truth, we are expressly told that "Man cannot be serviceable to God, as one man is serviceable to another." We can give him no gifts, make no sacrifices to him, and render to him no honours, any one of which can in the slightest degree add to a single attribute of his; for all the divine attributes are in themselves infinite, and therefore incapable of increase. It is true, that, by reverential feelings towards the Almighty, by making our supplications to him, and by rendering thanksgiving and praise to him for his great goodness, we may produce the most beneficial effects upon our own feelings and emotions, and those effects may lead to the happiest consequences, as concerns both our own welfare and that of others. We may thus kindle the flame of our own devotion with a live coal from the altar of our God, but we can in nowise increase the radiance of the glory there; and if we dare to make the attempt, we so far, to our own condemnation, substitute a dumb idol for the living God, and turn his holy religion into a mere idolatry. Hence it is that the express commandment that we shall love our God is immediately [illegible]d by that application which regulates the prac-

tice, and which forms the only sure basis upon which the knowledge of our duty to society, and the right desire of performing that duty, can be founded:—"Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." The commandment to us is not given in any vague and hypothetical manner, whereby we might be enabled to alter it by any glosses of our own, so that we might adapt it to our purposes, and each man interpret the law according to the imagination of his own heart. "As thyself" is a standard which every man has within him, and to which he can at all times refer, without difficulty and without doubt or hesitation; and yet, simple and explicit as it is, it meets every case that can by possibility arise.

In order to show with what beauty of perfection the statutes of the Gospel are adapted to the condition of Man, it may not be amiss just to glance at the application here. As has been attempted to be illustrated—it requires no original showing, as it cannot but be felt—every individual of the human race stands exactly in the same predicament with regard to society,—they are brothers in obligation to that society which has gone before them; and the commandment is such as naturally, and almost necessarily, arises out of this equality of state,—they are to have perfectly equal and reciprocal kindness for each other.

But there is another view of the divine law,—that is, of the feeling of the obligation which we are under to our God, which appears to be inherent in our nature, until—as may happen in the case of many of our kindly feelings—it shall be weakened and obscured

by vicious practices. This feeling is antecedent to that which arises out of religious knowledge, and is of the greatest service to us while we are too young for being governed or directed by that. As it is a mere feeling, and not a matter of reasoning or understanding, we cannot define it in express terms, but must arrive at the knowledge of it from circumstances. Perhaps one of the best general expressions that we have for it is, that "We are glad we are alive." In early life, this gladness is constant with us, excepting in those moments of pain or irritation which are expressed at once, while the frame is so delicately sensitive as it is then. But if the expressions of uneasiness are always instant upon the uneasy sensation, the "gladness of life" soon returns, and the child laughs while its eyes are still suffused with the tears of its keen but evanescent sorrow.

Then, at this young age, there is fondness for and delight in everything; and if there has not been—which, by the way, is very difficult to be avoided—something wrong in the management of it, the child loves everybody, and indeed everything that comes within the range of its observation. This love can be accounted for upon no principle of selfish gratification, and not wholly upon that of the pleasure of obtaining knowledge. The last is a natural pleasure, and one of so high an order, and so beneficial in its effects on the whole character and conduct, not at the time merely, but through life, that if we could be duly impressed with the truth of it, we should be careful never to repress it in the manner which is sometimes done.

To watch a healthy child which has been much kept in the house, when left to itself upon some grassy glade, enamelled with wild-flowers, gay with butterflies, and melodious with the hum of insects, while gentle winds are stirring the sprays around, and the birds are in alternate flight and song,—to watch such a child, in such a situation, is a treat in the way of feeling, and scarcely less so in that of instruction. There is a perfection of gladness—a rioting in delight—which has certainly no parallel in after-life, even in the cases of those who preserve the purity of their feelings with the greatest solicitude and success.

It is true that this delight of the child among the fresh novelties of nature is objectless, according to our common views of the matter, as it tends not to the cramming of any appetite or the earning of a penny; but, upon careful examination, the child will be found to be much more in the way of fulfilling the great law of love to society than he who is hedging and cozening every farthing with the intention of endowing an hospital or building a church with the proceeds —after he himself can enjoy it no longer. The child is exercising, and thereby cultivating, the feeling of love; and, if the feeling is duly cultivated, the application will be made in good time: whereas, if the feeling is neglected, there can be no application; and thus, though the party may have any degree of self-love—that spurious kind which means love of the appetites, and not unfrequently of the abuse of self—he can have no love for his neighbour, as he is destitute of the sole means by which that can exist.

As years roll on, and the volume of knowledge increases to such an extent as that the individual can form some estimate of his own powers, and the almost endless variety of subjects and ways for their gratification, he feels a stronger and a more definite gratitude,—a love of creation, and of all the works and ways of creation; and the friendships which he forms, the happy hours which he spends with his associates in this admiration, attach him to society with a bond which is not easily broken. It is true that, at all times, and especially at the time to which we are alluding, there are dangers to be avoided, and great care is necessary in the avoiding of them: but we are not now speaking of the errors into which Man may fall or may be betrayed,—we are speaking of what *could* and what *would* be the case with every man, if matters were conducted as they ought to be.

Then, again, in the various studies, labours, and occupations upon which Man enters, as preparatory for the business of life, but are no part of that business, he meets with so many means of help which have been contrived and prepared as for him, that he cannot, if his natural feelings have not been destroyed, refrain from feeling that gratitude—that obligation to society, to which we have made so frequent allusion. Say that it is merely the learning of some handicraft trade: he finds so many tools prepared for the different operations of that trade, and each of them so well calculated for its intended purpose, that he cannot help being struck with the vast advantages which the contrivers and preparers of those tools have conferred

upon him individually, and how helpless and miserable he would have been, if those things had not been prepared for his use.

If his range is a little higher than this, and he is led to examine and contemplate the resources of science and of the more general arts, he will feel the obligation still more. Even in so simple matters as the elements of geometry and algebra, the student feels a wonderful exultation and elevation, both of mind and of character, when he knows the extent of the new powers with which these matters have armed him; and this very feeling cannot but put him in a more happy frame of mind,—make him more in love with himself, with nature, with science, and with society. The additional power which is given to the eye by means of a telescope or a microscope, produces a wonderful impression the first time that such an instrument is seen; and as the fact here is at once palpable to the sight, without any process of reasoning, the effect is produced upon the most ignorant rustic even more forcibly perhaps than upon one who has more knowledge. All sorts of moving machinery, which are put in motion by other powers than that of living animals, produce strong impressions the first time that they are seen. The effects of animal power we do not admire so much, because it has a very close resemblance to the mechanical use of our own body in the drudgery of mere labour—the occupation in which, generally speaking, all mankind have the least pleasure, and to which all have a natural aversion, the instant that they can do anything better. It is true

that, if there is a considerable degree of contrivance and ingenuity required in the performance of the labour, the irksomeness is, to a very considerable extent, taken off; but then the pleasurable feeling which accompanies the mental part of the work is that which sweetens labour in such cases.

There is one little circumstance connected with this natural aversion to the performance of mere mechanical or bodily drudgery, which is not unworthy of our attention, as it is one of our natural incentives to the performance of our duty to society. If this disposition takes the alternative of idleness as a relief from bodily drudgery, then of course it is bad, and shows that the party has been vitiated by evil treatment, bad example, or neglect; but we may confidently say that when this takes place, the natural disposition of the party has been injured by some means or other. Idleness is no natural propensity of mankind; for when they are too young for being tainted by the examples of the worthless they are all activity, and always in motion in some way or other unless they are asleep. That this is the natural disposition, every one who has been in even the slightest degree an observer must admit; and it would be most unjust to human nature, and most destructive of the true philosophy of it, to found any argument upon its perversion. Idleness, whether of the body or of the mind, is "the refuge of the destitute;" and surely that is not the place in which to find the real character of human beings.

The natural and important, we may say highly

beneficial aversion to the mere mindless drudgery of the body, is the desire of mental occupation; and when, at an early age, children are doomed to drudgery of this kind, there is always pain and revolt upon their part, whether they have the means of showing it or not; and if some innocent mental occupation is not afforded, meanness and vice—a total prostration of all that is estimable in human nature—is the inevitable consequence. This is the reason why, in many of our manufacturing districts where the occupation of the man or the boy is hardly more mental than that of the machine which he attends, the human character is so wanting in all its better elements. The parties have no means of thinking; and, therefore, they have no fixed opinions grounded upon principle. Hence, the very slightest cause of animosity—or rather the first stirring of it, for there is seldom any cause at all, and never one of such a nature as to produce tumult,—they are thrown into a state of perfect anarchy; and devastation and death are often produced by that which, when examined, turns out to be nothing at all—but the simple though melancholy fact that a certain number of human beings have been so placed and occupied in society that they have no mental speculations, and are incapable of forming a rational opinion upon any subject.

That this should be the case is, in some way or other, a breach of duty towards these persons, on the part of some portion of the rest of society; but it is one of those breaches which are more easily pointed out than healed; and at all events it is in no degree

to be bettered by stirring up the turbulent passions of those who suffer by it. "Agitation" may suit the purposes of a political jobber, who traffics in the happiness and feelings of mankind for the furtherance of his own gain or glory; but it can have no place in the philosophical consideration of Man or Society. To afford to every man the means of as much mental developement as shall save him from this lowest state of human degradation — this fertile source of every private crime and every public mischief, is certainly a duty which Society owes to all its members, or, which is the same thing, to itself; but how this is to be accomplished is another matter. One thing is certain,—that there is a natural disposition in men to mental occupation, which, if cherished ever so little, instead of being checked and extinguished, would do this, far more effectually than any statutory enactment, which, judging from what one sees, would be very apt to make matters worse.

This desire of mental occupation, it will be understood, is one of the natural means which Man uses for the purposes of doing his duty to society; and this without any plan or thought, on his part, about the matter. Man feels that he is mind as well as body; and, therefore, he makes an effort to bring both to the service of society.

In these desultory remarks there will be found the principal elements of the grand or general stimuli which Man has to the knowledge and the performance of his social duties; and upon such a case we cannot venture to introduce any detail or individual example,

as the case of every man rests so much on its own peculiarities, that it cannot be applied with perfect accuracy even to that of one other individual. After noticing the inducements, the next point is, What are the duties themselves that Man owes to Society, and will be unjust to Society if he does not perform?

In the first place, every man is a burden upon society—an expense to it in some way or other, before he is capable of performing any duty whatever; and, in equity, he is bound to make the best return that he can for this, and to do it with a willing and cordial heart, inasmuch as he incurred the obligation, not only without any merit on his part, but when he was incapable of asking it in any other way than by simple signs of pain and suffering. It may be said that the obligation here is not to society, but to the parents of the individual, or to whoever might have taken care of him during his nonage. But that is not a correct view of the case, because society must, by some means or other, have enabled the parents or others to perform this service. Nor must it be pleaded that they did this of their own exertions or of their hereditary possessions; for where are exertions to be productive, and where are possessions to be acquired, but in society, and by the means of that society? Besides, what do we mean by society as that to which individual man is bound in the performance of certain duties? Is it the persons whom the party knows and has intercourse with, or those whom he has never known or seen? Not the latter, surely; for although we owed them ever so much, we

have no possible means of discharging the obligation. It is by no means unlikely that the present inhabitants of England, of what race or mixture of races soever they may have come, are all indebted to Julius Cæsar for having invaded the country, and thereby been the means of introducing some of the Roman arts and improvements; and there was a time of ignorance and superstition when, on account of these matters, or simply on account of his being the instrument in destroying a number of cities, and causing many men to be slain, Julius Cæsar would have been worshipped as a demi-god after his death; but, in the present enlightened age, no man would be fool enough even to think of any duty he could perform to Julius Cæsar.

Society, to one and all of us, means those that we know and are connected with, and no more; and if a child shall know only its parents, then its duty to society is confined to those parents; and the social duty gets wider in the range of its application, just as the number of those with whom the party is acquainted and connected extends; but, in all cases, a duty to an unknown party is merely an ideal duty, which may be spoken of, but which never can by possibility be performed. There are not a few of mankind who talk largely about the performance of these ideal duties; and who, in the abundance of their speech about them, slur over the real duties which they ought to perform.

The primary obligation which one and all of us are under in this way is, that of having had a body and

mind preserved for us during a period when we ourselves were incapable of doing any thing for their preservation. Besides this, there are many matters of detail, occurring from personal and local circumstances; but these belong to the several individual cases, and are not admissible into the general argument. This obligation gives rise to a number of emotions or feelings, which we may notice hereafter, such as love of country, love of one's native country or town, love of family, love of dress, love of station and profession, and a number of others. These are all branches of the general feeling of obligation, and as there is something of the nature of gratitude in them all, they tend, on the whole, to elevate the character; only they are all liable to be abused, and some of them are much more so than others.

As that for which all of us, without any exception or distinction, are under this primary obligation, is the possession of a body and mind, both capable of receiving certain training or instruction, or education in the case of the mind, and capable also of performing certain operations, if properly trained for them, which operations are useful to ourselves and to others,—the primary duty to society arising out of this primary obligation, is, to make our bodies and our minds as capable of useful application as possible. If we neglect this preparation for our duty, and it is also the preparation for our own happiness,—if we neglect this in that young stage of our lives, when, for various reasons, it can be best and most easily acquired, we are guilty of an offence against society, and even

against ourselves, which we cannot replace at any subsequent period.

This is a matter, too, upon which we must be very much upon our guard against subterfuges. It will not do for us to say that our parents or guardians neglected our education, that there were no schools in the locality, that the teachers we were under were incompetent, or any thing of a similar kind. For, no matter what may be the cause of our inferiority, either in bodily dexterity or in mental sagacity,—the effect of it upon our own happiness and our usefulness in society is exactly the same, whatever may be the cause. Independently of this, the excuses which we are in the habit of setting up, either for the awkwardness of our bodies or the ignorance of our minds, are seldom of a nature that can be rationally sustained. It is not the performance of feats of dexterity, or profound knowledge of abstract science, which is required of the majority of us, or indeed of any of us, as the means of discharging our duty to society, and to ourselves. It depends upon the event—upon what we shall be required to do, whether these matters shall be necessary for us or not. But there is a ready hand and a sagacious mind which all of us ought to possess, and the possession of which does not involve the necessity of much gymnastic training, or book learning. On the other hand, the very best part of it may be acquired by any body and without any formal training or teaching, and it may be acquired without any measured time set apart for the purpose.

There is not a more absurd or mischievous notion

afloat in society than that we must forego either some labour or some enjoyment, in order to insure the proper cultivation and management either of our hands or our heads; for the fact is that our employments and our pastimes, if we attend rightly to them, are the very best means for the accomplishment of both; and if we were always in the habit of attending to what we do, and how we do it, very little more education, either of the body or of the mind, would be necessary. In some of what may be regarded as the most arduous and most extensively useful, and, therefore, the highest occupations of human life, actual practice is the school, and there is no other of very much consequence. The very best of our civil engineers, and the inventors or improvers of our most valuable machinery, have all learned the way to eminence in the practice of their callings, and by the very simple and obvious means of attending to that which was passing through their hands at the time. Our admirals and generals who rank the highest in fame and in merit, have one and all been bred in the fleet and the camp. Our physicians and lawyers attain eminence only by long and assiduous practice; and our senators—such of them as have been good for any thing beyond a mere oratorical display, which might or might not have bearing upon the point at issue — have all been trained by actual practice in the senate-house. If we were to examine the whole range of society, we should find the case to be every where the same,—attention to that which is practically done for a useful purpose, being always of far greater

value than any amount of mere scholar-craft that can be brought to the subject. Nor is it difficult to see how this must be the case. The man who has paid long and due attention to mere scholastic subjects, whether scientific or literary, with little or no reference to the practical uses of those subjects in society, is very apt to take up a very silly and a very mischievous prejudice, of which he finds it difficult to free himself, however much he may be inclined to do so. There is apt—not necessarily nor always—to be a false pride about these matters, founded upon the very ridiculous but not unfrequent blunders of confounding means with ends — much in the same way as some sects of religionists, who, in love of favourite sins, go about to make a re-change of faith compensate for a deficiency of good works, and by believing what is not true, console themselves with the notion that they have compensated for the doing of that which is not right. Believing more than the truth is certainly a sacrifice in its way; but it does not in justice belong to the catalogue of *acceptable* sacrifices. It is much the same with the not uncommon blunder on the subject of scholastic acquirements: the parties fancy that these will make up for practical incapacity,—in the which they are woefully mistaken.

The fact that every man is naturally bound to educate, prepare, and discipline both his body and his mind in such manner and to such extent as that they may be singly or jointly of the most efficient advantage both to himself and to society, is necessarily followed by another obligation, upon which, indeed,

the whole merit and value of that which has been noticed depends:—The most efficient body and mind of which we can have any notion, can be of no possible use *hereafter*—that is, in a time not yet come to pass — to that society of which the man may be a member, or to any society or for any purpose whatsoever. Therefore, the man who is to discharge aright that duty which every man owes to society, on account of the simple fact of being supported by its care in his infancy, must not only acquire the requisite preparation and abilities, bodily and mental, but must put them into execution in something active. What this may be depends upon the circumstances of the individual case, and these are, in all probability, circumstances over which the individual has no absolute control. But this can in no wise alter or affect the principle of the obligation.

This principle is plain, clear, and explicit; and it may be said to embody in it the essence of all the positive duties which Man in his individual capacity owes to society. Of course we do not, at this stage of the investigation, make the slightest reference to any of the institutions or enactments of society as to Man's obedience or breach of any one of them. They are conventional matters, and are to be judged of in themselves individually; and they have nothing to do with the general principle, which, in its own nature, is anterior to, and far above, all merely human institution or enactment. The entire duty may be summed up in these few words:—It is the duty of Man to prepare himself, both body and mind, for the most

efficient discharge of every work which may be required of him, either for his own well-being or for that of society; and when the performance of it is required of him, he is to do it with all the energy and all the ability of which he is capable.

There is one consideration which is essential to the right performance; and that is, that nothing which comes under the denomination of a duty,—and every thing that Man does or can do, if it is not a crime or wrong, comes under this denomination,— no duty ought to be viewed in the light of a task, otherwise it will not be performed in the manner that it ought. The proper feeling is a wish and a determination to exceed what is expected; because this secures for the party an honourable distinction among his fellows, which is in itself one of the surest means of virtue and happiness.

Before we proceed to the consideration of the negative duty, we may just glance back at the tenor of the commandment:—"Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."—"As *thyself*," not more, not less, are the express words; and, in consequence of this, the way in which a man "loves himself" is an important element in forming a right judgment on the manner in which he performs his relative duty to society, and of judging whether that is as it ought to be or not. It is quite evident, from the mere wording of the commandment, that there is no sacrifice of a man's own interest or happiness to the interest and happiness of society required of him; and it is pretty evident, from what we observe in human nature, that

if such were required it would not be given. It has been said, and we have every reason to believe that the saying is invariably true, "That he who professes to sacrifice his own interest for that of society, always means thereby to conceal his practice of sacrificing the welfare of society to his own interest;" and when circumstances happen to lay bare the characters of these good "canting men of general philanthropy," who pretend to make such sacrifices, it is generally found that, under the glare of this pretence, which, as they flatter themselves, shall blind the eyes of men, they are in reality "sacrificing to their own net, and burning incense to their own drag;" and that, in truth, they deserve to be numbered with the impostors. They belong to that worthless and deceiving class who pretend to be "righteous over-much," which, as every body knows, is precisely the same thing as being righteous "over-little." Those who keep any law, whether divine or human, "too much," are just as guilty of breaking it, and very nearly of the same breach, as they who keep it "too little."

There is this further beauty in the expression—"as thyself," that a man who does not do his duty to himself cannot do his duty to society. It is not the feeling of rank, or station, or wealth, or connexion, or of social distinction of any kind, which ought to be the foundation here—the basis of that love of himself which, according to the commandment, a man is bound to extend to his neighbour, and which he must of course possess in himself, and for himself, before he can so extend it. These distinctions, or any of

them, may be very useful as *points d'appui* for sustaining a man in the estimation of society, when matters are a little doubtful with him—a sort of "witnesses to character," which may have the effect of mitigating his punishment in the estimation of others, but they have no bearing upon the strict justice of the case; and a man who pleads his status in society, when he degrades himself as a man, or offends against that society, makes the very same kind of figure as a criminal who, after being convicted upon the clearest evidence, boasts of his witnesses to character. Either of them may have, and probably has, its influence with the public, for mankind are naturally fond of rank and distinction, and we are all prone to worship that to which we are partial. But when we look upon the even justice of either of these cases, we come to a very different conclusion; for the man who pleads either his rank or the respectability of those who have known him, really confesses, by the very fact of doing so, that he is a worse man than if his status in life had been lower, or his acquaintance less respectable,—he makes voluntary proclamation that he has fallen with more means of having stood than the majority of those who fall; and that, by necessary consequence, he is more weak or more wicked than they.

There is a feeling far higher, more pure, and we may say more personal, than any of those which must be the foundation of a man's self-love, if that self-love is to be of the kind which he can, as according to the commandment he should, extend to his neighbour. A man ought not to make a boast or a con-

tinual avowal of its origin, because that would again be calling "a witness to character," and he who pleads "saintship" in mitigation of any vice or folly, is in all cases a meaner and more despicable villain than the man who pleads some worldly consideration. But, notwithstanding this exclusion of boasting, which exclusion is again in obedience to a gospel precept, we are sure that no man's self-love can be wholesome to himself, far less have the social quality which is enjoined, unless it is based upon religion.

The feeling of the true dignity of human nature, as it arises from a right understanding of the nature and position of Man as God's creature, with reference to creation and redemption, and to this world and to eternity, is the proper and only foundation of genuine self-love; and if this foundation is once laid, a man will neither need nor allow himself to build upon any other.

It must, we presume, be admitted that self-love is the spring of all human actions. This, we are aware, has been denied, and repudiated as a most dangerous and unholy doctrine. But notwithstanding the vituperations, it is perfectly true, and admitted to be so both by revelation and by reason—which, by the way, are always in perfect harmony when they are understood. The fact is, that the contrary is a downright absurdity. Of what use is the world to a man after he is dead? What would be the value of the enjoyments of heaven or the fear of the torments of hell, if the grave were to be to us the bed of eternal oblivion? What reciprocity even of simple regard can there be between the world of reality and an ideal

such as may be sceptical, or may be schooled in error (for it is the practice with some parties to impugn the truth, in order to clear an arena for the display of their own little, paltry idol or joss), we would say only as follows, leaving the conclusion to their own candour, if they happen to have any:—"In every case of self-degradation, self-error, or self anything amiss you can name, is there not always a certain something in supplement to that self which God made,—a certain idol of the affections?—and is not the going forth of the emotions after this idol the real cause of the wrong, which wrong is thus as much a crime against self as against the laws of society, or any laws whatsoever?" If this question is fairly met, we know what the answer must be. If it is not fairly met, we need not put another: the party is in that case "joined to his idols;" and therefore, in as far as rational conviction of any kind is concerned, we may as well follow out the quotation, and "let him alone."

One who is duly actuated by this genuine self-love—this self-love which is founded upon the knowledge of our God and of ourselves, and which is enjoined as the standard of our love to our neighbour, that is, to society,—one who is duly actuated by this, requires no other rule of action in the moral part of the business of life, of whatever nature and extent that business may be. It is true that this will not, of itself, give us any direct knowledge of the things of the external world, of the principles of science, of the practice of the arts or of business, or of the structure of society

and the relative stations of its several members; but it will lead us on directly to all of them, and will keep us ever anxious and right in the pursuit of them.

If we have a proper feeling of the dignity of our characters as men, we shall never stand still either in seeking to know or in learning to do; and if this is rightly conducted, we shall advance in usefulness and respectability in the world, in proportion as we continue true to the fundamental principle of self-love. But our emotions are always in danger of getting before our understanding; and the enjoyments of the world, and the example of those about us, all act as so many means of temptation which entice us out of the right path,—and when we have once departed from that, return is not so easy a matter.

In no case is it possible, from the cause which we have stated, to escape some, indeed many, aberrations; but there may be some deviation without an actual destruction of the principle. The cause of the advantage of emotion over understanding may at once be understood, when we consider that the emotion is instantaneous—a feeling of our nature—whereas the understanding is always the result of a process of information and thought, which occupies some time even in those whose minds are in the best state of cultivation and discipline. Thus it is that no man is perfect in his moral character, his duty to himself or to society, his science, his art, or his anything else; but this is our provision against despair in the case of little wanderings, and it often saves the character when otherwise that would be ruined. It is, however,

the dangerous point; for the line between not despairing because of one error, and daring to commit another error, is so very fine, that we are too often unable to see it. This uncertainty ought to prevent us from being dogmatical in our opinion upon our own case, and very many of us how we give any opinions upon the cases of others.

There is one certain criterion: the man who is actuated by proper self-love always rises in character, whatever may be the circumstances under which he is placed. By character we do not mean, of course, reputation, as that floats upon the common breath of society. The best characters have seldom the best reputations in this way; and there are very many men who pass through the world with excellent characters, and yet who never have any reputation at all, good or bad. It falls much more in with certain weaknesses of human nature to propagate evil reports than good ones, and no description of persons are more inveterately given to this than they who are denominated the "saints." No doubt they mourn over these matters, and expatiate on the wickedness of human nature, and the want of the "healing balm" of saintcraft; but one who is accustomed to look a little deeper than the surface, fails not to perceive that the sighs which escape, or rather which are fetched out, from them, are no sighs of sorrow. They are loved in secret, as demonstrations of the dogmas which they have set up as the idols of their worship, instead of that truth which admits of no idol. It is often curious to mark the different ways in which those parties

are affected by the merely nominal distinction—for it is purely nominal—of "saint" and "no saint." If the latter errs ever so venially, out comes a violent tirade against the corruption of human nature; but if, —which is rather common among such parties,—some fervid minister of holy love should err in the flesh, then human nature is spared, and the whole mishap is charged upon the devil, as if *he* could have any personal concern or interest in the breach of the particular statute which had been fractured by "the pious inbearing of the holy man."

In every station, and in all the modifications of life, the man who has the proper feeling of self-love, as man, may be known; and you can readily distinguish him from the meaner mortal who has huckstered away his proper self-esteem for the gratification of some passion, and thus has no love to spare for his neighbour—no right feeling to society; but who regards it as a poacher regards a preserve,—as the source of dishonest gain, when darkness shall cover his predatory inroad upon it. It is in the rubs and reverses of the world, however, which do come—though not, perhaps, in equal measure—upon the better and the worse, that you have full demonstration of the reality and value of his character; and, when you find a man rise the higher in moral greatness, the more angrily that this world's waves beat against him, you may be sure that that man is right in the foundation of his love of himself; that he will, to the utmost of his ability, extend it to his neighbour; and that he will let slip no opportunity of improving himself in all that can add dig-

nity, usefulness, and the capacity of rational enjoyment to human nature. Such is a popular outline of that which forms the essence of all the active duties of Man to Society; and we cannot consider it upon the details of any one case, without breaking down its unity, and impairing its general effect.

In the second place, we have to consider the negative duties which Man owes to Society; and the general statement embodying the principle of these may be made in very few words:—"No man ought to stand unjustly in the way of another, so as to impede his progress, or injure his prosperity and happiness, in society." This is the general proposition; and if this could be acted up to, there is no necessity of laying down any further law upon the subject. There is, however, an indefinite condition in this general statement, which requires explanation, and that is, the qualification given to the whole by the word "unjustly." Could we settle the general meaning of this term, the question of morality and love of mankind would be brought within very narrow limits; but the settling of this is a matter of extreme difficulty; for though every man is perfectly satisfied with his own justice—that is, with his own opinion of justice, in every case which interests him, yet, when we come to make a general examination, we find that there are not unfrequently as many modes of the justice of the case as there are parties interested in it; and when we make the individual the subject of our examination, we find that he very often has a different view of justice in every different case; or, if the discrepancies are not

so great as to make the one run counter to the other, they are always conspicuous enough for destroying the identity, and preventing us from saying that any man has a constant and invariable perception of practical justice in all cases that can come before him. We are not now inquiring into what may give the bias, or whether this bias may be right or wrong in any particular case: we are only stating the general principle, for each particular case must be settled upon its own merits.

Thus there is no absolute general rule, according to which we are enabled to say, in every case that may arise, whether one man does or does not "stand *unjustly* in the way of another." There are a thousand things that may stand in the way of a man's happiness or prosperity, as fatally for him as the unjust opposition of man could do; and yet no man may be guilty of the slightest injustice. Thus, our most gracious sovereign, and, for aught that we know, or indeed care, about the matter, probably nine hundred and ninety-nine of every thousand of the human race, and a large majority of the odd ones, stand between us and our being seated on the throne of these kingdoms; and yet so far are we from feeling that we are unjustly done by in this, that we have not one wish about the matter; nor—barring the lip-loyalty of the day, which is said or sung without much, or any, regard to meaning—do we care one straw by whom that high seat is filled, provided that the duties are properly done, and that nobody is injured by the succession. Again, there are very many beautiful residences

and fine estates in the county where we at present reside, and the present proprietors stand directly in the way of our having all of these, or any one of them that we might fancy the most; but when, on a fine summer's day, we take a saunter in any of those beautiful demesnes, though we perhaps are as much pleased with it as the proprietor himself, we never feel that the slightest injustice has been done to us in the place not being our property; and, so far from feeling any envy at these men, in consequence of they and others coming between us and the possession of these estates, we can wish them health, and enjoyment of them, with the very same equanimity of feeling as though we were the owner, and they poor wayfaring men getting a crust of bread and a horn of small beer at our lordly gate. To come a little more towards home: there are many men of high name and merit, in science and literature—no, not *very* many in literature—and if these were out of the way, we might have a chance of some name and renown in some branch of science; but, so far from feeling any injustice in this matter, we really and heartily wish that the stars in the scientific sky were both multiplied and magnified; and we do this upon the plain principle of society,—that we should have our share of this advantage in the full measure of our capacity of receiving it. Our maxim has long been—"Deserve what you can, and be pleased with what you get;" and we find that, if it leads to no wealth or fame, there is happiness in it, which, after all, is the grand matter.

We need not say that we make these personal allu-

sions with no ostentatious intention, for we know not the power of the moral microscope that could find even a *monadic* root of ostentation in them; but they go at least so far in illustration of the word "unjustly," as it occurs in the general enunciation of our negative duty to society. In themselves, there is no injustice in any of the distinctions of men in society, in rank, in possession, in mental acquirements, or in anything else; and the more numerous and more marked that they are, it is, abstractedly speaking, all the better for society, even to the very humblest of its members. There is more excitement,—a wider field for every man; and, "if no man stands unjustly in the way of another," there is more hope, nay, more certainty, of success. The witless and the wicked may talk as loudly as they please about the justice and the advantages of civil equality among men; but how grateful soever those matters may be to those who wish to possess that which they do not deserve, it is as contrary to the principles of moral justice as it is absurd and impossible in its very nature. The only "level" for mankind is the very bottom of society: in proportion as the whole are sunk nearer to that, they are more nearly upon an equality; and, as some will, in every state of society, remain at the bottom, let others rise ever so high, the very lowest will always appear more miserable in proportion as the average of society is more elevated and improved. A bricklayer's labourer in England forms a striking contrast with any of the leading nobility, who conducts himself in a manner becoming his rank; but, take it all in all, the

condition of the hodman is far more comfortable than was that of the favourite vassal of a quondam Highland chief.

But, while the social distinction which any individual member of society, from the highest to the lowest, may possess, is perfectly secure to him, both in justice and in equity, against the inroad of every other individual, every difference in rank, possession, or anything else, involves in it a difference of duty to society. "Where much is given, much is required," is the maxim here; and it is one from which there is no deviation. The distinction may come by descent, or it may come by personal exertion of some kind or other; but no matter how it comes, for the real fact is, that it comes in consequence of the parties, or, which amounts to the same thing, their ancestors or connexions, being members of society. If a man can do no better than carry a hod, then his duty to society consists in his being diligent in the use of his hod, economical in the spending of his wages, and careful in avoiding squabbles and the alehouse; and it will be seen that this is also his duty to himself, for it is by such conduct that hodmen become bricklayers, then builders, and so rise to independence.

Take a case in the opposite extreme of society,—in a proprietor of extensive estates in land. We are inclined to place this character at the head of society, because he is the master, or, if you will, the steward, over a number of those who are engaged in the most essential of all occupations,—the production of human food, without which all the manufactories and mer-

cantile establishments in the world would be of little or no value. Therefore, if there is any one station of importance and honour within the scope of society, in which it is the duty of the holder to be among his people, and encouraging them, it is the station of a landowner: yet, though this seems a self-evident proposition, strange to say, there is no class of men that, taken generally, are so negligent of their duty both to themselves and to society. The reason seems to be, that, of all active stations—and he who is master, in any way, over active men, should, in duty, be the most active of the whole—of all active men, the proprietors of land are the only ones that can obtain a handsome revenue without taking any share in the superintendence of what is going on. The consequence is, that many of them know no more about how an estate should be managed, than they know about the Chinese alphabet or the dictates of common sense. The care of the estate is left to hirelings, while he who ought to care for it, and be on it and acquainted with it for that purpose, lives at a distance, and wastes his time in dissipation or frivolity, and often in penury and want, while these hirelings, in whom he has placed his confidence, are wasting his estate, or conspiring with others as to how they may most easily and speedily deprive him of it altogether.

The mischief that is done in this way is absolutely incredible to those who have not entered into the most careful and minute examination of the subject. One can have some little notion of it by comparing two proximate estates, the one under factorship, and the

other under a resident proprietor, who knows his duty, and is active and regular in the performance of it. It is not only in hedgerows, and gates, and cottages, and matters of that kind, that the difference is apparent; for, to look at them, one would think that the animals and plants actually know when the master is resident, and put on their best appearance to do him honour. The former are so sleek and lively, and the latter so much more healthy and vigorous, that one who has very little skill in such matters may easily tell the difference.

The non-residence of a proprietor is always a loss to the locality in which his estate is situated, both in an economical and a moral point of view; but, when we consider the number of estates within the British islands, from which the proprietors are permanently or partially absent, and also the number where the resident proprietor cares nothing about his proper duties, the question assumes a very important shape in a national point of view. The people often complain of the laws which prevent the free importation of corn from other countries; and though those laws are probably of no use to the proprietors of land, and their repeal would not perhaps ultimately be of much use to any class of the people, yet they ought certainly to be repealed for the sake of peace, and their own absurdity.

But when we consider the extent to which the neglect of lands by their proprietors operates in "preventing the *growth* of British corn," we find a subject of vastly more serious import than the other.

It would be difficult to make an estimate; but, from a tolerable extensive and careful examination in different parts of the country, we are certain that ten per cent., and very much inclined to believe that twenty per cent., of the entire value of the crops is lost by the negligence of the proprietors; and this would make more addition to the quantity in the market than if all that is *now* disposable in foreign countries were to be imported gratis. Legislation has much less influence upon the price of corn to the consumer than either the friends or the enemies of the present system of corn-laws seem to be aware of; and, when it does operate at all, it probably operates chiefly upon the quantity produced, and most frequently in diminishing the amount of that quantity.

The history of the English corn-laws—that is, the various enactments which have from time to time been made, with a view of regulating the price of corn, or of promoting the interests of those who grow it, or those who consume it—is a curious subject, if (as we have not) we had room to give an outline of it. In the early times, the general policy was to prevent the exportation of corn, and thereby keep down the price, without any consideration of the effect that this might have on the quantity produced, or on the real comfort of the consumer. This state of things was attended with very marked seasonal consequences: immediately after harvest, the necessities of the farmers compelled them to sell much below the average of the year, and the consequence was waste and prodigality

on the part of the consumer; but the wheel came round before the next harvest, and there was yearly a dearth, and not unfrequently a famine. The act of 1436, which allowed exportation when the price did not exceed a certain amount in the home market, had some beneficial effects: it increased the quantity grown, and it checked the extravagance occasioned by the excessively low prices just after harvest. It is true that these were not the intended effects, but they were the real ones. Twenty-seven years after this, a prohibition of importing foreign corn, until the price in the home market had reached that at which exportation was allowed, was enacted; and agriculture languished under the operation of this double law. In the reign of Charles II., a more free exportation was allowed, and the duty on importation reduced; and in the reign of William and Mary, a bounty was granted on corn exported. But, notwithstanding both bounty and prohibition, the quantity of exported corn diminished; and there were complaints of the low and suffering condition of the agricultural interest. The grand improvement in manufactures, at that time, gave an impulse to the industry of the people; and the demand for corn in the home market greatly increased. This led to a more favourable rate of import, and a cessation of the bounty on wheat, when the price exceeded a certain sum; but there was a flaw in the statute, as the importation was not allowed till the price had risen four shillings a quarter, on wheat, above that at which the bounty ceased. After this, which happened in 1773, the alterations of the corn-laws have been wholly con-

fined to regulating the prohibitory statutes against importation. In comparing the fluctuations of the prices of corn with those fluctuations of the law, one can trace no such coincidence between them as to establish any very necessary or obvious connexion between the one and the other.

These corn-laws are matters of mere conventional arrangement, dependent on no fixed principle; and, from the history, apparently ineffectual for the purpose they were intended to answer; and therefore, as we said before, they ought to be expunged from the statute-book, on the ground of their absurdity alone.

We have gone into this apparent digression, not from any desire to discuss the question of the corn-laws, but because it bears very directly upon the case of the proprietors of estates, which case we have selected for the illustration of our argument. That neither the proprietors, nor those who farm the lands under them, feel much benefit from the corn-laws, we can see by observation; and it can be deduced from the clearest principles, that the grand source of suffering to both is the neglect, by the proprietors, of their estates. Indeed, while they continue in that state of ignorance and neglect which is now so common, all the legislative enactments in the world will not be of much use to them; but, in so far as practical effect is concerned, they will sound much the same in the ear of reason as a statute which should run in this wise:—"And be it enacted, by and with the advice as aforesaid, that, from and after the pass-

ing of this act no person falling into the water shall be drowned, and no person walking into the fire shall be burned."

The case may be reduced to two very short and simple positions:—First, the proprietor of an estate in land has a very important duty to society, which duty he is bound to perform, otherwise he is unfaithful to his trust, and ungrateful for that honourable station in which he is placed by being in an improved and civilized country. Secondly, no man can perform this high and honourable duty, as it ought to be performed, but the proprietor himself.

First, as to the duty. The public value of an estate, in a social or national point of view, is the production of a certain quantity of human food, the most indispensable of all articles that can be produced in any country; and, therefore, society generally have a deeper interest in its effective production than they have in that of any luxury, or even any other necessary of life. Not only this; for any one who reflects on the subject but for a moment, must arrive at the conviction that, of all the occupations in which Man can be employed, the management of the cultivation of the ground, in such a manner as that the same breadth of surface shall yield the best and most abundant crop, and continue to do the same, year after year, without any deterioration of the soil, is the one which requires the greatest knowledge and experience. Though many are, in the plenitude of their own ignorance, in the habit of bestowing what they consider as being clownish epithets upon the cultivators of the

soil, and the rearers of domesticated animals, yet no one manufacturer, no ten manufacturers taken together, require the constant application of so many practical sciences, and all of them involving elements of the most indeterminate kind. So much is this the case, that when a man has made a fortune, as it is called, by some trade or manufacture in a town, and retires to the country, the economy of which he is unacquainted with, to spend the evening of life in the practice of farming, after he has laid out part of his fortune in the purchase of stock and implements, he is obliged to lay out a good deal more in the purchase of experience.

The fact is, that any one of the many subjects that have to occupy the attention of the man who shall farm in the very best manner, would be study enough for most men. The nature of soils, and the adapting of manures to them in such a way as that there shall be no want or waste, is a study; the mode of preparing the soil in the best manner, and the least labour and expense, is a study; the seasons and the weather, and their secular variations, are a study; the choice of plants and their varieties for seed is a study; and, in a word, everything that requires to be done is a study. It is also a local study; for the treatment which suits best in one place may fail in another, which is not at any very great distance. These varieties may happen on the very same farm, and even in the same field. Thus, in many parts of England, one part of the same farm may be chalk, a second loam, a third strong clay, and a fourth sand or loose gravel;

and all of them are suited for different crops, and require different treatment.

It may be said that all these matters may be left to the practical farmer, and we are willing to admit that much must and ought to be left to him; but still there is a something which nobody can do properly but the landlord, and he ought to understand it and do it. The farmer holds for the term of his lease only, and he holds for the private purpose of making as much over and above his rent as he possibly can; but the landlord has a more permanent holding, in which the whole of society has an interest. Like all others, he should have his reward, and honour along with it, if he so deserves; but he must deserve both, otherwise he has no moral right to either, whatever the conventional laws of the country may give him. His holding is hereditary, and so his progeny have a provision; but they have this provision as their reward for the care of that which ought to be secured to the country,—an increase in the productiveness of the soil, which shall bear something like a fair ratio to the increase of the manufactures and the numbers of the people. The farmers will not do this of their own accord, and you have no right to compel them, or even to expect it of them. It wants the knowledge and the attention of the proprietor himself, whose interest and whose duty it is; and while he is doing this, his presence, if he is, as he ought to be, a man worthy of his situation, would in itself be half the battle in this and in many other matters.

No factor, steward, or other party holding deputed

authority, can or will do this, however able and honest he may be in his own capacity and place. He cannot, because, though the proprietor may delegate to him his own legal authority, his moral influence, which is the valuable part of the matter, is not transferable; and he will not, because, however honest he may be in his desire to serve his master, that master is not himself; and, whatever may be said to the contrary, it accords strictly with the law of nature, and is not at variance with the law of God, that a man shall serve himself in the first instance. We mean to bring no accusation against those who take the management of many fine estates which the owners neglect: we are, on the contrary, ready to admit that they are most upright and conscientious men; but we take their case on the ground of their very honesty and conscientiousness. A conscientious and honest man must, in the first instance, be honest and conscientious to himself and his family; and, unless he is so, he is not to be trusted in the case of another. A man that denies this does not speak the truth, as we *know* it to exist in nature; and he who speaks not the truth cannot be trustworthy.

Wherefore, society—that is, the society and all the human beings in, and belonging to, the country, including the neglectful proprietor of land, as well as the rest, have their first, and by far their most important interest, compromised in his neglect; and he is equally an offender against the interests of himself and his family as he is against those of his country. The plea that "he has a right to do what he will with

his own," will not justify the richest proprietor in the country, in the case of wrong done, any more than it will justify a man who has no estate but a pair of hands, in the wrongfulness of those hands. The man who has only the hands may not use them in taking or injuring the property of any other man, or even in the taking away his own life, though he may do all the good with them that he can, both to himself and to others. The extent of the possession cannot alter the nature of the law of that possession, though it may heighten the good or deepen the evil; and, therefore, though the possessor of a large estate may do all the good with it that he can, he may not use it as the means of evil to society, to any one member of society, to himself or to the estate, even though he held the whole empire in fee-simple, and strictly entailed on him and his heirs.

Wherefore, again, the proprietor of an estate has a duty to perform to society, great in proportion to the extent and value of that estate; and if he neglects to perform this duty to the full extent of his ability, or to qualify himself for the right performance of it, he is guilty at the bar of society, and unworthy of the place in it which has come to him by ancestry or by accident. There are too many of the proprietors of estates in all parts of the country who are in this predicament; and it is well for some of them that Common Sense has no constant seat on the bench; for assuredly, if she found them guilty of flirting at operas or brawling at gambling-houses in foreign parts, or even yawning over the newspapers in club-houses, or

losing their money at domestic hells, when they ought to be attending to their estates and setting an inspiring example to all around them, she would convict them to the treadmill with the same *nonchalance* as she would send those ragged wanderers about the streets who have no good account to give of themselves.

We have chosen this case, and we have dwelt upon it at some length, not because we have the slightest animosity to the proprietors of the land, but because that, if they would *all* do their duty as *some*,—as many, we hope, do it, the country would be in a very different state from that in which it is at present. We have also stated these as the most permanent as well as the most important of all the influential classes. Manufactures and trades seem old and got out of fashion; but bread and fat beeves have been from the beginning of civilization, and—at least we hope so, as we are aware of no adequate substitutes for them—they will continue to the end. These faults may be considered not as a positive aggression upon society, but as injustice; they stand in the way of others, who would do in a proper manner that which they neglect.

As we have taken pretty nearly the extremes of society in the examples of the hodman and the proprietor of large estates, they may be held as including between them all the intermediate ranks and classes; therefore we shall not need to enter into the details of every one of them. So we may leave this

branch of the subject with only this general remark, — that every man in society, and whatever be his rank or place in that society, or the means by which he obtained it, is bound to society to the full amount of the very best improvement and use to which he can turn himself and every thing in his power. No doubt the good of all is to himself in the first instance; but the individual and society are so intimately connected, that the man who does the best for himself must also, at the same time and by the same means, do the best for society; while he who really neglects what is his own interest, either in what he does or what he fails to do, is guilty of the same relative injury to society.

The only remaining point upon this branch of our subject is the duty which Society owes to Man as an individual member of that society; and the consideration of this will not detain us very long. Society, being merely the name for an indefinite number of human beings who live in terms of certain conventional understanding with each other, cannot be said to have any duty to perform, or to be under any specific obligation to any one of the members, of whose aggregate it is the mere name. The members, in their individual capacities, must perform all the duties; and all that can devolve upon the society as such, is the keeping of individuals right in the performance of what they do — according to those conventional arrangements into which the members of the society may have entered, — and the right

in which does not involve any abstract principle, but merely that which the society have agreed to hold as such.

These, though they all tend, or should tend, to the same purpose—the keeping of good order in society, and rendering it so agreeable to each individual as that he shall find his chief pleasure in doing his duty to himself and to others in the best manner that it can be done—are yet properly and indeed necessarily divisible into two distinct sections, which are always different from each other in their administration, and generally also in their origin. The first section consists of laws and legislative enactments, which are, or which ought to be, equally binding upon all the members of the society, without any regard to distinctions of rank or class. At least this is the general principle, whether it be always acted upon or not. This section includes all of what are called the *Public Institutions* of Society; and they may be general or local, according to circumstances,—the principle being that the local ones should be supplemental only to the general, and never in any way contradictory of them. We shall devote a future chapter to a few hints upon these institutions; but to give any thing like even an outline of them would far exceed the limits of one entire volume,—the books upon the institutions of Britain alone being so numerous that they would load a ship; and no man could read the whole of them, even if he were to live a hundred years and do nothing else. There is one principle, however, which ought to be borne in mind, and that is, that no merely con-

ventional institution can directly promote the intelligence or the productive industry of mankind; and that, therefore, care should be taken that they do not hurt or hinder on the one hand that which they are incapable of promoting on the other. They may, however, have a sort of indirect influence, by coercing those by whom the progress of society in this way might otherwise be hindered.

The other section of those restraints which society exerts upon its members, is perhaps,—at least in highly enlightened and improved states of society—even more influential than the other, though it originates in no positive authority, and has no power of enforcing named punishments on those who offend against it. This is what is called *Public Opinion;* and like that public, of which it purports to be an emanation, it fluctuates from day to day. In itself, it is a most shadowy and foundationless matter, — so much so that it does not admit of either analysis or definition. It depends upon what is called "the spirit" of the age, the time, or the place; and it is truly said of "the spirit" in all matters, "one cannot tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth." No individual or set of individuals that we can name, can be said to originate the public opinion of the time; and it is just as difficult to assign the numerous and rapid fluctuations of it to any definable or understandable cause. In the case of individuals, and even of sections or parties of men, it is very often wrong,—injurious, and even cruel to the individual, and unjust to the party; but, notwithstanding these imperfec-

tions or abuses, which really appear to be inseparable from its very nature, and which are the more numerous in proportion as it has more vigour, it is highly useful to society, and bears not only upon individuals but upon institutions.

CHAPTER III.

SOCIAL ADAPTATIONS OF MAN.

THAT Man is made for society,—that it is in society only where he can have rational enjoyment, or have his faculties so educated as to make him capable of such enjoyment,—are self-evident truths, neither requiring nor admitting of demonstration. We allow all the influence and all the solitary pleasure that Man can have in the feeling that he is alive, in the gratifications of his bodily senses and appetites, in the exercise of such mental speculations as one can suppose a solitary man to have, and in the feeling of the relation in which Man stands to his God. But after making all these allowances, we bid any one consider what the condition of a solitary man would be, and he will speedily find that it is impossible to bring the mind down to even fancy the idea of such a state of utter privation and wretchedness.

Not only this, for we cannot form an idea of a perfect solitary—of one who has never in all the days of his life seen or heard of one single individual of the race but himself. Even the allowances which we have made will not hold; for though we can con-

ceive that Man might eat and drink like the other animals without the society of his fellows, we have no conception whatever of the exercise of any one mental faculty in such a state; nor have we the slightest ground of belief that a man solitary from the moment of his birth could have or acquire any knowledge whatever of his Creator, mind, immortality, or any thing save the few objects apparent to his senses; and of these he would know nothing more than the simple fact of their being so apparent.

All, however, that we can by possibility say of Man as a solitary being is purely hypothetical, as we have not a single fact connected with Man as a solitary being to which we can refer. The whole character of Man is modelled by society; and few thoughts occupy his mind in which there is not some social reference. Strange as it may seem, it is, nevertheless, true, that the very breaches of the laws of society have not unfrequently what may be called a social origin,—as the offence is usually perpetrated with the intention and in the hope that the result will enable the party to stand better in the estimation of what he looks upon as society than he formerly did. And crimes of the most atrocious nature are sometimes perpetrated, not for the gratification of any personal revenge or other passion, but for the purpose of gaining a name in the estimation of the gang or section of persons with whom the perpetrator has associated himself.

This social feeling, which has so much influence upon the character and conduct of Man, is complex, and admits of being resolved into several more simple

emotions, of which we shall have to take some notice by and by. But, taken as a general feeling, it is worthy of bearing in mind that it differs essentially from the social instinct of gregarious animals; and that the difference is enough to show that, in Man, this feeling is, to some degree, a result of experience. There are certain circumstances under which the males of gregarious animals fight severe battles with each other; but then there are always physical causes by means of which these physical hostilities can be explained. Among men, on the other hand, hostility to each other appears to be the natural state, and society to be always the result of some conventional understanding or arrangement, how rude soever that may be. Were not this the case, war would not be the first trade of mankind, and the making of arms their first manufacture. Pugnacity is never the object which brings the instinctive animals into herds, although, as we have said, there are physiological causes why some of them give battle to each other at certain times. In the case of human hostilities there are no such physiological causes; and yet the hostility of man to man in the savage state is as general as those observations of it that have been made—no horde has been found without weapons of some description or other, even when destitute of both clothing and habitations.

The condition of females in these very rude states of society, shows us also that there is no instinctive principle upon which conjugal affection, which is one of the main pillars of social morality, can be founded.

The women are cruelly treated at all times; and society must make considerable advances before they are delivered from this bondage of the savage state. There may be other stages of society at which the pendulum may sway as far to the other side of the perpendicular; and females may be enabled to make reprisals upon civilized man for the wrongs inflicted by savages; but this does not invalidate the general argument that Man is not a social animal by instinct, but that the associating of man with man, from the meanest horde to the most populous and highly civilized nation, is a mental matter,—a matter founded upon the judgment of experience, and, at its first institution, conventional, and intended to answer a purpose, though what purpose we cannot positively say. The probability is that mutual protection and assistance are the first bonds of those rude societies; and that the same, varied only according to the circumstancee in which the parties are placed, continue the principal bonds of society in all its stages.

As the social feeling is not an instinct, but a matter acquired by experience, it is highly probable that no two individuals of the race have either the same notion of what society is, or of the relations in which they stand to it. As the social feeling is a result of experience, that which a man feels to be real and actually existing society, must be what is personally known to him, and no other than this. A man, for instance, is an Englishman, or a Frenchman; but all England or all France are not in this case his real society, as he cannot possibly obtain an experimental

knowledge of them. How many or how few of them he may know depends, of course, upon the particular ones; but in a great nation the portion must always be a very small one; and yet it is chiefly upon this small portion that a man's opinion of society and of the relation in which he stands to it depends.

It is true that, in addition to this society of fact and truth, there are other societies of fancy and idolatry, by which men are variously influenced; and which, as is the case with idolatries of all kinds, are very apt to put us wrong, but not to put us right again. Thus, for instance, every man has a tolerably clear notion of that little society of which he is more immediately a member, and all the persons composing which are known to him; but his knowledge of the society of the whole of a great city or of a large country becomes vague in proportion as that is extensive, and he is very apt to come to wrong conclusions as to its real truths, and the relations in which he stands to it. This is the main reason why disputes upon subjects of this kind are so difficult to settle; and why, when upon a scale of any considerable extent, they are for the most part settled by conquest, and not by conviction. This is true, not only of international disputes, but of disputes between parties within the same nation, even when both are equally loud, and perhaps equally sincere in their professions of regard for that country where peace is disturbed and where prosperity is retarded by their animosities.

There is no apparent possibility of avoiding this. Men cannot divest themselves of the habits and notions

of their own real or personal society; and as little can they understand those of other men whose personal society is different. Thus, when they come to matters in which they have a common interest, but respecting which none of them are so well informed as they are respecting the character and conduct of their own little societies, they come with that which, although not actual prejudice upon the subject at issue—the general welfare of the country we shall, for instance, suppose —yet come with that which is far more inveterate than any prejudice could be, inasmuch as it is that which they have been in the constant habit of honestly and conscientiously believing, and this is that, and that alone, for which a good man will contend to battle, and even to martyrdom if that shall be necessary.

Thus, the fact of the social feeling in Man, not being inherent and of the nature of an instinct, but acquired by experience, and as such varying with the circumstances of each individual, renders the question of Man's adaptation to society so perfectly indefinite, that it cannot be solved in any way so as to become the basis of subsequent reasoning. Hence, we have no alternative but to examine the principal social emotions in detail, and hint at the good or evil of which they may be productive to the individual or to society, according to the manner and the motives of their operation. Even were it possible to do this in the most full and satisfactory manner, we should still be without any means of a general solution, because the elements are of such a nature as that we cannot

generalize them. But though this is an insuperable barrier to our forming any thing like a general theory of Man in his Social Relations, yet it must not be supposed that it indicates any constitutional imperfection in Man, or any impropriety of adaptation to the social state. The very reverse is the natural conclusion; for in all parts of the study of Man, the portions at which our understanding, and consequently our philosophy, breaks down, are always those at which the subject becomes too exquisite for us. The connexion between the organic change and the mental perception, in the case of sensation, is one instance of this, and the connexion between the emotion of the mind and the organic change which follows that emotion, in the case of corporeal action, are instances of this. We know that these exist, and we cannot reflect upon either of them for a moment, without perceiving how exquisitely beautiful it is; and how far these adaptations, which are brought about without any apparent means of an organic nature, exceed those in which such contrivances are apparent, is an especial wonder; and, only that it affords no foundation upon which a structure of learning can be built, it would be by far the fairest basis for a proper system of Natural Theology.

So, in the case of the adaptation of Man to Society, we can trace, and tracing cannot but admire, the results of the adaptation. We can see what Man has done in science and in art, and we can, from the past, form, as we do in all cases of experience, pretty rational conjectures regarding the future. We are

also compelled to admit that all these beneficial results have been produced by Man in Society; that they could not have been produced without society, and a long continuation of society; and that therefore each and all of them are to be attributed to the social adaptations of Man, and to these only; nor, though we feel that we are wholly unable to say in what the adaptation consists, are we thence in any doubt of the reality of its existence, or is our admiration of these results in any degree lessened.

In as far, indeed, as we can trace the adaptation of the individual backward from its results, we see that, in order to be productive of the best consequences upon the whole, it must lead to those very inconveniences of which we have taken some notice. Man has to learn from example, which is nothing more than a secondary kind of experience—a transference of the experience of others to himself. He does this, of course, the more readily, the more nearly that which he imitates approaches to sensation and action in himself,—that is, the knowledge which he most readily and most rapidly acquires, and which remains most permanently with him, is that which he has actually seen done by others. Next to this, of course, is what he hears; and perhaps in the formation of his general character as a member of society, this has even more influence than the other. Our own actions, and all that we see others do, would form but a very scanty stock of knowledge, were it not for what we hear—including, also, of course, what we read, which is only a contrivance to serve the purpose of hearing,

and which possesses considerable advantages over hearing, in some respects, though it falls short of it in positive effect at the time. The book can be heard at all times and in all places, but still the book is not the same kind of society as one who addresses himself personally to us.

It is thus that, in the early stages of our existence especially, we acquire in great part the character, and even the modes of thinking, of those with whom we associate, as well as their language, down even to its minutest peculiarities. We even acquire their gait and bearing, their mode of going about what they do; and if the class to which we belong is an exclusive one, and we live permanently in it for a considerable time, we, unknown to ourselves, become a sort of personification of it. This, of course, extends not merely to action, to speech, and to the air and bearing of the body, but to the whole train of the intellectual character. We adopt the beliefs and the disbeliefs of our small society, very generally, without the slightest inquiry into the truth of their foundations; and, in like manner we take up all their opinions of right and wrong, good and bad, and all matters whatsoever which have not been in some way or other altered by our own practical experience; and even then, the dictum of our society will often maintain an obstinate battle with the palpable result of a contradictory experience.

This holds equally true, whatever it may be that places us among the members of any particular society. It may be mere locality, it may be rank, it may be

occupation, or it may be even a certain fashion of talking, or of any thing else; and whatever it is, it gives us a prejudice in favour of our new society, and all that is thought, said, and done there; and, at the same time, an equally strong prejudice to what runs counter to that which we have been inured to. This makes hundreds of societies existing in the same country at the same time, all of which have conflicting notions upon some points; and when they do come to misunderstandings upon these, their misunderstandings are not easily adjusted.

Still, it must not be considered that this localising of society—this breaking down of the great mass of the population of a country into small sections, is wholly, or even in the greater part, an evil. Attachments are the holds that Society has upon individual Man, and that individual Man has upon virtue. These, to be of such strength as to be useful, must be personal and local; for a general attachment is at best a very doubtful matter, always lax, and very generally a mere pretence. We all know the character of him who claims no attachment to place, and can call no man friend or brother. He has no kindness for any part of society; the best feelings of his nature have no escape; and he is driven to the meanest vices as a resource against that feeling of the desolation of loneliness, which would otherwise be unbearable. The spot that we love, be it the place of our birth or boyhood, or the scene of any thing else that endears it to us, may be the most humble or the most homely upon the face of the earth; and these recollections,

to which we can always revert with a renewal of pleasure, when the ways of the world become rugged to us, may be ever so trifling,—they can in no instance be vicious, for vice never returns in suggestion without a sting; but they give us a firmness and repose of character, which we could not entertain, even under the most exalted thoughts, if we had no attachment upon which the mind could rest. A "man of the world," as he is called, that is, a cosmopolite, who has no attachment, but who stands equally free to do and to enjoy as he lists, has no enjoyment but of the world, and when he is by any means cut off from its activity, he has no alternative but being utterly wretched. He may be free from prejudices which attached men have, and he may be able to act, and to act for his own personal advantage, in the world, in cases where their prejudices would pull them back, but still he is without that which is the real sweetener of life.

We find this very strikingly exemplified in the case of every man who "breaks away" from his caste in society. By breaking away we do not, of course, mean the change of station upward in society, by the usual means of rising in the world, or downward by the usual means of decline; for the one of these may be highly honourable to a man, and the other may be neither disgrace or suffering. The man who "breaks away," does it without any apparent cause, and he generally does it to a very great distance,—at least to as great a distance as the rank or class from which he breaks will allow him; and how far soever he may

move in this way, he never alights and settles in any other fixed class. If the party who thus breaks away happens to belong to the humble states of society, his fall is of course among the utterly destitute, or he falls again into dishonesty, and pays forfeit to the outraged laws of that general society which he has first deserted and then injured. If the breaking away is from any of the intermediate classes, the friends of the party may break his fall, and prevent him from sinking so low in mere maintenance of his body as the man who is friendless. But still, he gains no new caste; he is a burden to friends, a still greater burden to himself, and an excrescence upon society. If the breaking away is from the highest class of society, the fall is generally into the very depths of society—in as far as immorality is concerned; and when a young man of fortune conducts himself thus, he almost as a matter of course outrages even the vices of the vulgar wicked. If his property is so secured as that he cannot squander it, he generally runs his career as long as he can obtain credit by any means. When he can do that no longer, of course his companions abandon him, and he is sent "to grass," until his matters are retrieved. From this state he generally returns a very altered character, though we cannot positively call him an improved one. There are not, we believe, many instances of characters which had broken away from their caste in this manner, returning to it again as good and orderly men, according to the proper meaning of the words; but there have been not a few who have,

during the time of their retirement, shifted round from the phase of spendthrifts to that of misers; and have, before they quitted the world, made considerable additions to their estates, which they had at one time used every effort to squander;—but vices in opposite sides of the right are so nearly allied to each other, that he who shifts from the one phase to the opposite can hardly be said to change his real character.

It would answer no good purpose to cite every particular instance of these breakings away from the caste or particular class of society to which a man ought to belong. They are so numerous that they will readily occur to the reader; and the details of them are by no means pleasant to dwell upon. Still, the mere notice of them is important, as showing the necessity of those attachments to class which the majority of men form, and which, though apt to put them a little wrong when they are forced into discussions involving the interests of other and opposite classes, are yet, upon the whole, highly useful, and necessary for their own guidance. Of course there may be error in this way as well as in the opposite, but it is error less closely connected with guilt. Not only this, but it is more than probable that a man's strong attachment to his class in society is in itself both the means and the proof of an elevation of character, greater in proportion as the class to which he belongs is higher and more honourable in society. That every man looks upon that to which he has a strong attachment as being honourable, amounts so

very nearly to a truism, that we should not require to mention it, were it not for the sake of the desire which accompanies it, and which has the effect of turning it to an active virtue. Of course we do not allude to that silly vanity which sits down in simple and senseless admiration of its object, whatever that may be, but the ingenuous and manly feeling which makes him who is actuated by it desire the improvement and devotion of the object of his affections, whatever that object may be. A man who is thus actuated will not only be careful not to do any thing calculated to degrade that for which he has an affection, but he will do all in his power to bring honour upon that subject. The proper conclusion, therefore, to which we are brought, upon considering that strong tendency which Man has to attach himself to his own caste or party in society, is, that this attachment, when properly directed, is not only valuable in itself, but that it is the means of very much of the real and substantial good of society. As proper love and respect by individuals to themselves and their own interests is the only foundation upon which the right discharge of their duties to society can be rested; so a proper feeling of the importance of his rank, station, office, occupation, or whatever else may give a man his status in society, and in the ground of his relation to it, is the only foundation upon which he can rest his duty to all other ranks and classes.

In this matter, however, we must be on our guard against mistakes. It is not the mere fact of having the rank, the office, or whatever else it may be, that

should be the ground of attachment to it. That is, as we have said, mere vanity; and though there is an honest pride of well-doing which is not only a virtue in itself, but which is the parent of many virtues, yet vanity, whatever may be the subject of which we are vain, is always a vice—an indication of meanness of character, and a certain sign that the character on which it is habitually displayed is in the certain way to becoming more mean—if that be possible.

No man will do his duty in any station, whether that station be high or low, if he himself does not consider what he has to do as a matter of great importance—as the very foremost in his thoughts. To this there is no exception; and if any man feels otherwise, he is out of his place, and will speedily either break away into idleness and vice, or sink down into utter and hapless insignificance. The desire of rising in the world—that grand desire to which we are indebted for all the comforts and improvements of society, so far from being adverse to a proper feeling of the importance of our present occupation, is not fairly produced, and stands no chance whatever of being gratified, unless this feeling is the very foundation of it.

And a mere feeling of the importance of that in which we are occupied, how high soever that feeling may be, is not enough: we must go much further than this. We must have a constant desire to do that which we have to do in the very best manner,—in a manner better than we have done it hitherto, and

better, if possible, than is desired and expected of us. This is the only honest claim that we have to any advance in society, and no one can put us in possession of this claim. We must fairly win it for ourselves; and if we do not so win it, we have no business to come to the bar of society; and, indeed, we cannot come there, with any expectation of advancement, excepting upon two grounds, neither of which is very creditable. In the first place, we must come before society in the character of beggars, which is not a very desirable character in any view of it. But we are more than simple beggars: we are unworthy and self-condemned beggars, who come to plead for a more important trust in society, upon no ground but that we had failed in the duties of a less important one. Suppose a common soldier were dismissed from his regiment for incapacity or neglect of his duty, with what face could he petition the commanding officer to take him back as a serjeant? Or suppose a subaltern to be cashiered for incapacity, how could he memorialize the War-office to gazette him as a field-officer? If any man were to hint at such a thing, he would be looked upon as a madman, and sent to Bedlam, to be out of the way of injuring himself or anybody else.

In the second place, the only alternative to the begging is obtaining the social promotion by fraud; and though this does sometimes succeed, it requires a training in villany which renders the success of it hazardous to any one except a regular student in deception; and even if such a one should succeed, the continual fear that the unworthiness, which he, of

course, cannot hide from himself, renders his nominal advance a perfect bed of thorns to him. We have heard of characters of this description having, by impudence and duplicity united, raised themselves to places for which they were not qualified, either in knowledge or trustworthiness; and it has been described to us to what ludicrous shifts they were put to prevent the detection of their ignorance, when they found themselves in the company of men whom they knew were capable of making the dreaded discovery. To play the silent man, and put on the solemn looks of superior wisdom, will not do upon such occasions; for the silent man, when subjects of importance are on the tapis, is generally regarded as a profound thinker, who, though he takes no part in the discussion of what may be going on, is yet so conversant with it all, as that he may be appealed to as umpire upon any point of difficulty that may arise. This would, of course, be a very dangerous position in which to hide felt ignorance; and therefore another method is followed. It is generally said of the cuttle-fish, that, when in danger of being captured, it discharges its inky fluid, and escapes in the darkness which this produces in the water. Now, the personages alluded to, when they are in fear that any one shall catch them in their ignorance, play the cuttle-fish: they are the most loud and magniloquent of the whole; but they contrive that what they utter, in the most voluble and sounding tropes, shall not only be utterly incomprehensible in itself, but shall so darken the matter at issue as that nobody shall be able to

comprehend it, thus verifying what is said by the poet:—

"True *no*-meaning puzzles more than wit."

But though fetches of this kind occasionally succeed, they only do so in those bubbles of an ephemeral nature which are broken before society has had time to understand them. They will not do in regular matters; and it is well for the true interests, both of individuals and of society, that they will not. The success of the undeserving, in whatever way it may come, is always an injustice to those that really deserve; and it is also a much greater injury to society than it is to any individual.

That to which the natural social feeling of mankind points, is very different; and if it could at all times be steadily kept in view, and habitually acted upon, it would conduce to the greatest good, both of the whole society and of all its members individually. That it is acted upon in the majority of cases, is proved by the fact, that, on the whole, society is advancing. To have a proper feeling of the importance of what each has to do, to act constantly upon this feeling, and to have it so continually in operation as that no opportunity of learning how to do better shall be allowed to pass unimproved, is that which has brought the whole of society to its present state; and which, persevered in, may, and must, carry it to degrees of improvement, compared with which its present condition, much as we may think of it, will be found to be only a relative infancy.

And this would also be of considerable use, to carry with us as a touchstone in a searching and important examination of the relative progress made by the several ranks, classes, professions, and other sections into which society is divided, or rather of which it is composed. If, upon making a faithful examination of the progressive history of each of these, it were found that some had made great and rapid advances, some had moved on at a sort of average rate, and some had lagged behind or even retrograded, we should then be led to the degree of justice that had been done to each, and the corrections which required to be made, in order that all that is for the real good of society might move on equally and harmoniously, and at the most rapid rate that could reasonably be expected.

It is true that there would be many preparations necessary before we could enter upon an examination of this kind with that fairness which its importance demands. There are many arts, some sciences, and other matters, which are merely temporary in society; and which, like the fashion in dress and furniture, and other adventitious matters, come into fashion, prevail for a time, and then fade away, leaving no matter of reasonable philosophy with which any one could encounter. There are also various improvements, discoveries, and contrivances—often supposed to be accidental, but never so in reality—which not only give great impulse to some branches of social industry and accommodation, while no such advantages accrue to others, but which also leave them, as it were, over the heads of these, and cast into the shade

that which before had been looked upon as the very best of its kind?

These considerations, and others of a nature somewhat analogous, would render such an inquiry as that which we have suggested, impossible in some matters, and so indeterminate in others as to be of comparatively little use. But they would not affect the whole inquiry, or even affect to any material extent that portion of it which would be of real use to society.

The sciences and the arts might be left very much to themselves, at least in so far as their real advancement is concerned; and that for this very obvious reason, that no parties could be found nearly so capable of understanding their nature or the means of their advancement as the persons who are actually engaged in them; and they have all arrived at such maturity—in the ratio of their constitutional strength, as to be but little the better for positive legislation or patronage. Yet there are some matters of regulation, in which it might be worth while to inquire whether the state of the law may not stand in the way both of science and of art. An inquiry of this kind may be more freely made, when it is considered that legislation may hurt these matters, but cannot by any possibility do them good. It is not our intention to go into any part of this inquiry, as we have not the leisure, and do not pretend to possess the multifarious information that would be requisite, even though we had; but still, we may venture to merely enumerate a few such points as the following:—If the duty upon the importation of foreign corn is in any sense of the

word a burden upon the industry of the people of this country—a position as to the extent of which we are not quite sure — does it not fall more heavily on the agricultural interest than any other interest in the country? What raises the price of human food, raises the price of the food of horses also; and agriculture is the branch of our national industry, which is, and must continue to be, most exclusively performed by men and animals. Mills, steam-engines, and all the other contrivances by which so much of the heavy labour of the arts is now performed,—and by which more and more is performed, and performed to better and cheaper purpose, every day,—are most abstemious things in the way of eating and drinking, or at all events they are satisfied with coal and water, articles which we have no occasion to import. Consequently, in as far as the employment of these is introduced, the employers are relieved from the burden of the price of food, whatever it may be; and as the agriculturists are not so relieved, the burden must fall with the greater weight upon them; and as they must go to the same market for provisions as other people, they have no means of avoiding this additional burden. It is in vain to say that this falls only upon the farmer, and the proprietor reaps the advantage; for, as the landlord can get no more from the farmer than the latter can afford to pay, and would only injure the value of his estate if he were to attempt to force it, no unfair burden can be laid upon the farmer, but which must in time come to the landlord himself,—and that in much shorter time than many who speak

with great confidence upon such subjects appear to be aware of.

Again, there is a point connected with science into which a little inquiry might be made; and that is, "Whether, in a country like this, which turns so much upon the estimating of all value in money, the reward of scientific discoveries ought to be mere glory, when that of contrivances in the arts, which are often founded upon those very discoveries, consists of both glory and gain?" Then, as to the arts themselves, it is allowed that our patent laws are exceedingly clumsy and expensive, and thus, in the majority of instances, of no real value to the *bona-fide* inventor of that which is useful, and especially of that which is ornamental to the public. We enter not into the merits of these any more than into those of the former. We merely throw them out as hints that some things connected even with the sciences and the arts might be the better for a little scrutinizing observation.

There are, however, other subjects upon which there is more apparent contrast, and consequently more probability that equal justice has not been done to them. We need hardly say that we allude to the discernment of the people generally, as contrasted with their progress in the arts, and all that concerns the business and enjoyments of the present life. We can find clever artisans and skilful men of business any where; and there is no lack of improvement in any kind of accommodation, or in any of the bodily comforts; but, with some splendid exceptions no doubt, there is a very great deficiency of intellectual

acumen, and an almost unprecedented aptness on the part of the public to become the dupes of quacks and impostors of all kinds. We do not so much allude to the sums of money which are paid to these parties, though these must be in themselves a very considerable pecuniary evil—as the sums paid for quack advertisements alone, which must be paid out of the gullable part of the population, would suffice to carry on half, if not the whole of the public works and improvements which are in the country, expensive as many of them are. It is probable that, if these empirical announcements were put an end to, a full half of the country newspapers, and not a few of the metropolitan ones, would have to be given up as unprofitable speculations; and it is not very creditable to the taste of the age, or pleasing to the feelings of a man of decent taste, that he should not be able to procure the common weekly intelligence for himself and his family without subjecting the latter to the chance of the mental and moral contaminations of these offensive matters.

This is only one of numerous ways in which the ease with which the public can be imposed upon in all matters of judgment is openly proclaimed; but even in this one it is sufficiently glaring; and it demonstrates, as clearly as a subject of the kind can admit of demonstration, that there is an intellectual want somewhere,—a want which can hardly exist without bringing along with it a moral one of the same, or even of far more serious amount. In all that the people do for themselves, the result shows that they

do well; but we fear that we must add that, in all that is done for them, they do—or if *suffer* is preferred—they suffer ill. This puts one rather forcibly in mind of the old story of the healthy clown, who so far forgot etiquette as to take the wall of his instructor. "Sirrah! you are better fed than taught," exclaimed the offended man of dignity. "That may be, sir," rejoined the clown, "for I feed myself and you teach me." The story ranks but as a common jest, and it is not in itself entitled to rank higher; but still it is by no means inapplicable to a very large proportion of the people of Britain, and probably of all other countries.

How matters could be improved in this respect is, however, another matter; for if it is not done by the people themselves, one does not very well see how it can be done for them,—as it does not, at least on a cursory view, appear to be of a nature to which institution or enactment can very efficiently apply. At all events it shows that, besides what Man can derive from the society in which he is placed, either in the way of impulse or of direction, there still remains not a little which he must do for himself. But we must leave these general matters, which are as vague as they are general, and take a brief survey of those emotions by which Man is, for weal or woe, fitted for acting his part in society.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SOCIAL EMOTIONS OF MAN—IMMEDIATE EMOTIONS.

EVERY thing of a moral nature which is in any way connected with Man, may be said to be connected with him in his social capacity, and not as an individual. The feelings of the relation in which he stands to his God are purely religious, and cannot be said to have any thing moral mixed up with them; for, in as far as the foundation of these is concerned, they are wholly of free grace on the part of the Almighty Being; and the finite being is not capable of doing, neither is he required to do, any thing in the way of compensation upon this most sublime and solemn of all subjects. But, while the assurances of religion are thus free to Man without any moral act on his part, they leave him responsible for the whole of his moral conduct, the same as if no such religious assurance had been given,—only with a feeling of gratitude stronger than what could arise from any moral claim whatever; and, therefore, with what ought to be, and is, in every case in which the religious assurance is real, more readiness, cheerfulness, and delight, in the

performance of every moral duty, than he could possibly have if this religious assurance were wanting. At the same time, there must be, if the feeling of the religious assurance is genuine, a more lively sense than if it did not exist, of the necessity of the performance of every moral duty, not from a principle of fear, but from one of gratitude: and this along with a distinct and habitual consciousness that failure in the performance of those moral duties must necessarily involve the abrogation of the religious assurance, and leave the man who is thus exposed to a far more fearful weight of eternal punishment than if he had perished in his original ignorance.

Such being the case, it follows by obvious and very necessary consequences, that all the emotions of Man which, in any way, involve mental feelings, of what kind soever they may be, and whether they are in themselves pleasurable or painful, belong to what may be called the Social Emotions. All the Retrospective Emotions arising from the past, and all the Prospective Emotions that have regard to the future, are, therefore, of this description, as well as the Immediate Emotions which have any moral reference. Thus, they include the whole of the emotions, except the few which we enumerated in the volume on "Man as a Moral and Accountable Being;" and thus we shall briefly enumerate the principal ones in the order of these three classes or sections.

The knowledge and conduct of these emotions is by far the most important part of our self-knowledge and self-government, both as regards our own per-

sonal happiness, and as regards our conduct in that society to which we are under so many obligations, and in which the whole of our happiness and enjoyment in the present life, and the foundation of our eternal happiness, may be said to lie. All the pleasure which, as rational beings, we can enjoy, all the usefulness of which we can be the instruments, and all the distinctions to which we can arrive among our fellow-men, depend upon the right conduct of the emotions; and, on the other hand, all the degradation to which we can be sunk, all the follies and crimes of which we can be guilty, and all the merited obloquy and execration of others, with all the agony and remorse of our own minds, of which we can be the victims, are the results of misgovernment of the emotions. It is to them that the allusion is made when it is said, "Keep thine heart with all diligence; for out of it are the issues of life;" for in all cases in which the "heart" is thus made allusion to, it has no reference to the mere bodily organ which puts the circulating blood in motion, but refers to the emotions or feelings, in contradistinction to those purely intellectual states of the mind in which, of themselves, there is no directly moral feeling, however they may lead to one emotion or to one modification of an emotion rather than to another.

IMMEDIATE SOCIAL EMOTIONS.—The emotions which come under this denomination are the simplest of all our moral emotions. They have no obvious reference either to the past or the future, neither are all of them necessarily connected with any process of

reasoning at the time, though they always have some shadowy allusion of this kind, in consequence of which they are much modified by the habit of the party, as that has been formed by his conduct and connexions in society. They are the emotions upon which the more broad and obvious distinctions of moral character among men are founded; and, according as one or another of them predominates, that particular one, whatever it may be, is made the basis of the characteristic epithet. They are more conspicuous in their outward manifestations than any of the other and more complex emotions; and if any one of them predominate so as to affect the whole man, and influence the intellectual states and the actions, it becomes depicted in the countenance, and indeed shows itself in the whole air and bearing of the body. In as far as they are concerned, a rational system of moral physiognomy, or one of judging of the character from the face, may be formed, having a very considerable approximation to the truth; but to be true, that system must have reference to the expression of the features rather than to the form of them; because there is no "reason" why one emotion should, rather than another, be connected with the relative size and the particular outline of any one part of the countenance; and the number of instances in which any coincidence of this kind has been, or can be, observed by any individual, form so very small a fraction of the whole human race, that no satisfactory analogy can be founded upon them.

There is another difficulty in the case: These emo-

tions are social, that is, though the mind must be capable of feeling any of these, or indeed any emotion whatsoever, before that emotion can possibly be felt, yet it is the conduct of the individual in society, and the mutual influence which they have upon each other, that gives strength to any one of the emotions, so as to make it take the lead of all others, and be the basis of that character whereby the party is socially distinguished. Were this not the case, and did the features of a man's face, merely from their original cast, and not in consequence of any thing which the man had himself done, or others had done to him, determine that he must be under the influence, nay, the absolute dominion of any one emotion, or class of emotions, then it would be vain to talk of self-government; morality would be an empty name, and the laws, not merely those of man, but the Christian precepts themselves, would be systems of iniquity—only the word "iniquity" would then have no name in the vocabulary.

Still there is much in the expressional physiognomy —so much as not only to be of the most essential service to painters, sculptors, and other delineators of human character, but that we all feel a particular expression habitual upon the countenance, as a certain indication of the leading character of the party. In the nicer shades, and in those more light and feeble characters which are incapable, as one would say, "to take hold" of any subject so that it can excite any deep emotion, good or bad, agreeable to society or the reverse,—in such it may be difficult to

draw any positive conclusion from the aspect; although we do come to the physiognomical conclusion that what we term "an unmeaning face" is the sure sign of a weak and insignificant character. If, however, there is any expression so strongly marked as very forcibly to attract our attention, we instantly conclude that there is corresponding strength of character; and if we have had much observation of mankind, we can form a tolerably correct judgment as to the description of character.

We can carry our physiognomical scrutiny even further than the mere emotions; for we can distinguish a thoughtful or intellectual man from a man of emotions, and also from an insignificant character, in which there is little emotion or any thing else. The *subjects* of purely intellectual states—of those states in which no emotion mingles—are not portrayed in the expression of the features; but there is a general expression of thoughtfulness, which is not only easily distinguished from mental idleness and oblivion, but of which the degree of intensity may generally be known from the expression; so that, to one who is a close and practised observer, the silent fool and the silent philosopher are as easily distinguished as the same parties are when they speak.

If there is deep emotion with the thought, that emotion will be eloquent upon the features, in spite of silence, and of every effort to conceal it; and, to those who study character in this way, it will be the more apparent the more that it is a habitual emotion of the party. The violent man, who struggles to hide his

violence, shows it just as much as if he were to give way to all the frantic demonstrations of which the very excess of it is capable; and it is the same in every other case. Indeed, when the immediate emotions are attempted to be restrained from their natural display, they have, if in themselves of a pernicious nature, a worse effect upon the character than if they had the most ample scope for display. "If you plant anger in the bosom, it shall surely grow there," says a very old but a very true proverb; and what is true of the retrospective emotions of anger, is true of all emotions whatsoever, be they immediate or not. The fact is, that the moment we make any emotion a matter of memory, we change it into a retrospective emotion; and thus it is more fixed in the mind, and more completely a part of the character, than if it had had its demonstration at the time, and thus had passed away; and if it is strong, it will return again and again on suggestion, and though this may be in secret or in solitude, it will stamp its impress upon the features as certainly as if every such mental return had been a public display. He who has been brooding over cruelty and revenge during the silent watches of the night, rises from his couch with more of the fiend depicted in his countenance than if he had run raving, dagger in hand, during the whole time.

All the strong displays of emotion may therefore be read in the countenance, if we only study that as we ought to do; but there are many cases in which our own immediate emotions take away or confound our judgment. Thus, if the lineaments of a human visage—

expression of emotion apart, and regarded simply in their statuary—strike us as very much the reverse of beautiful, we shall be disposed to undervalue any good they may indicate, and shall perhaps never be able to do justice to the merits of the character, simply on account of the unfavourable impression made by the mere countenance. This is an involuntary wrong done to the party who makes the unfavourable impression; but we may, in an opposite way, do an involuntary wrong to ourselves, which may be more serious. The emotion of beauty is the most pleasurable, and therefore the most captivating, of all those simple emotions that have no direct moral in them; and hence it overcomes us, blinds us to other impressions, and confines our feelings to its own subject, just as the light of the sun, at the same time that it displays the beauties of the earth, conceals the glories of the heavens. In all cases of strong emotion of beauty, we are in danger of being blinded in this way; but there is none in which so many are blinded, or pay so much for the operation, as in the case of female beauty. We speak not of the simple immediate feeling of female beauty, for that is a very harmless as well as a very pleasing gratification; but when it is borne in mind that the most important of all the social relations turns upon the admiration of females, and that mere beauty, though it often proves a curse, never can, in itself, be a blessing, the complexion of the case alters not a little. The very worst passions, as well as the utmost insignificance of character, are not only compatible with what is called female beauty, but there are some

by one mode of treatment, though by another they would have become the very best.

This, however, cannot be subjected to practical regulation, and it is even too fine for being thoroughly subjected to philosophical analysis. It is highly probable, that the leading bent of the emotions—that which decides for life both the personal and the social character—is confirmed before there is the least idea that the child is susceptible of any training whatsoever; and by this means, that which is really owing to treatment not suited to the constitution of the subject, is attributed to difference of disposition. But still, all that can be done upon this subject amounts to little more than the expression of our regret; and we deal with it in the same way as we do with other matters, to the management of which as they ought to be, we are incompetent: we shun it, and say nothing about it. And yet, in this, the most sacred duty of society to the individual and to the whole, is herein compromised by the parent, or other party, to whom the charge of directing the emotions is delegated. The emotions are not only the foundation of the happiness or the misery of the individual, and the cause of the esteem or the aversion of society, but they are the basis of the whole character, whether intellectual or moral. The susceptibility to emotion which, as we have said, may depend much upon the original constitution of the body—though it depends far more upon the early treatment—is really the source of all that is usually called genius; and which, if it were not neglected, prevented, or destroyed, in the

early stages, would be genius for any one of the studies, pursuits, or occupations in which Man can engage; or, which is far better, both for the individual and for society, it would be that general genius which enables a man to know and to do all that is necessary for his own good, or for that of society, in the easiest and best manner.

If this sensitiveness of any emotion is neglected, it is very apt to find out occupation for itself; and though this aptness does sometimes, now and then, take an advantageous turn, and produce what is called an original genius for some art, occupation, or other matter, yet the fear, nay, the truth, is, that for once that it takes this direction, and conducts its possessor to happiness—even the happiness of mental occupation, which is really the greatest of any—it is ten times led into vice; and they who should be, on account of their natural aptitude, the most valuable members of the community, are turned into the veriest of its plagues. There is probably more of sterling talent among the thieves of the British metropolis than among the whole of its philosophers and literati—with various high personages in the scale as make-weights. Among the juvenile part of these depredators—though one cannot help lamenting the fact, and lamenting it the more deeply the more apparent its truth is—there is certainly more real ability displayed than at all the examinations of all the schools within the bills of mortality. Nor are we quite sure that all the wits of all the "circles," redolent as some of them are of these glittering

appendages, could pen a couplet containing a moral aphorism with more truth and naiveté than the urchin some nine or ten years old, that, when sent to the house of corruption—correction, we mean—for his moral health, a few years ago, chalked upon the wall this moral reflection :—

> " Him as prigs wot is'nt hisn,
> If he's cotch'd, must go to pris'n."

The whole stress of the matter, in this most curious couplet, turns upon the fact of being " cotch'd ;" and in the escaping of that lies the whole merit, or fascination, or whatever it may be called, of this most extensive and apparently incurable species of crime. Nor is there the least doubt that many children, of highly susceptible minds, and of such capable of great usefulness and honour, if properly treated, are attracted to this nefarious course by the ingenuity which is required in order to become successful in it. This appears to be the case at an age when—precocious as great, wealthy, and commercial cities are in such matters—the parties are all too young for having any of that cupidity of disposition which actuates those who set them on, and in the matter of which the Romans were never able to draw distinctly the line between *fur* and *mercator*. As we have noticed this subject, we may remark, though this is not the systematic place for it, that the provisions for the encouragement of these pupils in crime appear to be as efficient as if they were expressly so meant. The public examination before the police magistrate, where the audience is composed, for the most part, of cha-

racters of the very worst description, is in reality an exhibition of talents, such as they are, before the very persons among whom such talents are in demand; and the committal to the house of correction which follows, is placing them at the finishing academy, so that they shall be fully qualified for the profession when the terms of their sentences expire.

Many other instances of the perversion of the emotions of the young might be pointed out; and these are probably all to be accounted for upon nearly the same general principle,—namely, that the honest occupations to which the young are in general sent, whether they be scholastic or anything else, have much of mere repellent drudgery in them, the use of which is not seen, and from which the emotions of course turn away; while, on the other hand, they have no attractions, excepting such as are just as likely to injure as to improve—if, indeed, they are not much more so. But we must close these general remarks, and turn our attention to some of the particular emotions.

THE VIRTUOUS FEELING.—The approbation of virtue, and the dislike of vice, is perhaps the simplest, and certainly one of the most important of our immediate moral or social feelings; and it is one which perhaps more directly bears upon our relation to society, and our happiness and usefulness in that society, than any other which can be named. We do not mean that thorough conviction of moral good and evil, and their distinction, which is founded upon knowledge, and can be supported by argument; neither do we

mean right and wrong, according to the laws and institutions of society. Both of these are highly important matters, and essential to the right conduct of a man in life; but they are both matters of study, or, at all events, the one is a matter of study and the other of obedience. The last is highly necessary, at least for all who have not a very clear and thorough knowledge of the first, which there are many who have not; and thus, for their own good as well as for that of society, the law must keep them in order, without any regard to the fact of their being satisfied or not satisfied, either with the nature of it or with the extent.

That to which we allude is a simple feeling, which instantly arises upon our seeing anything done, or being informed of the doing of it, and by means of which we instantly, and without any inquiry or deliberation, approve or disapprove of that which is done. It has no reference whatever to the party by whom the act is done: if it had that, it would be a retrospective emotion, connected with the character of that party, whereas that which we now treat of is a mere momentary feeling. Neither has it any reference to the consequences of the action, whether immediate or remote, for that would change it to a prospective feeling.

The simple feeling is very closely allied to our emotion of beauty, only there is a moral and social element in it which the mere feeling of beauty wants. If the actor in that which is done is not our associate—a human being—we feel, on seeing it, a simple emo-

tion of beauty, and the action itself is merely an instance of beautiful activity; but if the actor is a human being, we feel that it is done "by *us*,"—that is, by a similar being, and this gives it a moral or social character.

It must here be borne in mind that our immediate emotion of virtue, or its opposite, applies very imperfectly, or not at all, to actions done by ourselves; for in them, if we have any feeling of virtue or vice, that feeling does not arise immediately from the action itself, but is a prospective emotion, connected, in some way, with the consequences to which the action may lead. In this, again, it very closely resembles our feeling of beauty, or of the physiognomical expression of emotions, both of which are very imperfect in our own case. The reason of this is easily seen: the emotion which is strong enough for prompting us to the actual performance of an action, is also strong enough to hide any simple and immediate feeling of the right or wrong of that action. Still, this feeling is useful to us in the regulation of our own conduct; for we will not, upon the mere impulse of the moment, perform an act which we, by immediate impulse, feel to be wrong in another.

Whether this immediate feeling of virtue or vice in human actions be correct or not, in any particular instance, is another matter, and depends upon the general character of our own mind. There is reason to believe that, as soon as a child begins to take notice of human actions, it has feelings of like and dislike for them without any regard to the consequences, or

indeed any knowledge of them; but how strong this feeling is, what are the nature of the actions which it discriminates, or how soon it begins to be mixed with other feelings, and heightened, obscured, or changed by them, are points upon which, from their very nature, we can obtain very little information.

There can be little doubt, however, that this is a subject upon which the education of example begins very early; and so, whatever the natural feeling may be, it very speedily merges in that which we see done around us. When it once takes a decided bias from example in this way, that bias is not easily changed afterwards, either by new example or by precept, though it does remain for some time susceptible of change. Hence the great importance of good example in all that children see done; and hence, also, the laxity of moral feeling among so many of those whose parents can afford to pay for having the first tendencies of their minds given by a class of persons not very celebrated for moral purity.

Though this simple feeling of virtue and vice is of small direct influence to us in the case of our own actions, yet in other respects it is of very great value, not merely to ourselves, but through us to society. It has a powerful influence in the choosing of our companions—a choice upon which very much of our happiness and usefulness depends, not merely at the commencement of life, when it is of such importance in the formation of our character, and determining our course, but through the whole of life, even to its close. We naturally love those whose actions we

approve, and avoid those whose actions are offensive to us; and, therefore, the keener and more immediate our perception of right and wrong is, we are the more likely, nay, the more certain, to select proper companions, and avoid such as are improper. Even if our notions upon this subject are a little fastidious, they are far better than if they were lax; for our fastidiousness "gives us pause"—time to reflect upon the case, and thus lead us to that best of all decisions, a decision upon evidence. To be facile in this matter is not so bad in the immediate instance as to be wrong, upon the same principle that an unstable character is not so bad as one naturally wicked; but the facile are always in the road to vice; and the person who says to-day "I don't care," is almost sure to be vicious to-morrow. But, while insensibility is a means of vice, extreme or marked feeling in the case of this or of any other of our immediate emotions, is not a virtue. These are all feelings which ought to lead us to think; but there is not one of them upon which we should act without thought. They are our warnings, not our guide; our only sure guide is experience.

SYMPATHY.—The feeling with others in what they enjoy and what they suffer, is another of the immediate emotions; and one which is in an especial manner social, as it leads us to the fate of our fellow-men, and makes us partakers in their joys and their sorrows; by which means we increase the zest of every joy, and take part of the burden of sorrow upon our own shoulders.

Sympathy is at once the most universal and the

most social of all our feelings. So far from being confined to the object of the moment, to the human beings that we know, or to the human race, it extends to the utmost limits of our knowledge, and to the most ideal creations of the fancy. It can extend to all time, and over all space, and it even approaches eternity and infinitude. There is nothing, in short, which the feeling of sympathy cannot find out, and invest with all the gladness or the gloom of which it is the minister.

It is also equally ready to give and to receive; and thus, like heat and some of the other modifications of physical action, it equalizes itself among all subjects in the world of our observation and thought. The happy mode of sympathy is an expansion of the simple and personal emotion of cheerfulness until it embraces all men and all nature, and the sorrowfulness is the same social extension of sadness. In sympathy, however, there is always a temporary cause; and they who are the most susceptible to the one of its modes, are also the most susceptible to the other. The cheerful are not necessarily less alive to sympathy with suffering than the sad, though the expression of the emotion may be different in the two.

Sympathy is the bond and the charm of society; and, without it, the miscellaneous intercourse of the world would not be bearable, while the most intimate friends would often be at variance; and when a breach was made, it is doubtful whether it could be healed again without this emotion. No two human beings are alike in the general habit of their minds, or in

their thoughts upon any one subject. On the contrary, they are very often in direct opposition, and each is equally convinced that himself and himself alone is in the right. If sympathy were blotted out of the catalogue of the feelings, and men thus circumstanced were to be brought into collision, as they are every day, each would be intolerable to all the rest, and all the rest would be intolerable to each. Quarrelling upon every point of contact would be the necessary consequence; and they would have no means of avoiding absolute hostilities, but by each betaking himself to his own den, and enjoying his own thoughts and pursuing his own plans there. But sympathy comes as a messenger from heaven to reconcile all their differences, and turn that which else would be a battle-field in a banqueting-place of intellectual and moral enjoyment. The stubbornness of every particular opinion is subdued, the violence of every passion is softened, those who were too elevated are brought down, those who were gloomy and desponding are raised, and order, harmony, and happiness are, by the ministration of this delightful emotion, brought out of the very elements of discord. Nor is this all; for that sympathy which man feels for man in society, is a benefactor as well as a blessing. The whole are not brought to the mere average; for there is a cheerfulness and joy diffused, which makes the sum of enjoyment far greater than all the items when they are apart. The excess of all our emotions, whether they, when in moderation, belong to the pleasurable or the painful class, is in itself to some extent

painful; and there is an agony in the intemperance even of joy. The sympathy which we partake in society abates this painful excess, and we are really happier than before. Thus, the assemblage of a company of miserables of different moods, becomes a society of happy men; and this not merely when they meet for the purpose of relaxation and enjoyment, but in the common intercourse of life. Upon the angry, the grieved, and the desponding, the sympathetic influence of society is still more beneficial; and if those who are under the influence of more pleasing emotions are so numerous as to give a tone to the whole assemblage, the painful emotions are lost for a time, and they never again return with the same violence that they had before.

This is the reason why, in any case of very strong emotion—any cause of excessive joy or excessive grief, we are always relieved when we impart the knowledge of it to a friend. Nor is a friend always necessary; for, if a stranger, whom we never saw before or may never see again, will listen to our tale of joy or of sorrow, we are always relieved. It matters not whether the sympathy is a real feeling on the part of the stranger, for if it is only the common courtesy of society it will answer just as well. Nor will it make much difference, if the man whose sympathy we get on such an occasion, is in habitual enmity with us at other times; for so immediate is the relief we obtain from sympathy, that we do not pause to consider whence it comes; we take it as if it were the free gift of Heaven. And it is one of the very best gifts of

Heaven—a gift but for which Man could not have been happy, could not indeed have lived, in society.

There is, in truth, one agony of the mind for which sympathy has no balm—the agony of utter despair. This is not a feeling, but a breaking down of all feeling, in the torment of that which feels; and, therefore, the man who is under its influence can have no associate, and consequently no sympathy. The sympathy which we feel for others, is an actual taking upon ourselves the feeling under which they appear to labour; and unless we can thus, as it were, enter into their feelings, we can have no sympathy for them. Now, in that despair of which we speak, there are no degrees. Despondency may be so deep that the mind may appear to sink under it; but there is no prostration until the despair is utter; and from that there is no return to society, and under it there is no endurance of solitude. If the strength of the mind is not such as to cast off the body by its own efforts, then the party lays violent hands upon himself; and, for this reason, suicide is, except in some very extreme cases of the more violent emotions—such as pride, always the act of the feeble-minded. Other than its fatal and final termination, we know of no symptom by which utter despair can be known; and this termination is a consequence of the state, not the state itself — that state is an agony of the soul into which none but the eye of Omniscience can look.

Our sympathy with the distant and the dead, and with the whole of nature, animate and inanimate, is still more wonderful than our sympathy with living

man; and, like that, it is a reciprocating emotion, which we can either impart or receive. To the gay all things are gay, and to the sorrowful all things are sad. One goes forth, and beholds the whole face of things clothed with beauty; another sitteth down in the ashes and curseth his day; and yet the whole cause of this strange difference may be a mere momentary feeling, which has not the least reference to any real cause of joy or of sorrow in either party.

If the mind is in one of its joyous moods, it signifies little what may be the abstract merits or the intrinsic value of the subjects upon which the enchanting mantle of sympathy is thrown. It sits as gracefully upon the meanest hovel as upon the most splendid palace; the barren moor is as full of delights as the choicest parterre; and the wanderer who knows not where to lay his head, feels nature as sweet as does the first-born of fortune. Be the capacity, the rank, or the condition of the man what they may, the mood of sympathy can—

> "Make all nature beauty to the eye,
> And music to the ear"—

not in the poetic fancy only, but literally and in truth. These are moods of the mind in which a simple grey stone in the wild shall be invested with more beauty than in the ordinary calm of indifference, we can find in the Medici Venus; and when the note of a cuckoo, or even the croak of a raven, shall have more of melody in it than the most skilful player can at ordinary times extract from the finest instrument.

Such is the power of our imparted sympathy over the pleasure which we feel in inanimate things.

But the sympathy which we can in return draw from nature is not less effective, and it is far more useful, inasmuch as it can win us from our woe, and restore the tone of the mind when it is all but broken down. This is a more complex feeling than the former; and yet, like that, it is an immediate one, and comes to our relief without any effort or even wish on our part,—just as if the bountiful Author of nature had instilled into natural things a restoring balm for the wounded spirit—wounded beyond all healing of even the sympathy of Man. And it is great kindness to us and to our infirmities that there is this power in nature; for there are wounds that the most even-tempered of us may receive at the hands of our fellow-men, which, ere they have been cicatrised by time, will bleed afresh at the sight or even at the thought of Man; and if we had not nature as "the comforter" in such cases, the burden of our anguish would be too grievous to be borne. This is given to us for our instruction, as well as for our relief in the extremes of mental suffering. Nature is the grand museum for our study, and the grand magazine of all that is useful to us; and thus, the sympathy which exists between us and nature, is one means by which we ought to be drawn, and powerfully drawn, to study the beauty and find out the usefulness of the several parts and productions of that nature which is so rich in usefulness and in pleasure.

Indeed, we cannot fully enjoy the blessing which

nature can bestow upon us in the hour of need, if we do not prepare for it in time by the observation and the study of nature around us. Of those who are cast down and broken in spirit, whether by their own indiscretion or by the conduct of others, very many are so, solely because they have no tie whereby they can be bound to nature, so as to call up the sympathy of nature when that is required. Nor is it in the hours of sorrow only that this sympathy is to be desired. Nature, in some of her endless variety of productions, is always within our reach, whenever we have a moment of leisure from the business and the duties of life; and as she is always free to us, so she is always ready to give us that pure mental delight, in which there is no present weariness and no future sting. On the contrary, there is that in nature which sharpens the sense and revives the limbs, at the same time that it elevates and delights the mind. No repose is half so invigorating as waking repose, where the beauty and the abundance of nature are spread widely around. All bodily fatigue has nearly the same effect upon the body; and so we shall suppose that one has been labouring and toiling along, under the burning ardour of the summer sun, through many long miles of deep and narrow lanes, where nothing but a small streak of sky over head was to be seen. Even such lanes have their beauties, in the trailing shrubs, the gnarly and contorted roots, with here and there a plant of the shade, not found in more open places; and there are birds, too, which flit along by very short stages, as if they were showing off the gracefulness of their form

and the briskness of their motions, solely for one's amusement. But, though there is beauty in all these things, it is beauty which is apt to pall, if we have a twelve miles' length of it unbroken by any variety; and more especially if we are panting under the hot sun without an air stirring in our narrow and dusty way. But suppose that, after having had this, not only beyond the point of satisfaction, but up to the full measure of satiety, with the sun beating behind, reflected from the path before, and the heat radiating from under our feet like the breath of an oven;—suppose this, and that our path terminates in a finely-margined copse upon the steep, a little wood of nature's own planting and tending; and after a short passage through the shade of this, we come to a little shady glade, on the summit of a pretty high hill, where the margin of the copse advances right and left, in the form of a crescent, and fines away till it melts either way into the grassy slope of the hill. This is a "rest and be thankful," the luxury of which no weary wanderer would be very able to resist.

Here, then, one reposes, and gazes with equal wonder and delight upon the prospect, which stretches far to the eastward, glowing in all the radiance of that sun whose beams have been so warm upon us, and which contrasts finely with the shadow upon the place of our repose. On the extreme left is a rich, champaign country, with tufted groves, clustered cottages, rich fields in the bloom of summer, a mansion here and there, and just by a placid lake in the middle stands a village, with its venerable church and tower.

From the lake a river winds its way, now concealed by its banks, now expanding into little ponds, and ultimately discharging its waters into a land-backed bay, which is barely visible in the extreme distance; but there is a "blink" upon the horizon which tells that the ocean is there. Then to the right of the lake and village, hill beyond hill rises with gentle ascent, and each advances upon the ocean with a bold and jutting promontory, breaking and partially concealing the line of the shore. One presents a chalky cliff rising in caverned grandeur, bold and perpendicular from the green sea at the bottom to the green earth on the top; and another is black and burly, torn into ravines by the winter torrents, and cumbered at the base with its own ruins. The sea is not dead, but it sleeps, and there is just as much of zephyr upon it as ripples the surface, and fills the white sails of the vessels, brought, it may be, from all parts of the globe, which are marching along in slow and gorgeous majesty. Were the billows rolling mountains, and the surges thundering against yonder cliffs, until the salt spray watered the summits, it would be sublime; and those mariners with whom all is now ease and pleasure, would be struggling for the life, fearful of the hidden bays, between which those headlands stand out as the gates of death; but it is lovely in the hour of its tranquillity. All the fatigue is forgotten; and the body is not merely at ease,—it is in the full tide of enjoyment. And every delighted sense communicates the tale of its pleasure to the mind; and the mind is awakened, not merely to the sensal intelli-

gence, but, taking that as a basis, it rises up in its own strength, till earth, and sea, and sky become all too narrow for its range; and it mounts up to the heaven—to the heaven of heavens, and pours forth its gratitude, at the footstool of the eternal throne, to Him who has made nature so full of delight and Man so susceptible of enjoyment. Such is the sympathy which Man can inspire himself with, if his mind is not corrupted by low and grovelling thoughts and habits.

It is true that there is a contrast to each of the pictures, in the outlines of which we have attempted to touch a point here and there; but these dark contrasts are in Man himself, and not in nature. If the spirit is in itself what it ought to be, there is nothing in nature which is in the least calculated to cast it down; the brightness of nature is always beauty; and the gloom of it is glory.

It is also worthy of remark, that the pleasure which Man derives from his sympathy with nature has no antisocial tendency, but quite the reverse. A love of nature is always a love of Man,—fond of society, and happy and cheerful in it. Nor is it difficult to see at least some of the reasons. The feeling of a resource in nature, and the experience that this is a consolation under the little rubs and afflictions of the world, tends to soften the temper; and further than this, the love of nature leads directly to, and indeed involves, the love of Man, as the noblest work of terrestrial creation.

The joyful mode of sympathy, whether with Man

or with the rest of nature, delightful and valuable as are its effects, is very apt to pass unheeded. As has often been remarked, smiles are the usual dress in which mankind pay and receive their visits; and therefore the line of distinction between the smile which is produced by sympathetic affection, and that which is put on as a garment, is not very definite. It matters not whether it be the one or the other, for both tend equally to make men agreeable to each other; and the suavity which is put on solely for the sake of appearances in society is never wholly put off, but remains in a part proportional to the cheerfulness of the society, and the length of time that the individual remains in it. It may seem that there is a little dissimulation in every man's thus wearing a pleasant face in the society of his fellows; but the deception is only seeming, not real; and unless there is some deception put on for a purpose against some member of the society, the concealment of the leading passions and purposes of the whole is a very great advantage, for it causes happiness where, if all the truth were known, there would be misery.

But it is to the mournful mode of our sympathy that the attention of mankind is most strongly directed; and though, in this mode, men are probably not so useful to each other, upon the whole, as they are in the cheerful mode, yet the instances which call it forth are more striking, and the cases which it prompts us to relieve are more imminent. Unless we are under the influence of some very strong emotion of a very opposite nature, towards the individual, we

instantly sympathize with the suffering or the danger of any one who is exposed to it; and we do this without the least reference to the claim which the party has for assistance, or our own capacity of giving that assistance. A perfect stranger will instantly run to pick up those that fall, without pausing a moment to deliberate on the propriety of doing so or his own ability to do it. When the scaffold is struck from under a murderer, or the head of a traitor is severed from the body, there is a thrill of horror which runs through the crowd, and an impulse felt by many, if not by all, to deliver from death even the man whom the laws of his country have justly, and in mercy to society as the expression runs, doomed to pass thus ignominiously out of the world. Nay, so very powerful and instantaneous is the emotion of sympathy, that it will overcome aversion or hatred, or indeed any emotion whatsoever, unless that emotion is in a violent paroxysm. The habits of individuals may affect the promptness and intensity of our sympathetic emotions, as they do any or all of the others; but still he is a wretch indeed who does not instantly sympathize with the depth of human suffering or misery of any kind, especially if it bursts suddenly upon him.

This emotion is of vast use in society, as it—without any statute, and without any inquiry into character—makes the whole of society guardians and protectors of each of the individual members. It is, however, an emotion which is not unfrequently imposed upon, especially in the case of distress or suf-

fering, which can be removed by pecuniary means; and this, not only in the case of those wandering beggars that infest the streets and lanes, displaying generally tenfold more distress than they really suffer, but in the case of more insidious beggars of all ranks, who impose upon the feeling with tales and expressions of heavy woes which they never in reality feel. There is a very offensive leaven of this sort of imposture among persons of vulgar minds, who have, in their youth, been contaminated by the society of the violent in temper: they attempt to carry their point by a threat to lay violent hands upon themselves, in the ultimate degree beyond which their very extraordinary eloquence cannot be carried, and in this they often succeed; but they should be allowed a little pause upon the threat, as not one of them would put it in execution. In the case of pecuniary or other alms-giving, there is always, also, some time for reflection, as it is never quite a case of life and death with him who can ask for alms; but the parties ply their calling in the thoroughfares, and profit by the mere emotion of those who have no time for reflection. In all cases, the emotion of sympathy with a sufferer is invariably followed by a desire, more or less strong, to relieve that sufferer; and whether the desire should or should not be acted upon, is a matter which belongs to the particular case.

LOVE AND HATE.—If taken in all their degrees, in all their subjects, and in all their tendencies and results, these are very complicated emotions; and though, when we consider them as merely immediate

emotions, without any reference to the actual merit or demerit of their subjects, they are comparatively simple, yet it is difficult to keep this simple condition of them so free from the more complex ones, as to be able to obtain a clear notion of it.

Indeed, it is doubtful whether, even in the most momentary case that we can suppose, we can regard either love or hate as a perfectly simple emotion. This is especially the case with love; for the desire of good to its object is so intimately blended with this emotion, that we are not sure whether the antecedent of them can be decidedly felt without a feeling of the consequent. In the case of hate, it may not be quite the same: at all events, mankind may not be quite so forward in confessing their desire of harm to the object of their hatred as they are in confessing that of good to the object of their love; and it may be that there are some degrees of *aversion*, in which the desire may be simply to avoid or get away from the object, and not to wish any positive harm to it. This distinction is, however, a very nice one; and the desire of injury to the hated object follows, in general, so closely upon the hatred, as that it can hardly be termed a retrospective emotion.

Love and hate have some analogy to the approbation of virtue and the disapprobation of vice; but they are much more extended in their application, and much more varied. Virtue is certainly a subject of love, and vice a subject of hate; but still there are many cases of love into which no feeling of virtue enters, and many of hate in which there is no feeling of vice.

Not only this, for there are many objects, both of love and of hate, of which neither virtue nor vice can be predicated; and there may be minds so perverted and depraved as to hate virtue and love vice, in particular instances, if not upon the general principle.

Independently of the Gospel commandments, to which we made allusion in a former chapter, it appears that mankind are really so constituted, that love is an habitual feeling with them, and hate only one to which they are driven, as it were, of necessity. A very little consideration will show why we have reason to believe that this must naturally be the case:—The desire of happiness, of some kind or other, is the predominant desire of all men; and unhappiness is their general aversion. That some people have shaken hands with sorrow, and are so wedded to their vices, as to appear to make the cultivation and increase of them an habitual study, is certainly true; but these persons have merely a perverted taste in their love; and, in consequence of some waywardness of pride—certainly often the most whimsical of all the emotions,—set their affections upon that which the majority of men dislike. Hence, they do not follow after unhappiness any more than other men do; they have only strange notions of their own happiness.

Setting them aside, as not bearing upon the main question, we may say that love is always a pleasurable emotion, and hate always a painful one. This is perfectly and generally true, without the slightest allusion to the merits or the demerits of the objects of either emotion. There are circumstances which

blend with them, no doubt, which, in the cases in which they exist, generally heighten the pleasure of loving, and deepen the pain of hating; but, independently altogether of these mixed emotions, there is a positive pleasure in the simple emotion of loving, and a positive pain in the simple emotion of hating, independent of all other feelings, and also of the nature of the subjects toward which either emotion is felt.

It is impossible not to admire the beauty of this adaptation of pleasure and pain to the two emotions under notice, or how admirably it suits, both for Man in his individual capacity, and as a member of society. Love is the band by which Man is drawn toward every subject, whether of contemplation or of performance; and hate merely arises upon occasions, to warn against that which would be dangerous in some way or other; and when it has performed its office in this way, the more speedily that it becomes still, and leaves the whole activity of the mind to love, the better. He who hates, lays himself on a bed of thorns, of the torment of which the object of his hate knows and feels nothing; and a continual hater cannot be other than a man of habitual wretchedness. Indeed, one can see this in the certainty and rapidity with which one fixed and determined hate eats into the whole mind, poisons every source of happiness, and makes the unhappy victim a torment to himself, at the same time that he is more a subject of laughter and pity to the rest of the world than any thing else.

Still, hate is a natural emotion, and has been implanted in human nature for the best and most

benevolent of purposes; and therefore it wants only to be regulated, not extinguished. One who could not hate would be very unfit for his place in society, though there ought to be as few cases of it, and those of as short duration, as possible. Strange as it may seem, we often have most occasion for the vigilance of hate when we are the most strongly affected by the opposite emotion. All strong emotions are apt to blind our intellectual perception, and thus carry us further than it is safe to go; and there is none which is so deceiving in this way as love, because there is none which, in all its modes, is so pleasing. Hence, if there is in, or connected with, the object of our love, any circumstance which gives rise to the slightest emotion of hate, especially of that species of hate which is allied to our aversion of vice, we should pay instant and careful attention to that; and how softly soever the current which is bearing us on may sound against the rock, we should listen to it with far more attention than to the loudest and loveliest strains of the siren. If the warning comes even in the lowest whisper, when we are in the fervour of the opposite emotion, we may be sure that it will break forth in thunders when that emotion shall, as it must, settle down into the ordinary calm of life. Many have been miserable for the whole term of their lives, from not attending to a warning of this kind; and have had the continual remorse of the neglected monitor adding to the torment of misery, all too bitter in its own reality.

Notwithstanding such dangers as that which has been mentioned, and some others of which we have

no warning, it is both our interest and our duty to make the range of the subjects of our love as extensive and as little dependent upon contingency as possible. Of this class, the foundation is the love of God, as the God of Creation and the God of Grace; and this is a love for eternity, as well as for the present world. Next comes the love of all that God has made, from the stupendous system of the heavens to the minutest thing upon the earth. In this there is involved not only the love of ourselves, in the highest and most desirable sense of the term, but the best and most disinterested love of society,—the love of being useful to our fellow men, according to the measure of our opportunities and our means. The rest of mankind around us are all children of the same Almighty Father; we all dwell upon the same earth, and the same subjects are given for our common study and our common use. If we do wrong to any one, we injure that of which ourselves are part; and therefore, while we feel the honest indignation of men when we see vice, injustice, or any thing wrong in others, we should be doubly careful to avoid even the slightest tendency to the same in ourselves. In all this wide field of scope for our emotion of love, there is nothing that we can morally hate till we come to Man, and in him it is the offence only against which our indignation can either in reason or in justice be directed. We may and should shun the offender, and if he is about to injure others, it is our duty to prevent him; but still, to extend our implacable hatred to him personally, would

only be making ourselves unhappy in the cherishing of a bad passion, without any good in return.

Offences against our standards of beauty and taste, which are always arbitrary, and not unfrequently absurd, are apt to disquiet us much with small hatreds, in the practice of which we vex ourselves with the merest vanities. We ought to bear in mind that there is no beauty or opposite of beauty in created things, as there is in the works of our artists of whatever description. The beauty or the contrary is in the mere feeling. No two human beings can agree in that feeling upon any subject of beauty or taste, unless they had been subjected to exactly the same circumstances, and had the same identical trains of sensation and feeling. But these things are impossible; therefore, all men must have different tastes; and consequently none has a right to quarrel with, or hate another.

We have said nothing of the relations and the alliances of men in society, or of the peculiar modifications of the emotion of love that naturally arise out of these; but we are speaking only of the immediate emotions, which are common to all the members of society, without any regard to the peculiar relations in which these members may stand to each other; and which relations, growing as they do out of conventional arrangements, ought not, however important they may be in themselves, to favour any part of the general question.

When these are left out,—and even if we were to admit them, it cannot fail to strike the reader, how

very little is that we can hate, or ought to hate, and the whole field of our knowledge and activity, wide as it is, and countless as are the objects of love, and of knowledge and benefaction as the reward of our love, with which it is stored,—within the whole scope of nature and revelation, and in all the adaptations of Man to the rest of nature, and of the rest of nature to Man, there is not an iota or an atom that we can by possibility hate, or that we can, if we have understanding, cease from loving; and this is exactly what we might be prepared to expect, for God is love, the covenant of his mercy to us is love, the creation in which he has placed us is love, and while we act in that line of duty which he has pointed out for us, we are under his special care, and "his banner over us is love."

In society, Love follows close after sympathy. This brings us together, tunes all our varied emotions into harmony, and diffuses over the whole of us one spirit of cheerfulness, by which we are wound up to the due capacity for happiness; and thus causes love to endear us all to each other, and make us fellow-workers for good, to ourselves and all our brethren.

PRIDE AND HUMILITY.—These are the last of the immediate emotions which we purpose to notice as bearing upon Man in his social relations. It must be understood, however, in the case of these as well as in that of those already noticed, that there are many different emotions, or shades of the same general emotions, included under each of these general names; and that, as is the case with the others, many of the

distinctive epithets given to these shades are exceedingly vague.

Pride and humility are reflected emotions, that is, in both of them the party himself or something connected with him is the subject of the emotion. This gives them the appearance, certainly, of being selfish rather than social; but still they have enough of social application to bring them within this class. They are the feelings which a man has of the relation in which he stands to society; and thus, though they always originate in something personal, they are displayed to society, and have very considerable influence upon the conduct of Man there.

Thus, emotions of self, if we may so call them, are not so immediate as those already considered. They are founded, not upon simple impulses, but upon comparisons; and every comparison, of whatever nature it may be, always involves the notion of an intellectual process of some kind or other. It is to be understood, however, that the comparisons from which these feelings result, are not facts,—subjects of actual knowledge. They are partly feelings, and partly opinions raised up with those feelings. It also matters little to the feelings whether the judgment drawn from the comparison be well or ill founded, provided that the party is satisfied with it; and indeed, it very often happens that the less foundation there is for the feeling, the more broadly are the consequences of it displayed before society. Many men, who are not merely conspicuous but absolutely notorious for their pride, have far more cause to be

humble; and many men who are habitually humble, have the most legitimate claims to be proud.

When the result of the comparison with society, or with any part of society, is—right or wrong—favourable to the party, he feels an exultation and joy, lively in proportion to the excess by which he overtops the subject of the comparison; and this joy, in its first and simple stages, is the immediate emotion of *pride*. If, on the other hand, he finds, upon making the comparison, that he does not in his own estimation come up to the standard, then he feels cast down and dispirited, in a degree proportionate to his felt inferiority; and this feeling, in its earliest and simplest stage, is the immediate emotion of *humility*.

It is not, as we have said, necessary that the party should be correct in the judgment he forms of himself that precedes the feeling; and there are many circumstances which may tend to mislead even the man who wishes to be correct in his estimate. It is also doubtful whether many men, indeed, the majority of mankind, can come to this judgment with their minds wholly unbiassed. The comparisons of which the feelings are the results, give them very much the appearance of reasoning from experience; so that if a man has come to any one of the conclusions in one instance, he is very apt to come to the same one in the next. A few repetitions of this confirm it into a habit; and thus the character of the man becomes proud or humble according as the habitual decisions are the one way or the other; and this, still, without

any necessary reference to the truth or the falsehood of the decisions.

Whatever we may say of the individual man or the individual instance, there is nothing wrong in either of the feelings, considered merely in itself. On the contrary, they are both feelings of human nature, implanted in that nature by its All-wise and All-bountiful Creator, and only given to Man for the very best of purposes; and therefore, if there is anything improper in them —or, indeed, in any feeling,—the fault is in the individual in whom it appears, and in those who betrayed him into the error, if any such there were.

Different as they are in their display, and in their influence upon the character, pride and humility originally answer very nearly the same purpose, only they do it by different means. The object of pride is to stimulate us to do better, from the feeling that we have already done well; and humility is a spur to urge us on to well-doing, from the feeling that we have fallen short of what we ought to have done. To give them effect in these, the proper modes of their operation, pride is a pleasurable feeling, and humility is a saddening, and, in so far, a painful one; and whether the one or the other is to be more efficient, is a question which must depend upon the merits of the particular case. "Encourage the diligent, and shame the idle," is, in so far, a good rule, but we doubt whether it is universal. For the exercise of humility, the whole field of knowing, of doing, and of possession is open; and there is only one single subject from which the simple and honest feeling of pride is

excluded—the knowledge of God and of the relation in which Man stands to Him. There, there is no room for pride,—no ground for exultation, because one man is more deeply read in theology, or holds a higher sacerdotal office than another. The ignorant and the learned, the pew-opener and the prelate, are equal in the sight of God; to Him they are debtors for all that they know and all that they are called; and if any one has received more than another, he is so much more a debtor, and so much more will be demanded and exacted of him.

But, with the exception of this one grand and solemn subject, the whole of nature, of art, and of society, is free and open to the honest pride of Man; and, so that he uses that pride as it ought to be used, it will certainly carry him to greater excellence than its opposite. But, it follows the general law of all active matters, whether human feelings or any thing else, in this—that the more effective it is for good, when rightly directed, the more efficient it is for evil, when perverted. We must also bear in mind that there are few of the human feelings that have greater aptitude for perversion than pride; because, along with even the honest consciousness of self-superiority, there is always more or less of self-flattery or adulation that blends with it; and all flattery is seductive, but self-flattery is the most dangerous of any. In the case of humility, there is no such danger; it is a quiet, unobtrusive feeling; and thus, the only evil that can result from an excess of it is, to depress the individual below his proper level, and thus diminish

his usefulness both to himself and to society. This injurious degree ceases to be humility, and comes under the denomination of *False Shame*, which is in part an acquired habit, and in part perhaps a bodily infirmity.

There is one form of pride, and one of the very best forms of it, which has been sometimes confounded with humility, though it is very opposite in its nature. This is the *mens conscia recti*,—that inward consciousness of ability and willingness, and actual performance of a man's duty to himself and to society, which is satisfied with itself, and thus makes no display, and courts no homage from the world. This is at once the noblest of all human virtues; and the one which is most fertile in the production of great deeds and great acquirements, of what kind soever they may be. It has this advantage, too, over most if not all of the others,—that it cannot be counterfeited. All the forms of pride which have a leaning toward vice or weakness, require some display before the world; and a man could not attempt to assume this virtue without making a show of the counterfeit in some way or other; and this of course would, in the eyes of the discoverer, completely dispel the delusive attempt, and place the party in the unenviable category of the convicted vain upon false pretences. Men who are in possession of the genuine virtue to its proper extent, do not, like the very equivocal character eulogised by Pope,

"Do good by stealth, and blush to find it fame:"

they honestly and manfully do their duty, in justice to their own character and to society, and never waste a thought either about "fame" or about "blushing." Instances of this character, both in the present times and in times gone by, will naturally occur to the reader; and it will be found that they are firm in their purposes, and care but little either for the praise or the censure of the day. Their exposure to either or to both,—for in any length of time they are pretty certain of meeting with both,—depends of course upon the nature of the duties which they are called upon to perform, and of that of the professions in which they are engaged; but whatever may be their stations or their doings, they are, under all circumstances, the very best men in society. If it were necessary to name one as a specimen, perhaps George Washington would occur to the reader.

The public, we had almost said the vulgar, display of pride—for the veriest vulgar are seldom without some form or degree of it,—is legion, both in its forms and its designations. There are, however, two leading types, of which some notice may be taken. They are *Haughtiness* and *Vanity*,—the first pointing to tyranny of character, and the second to frivolity,—the one the scourge of society in its extreme cases, and the other the amusement.

Haughtiness, which, however, is not a form of the emotion of pride, but a consequence of that emotion, —a peculiar direction into which pride is perverted by other feelings or habits which do not grow out of the simple emotion of pride, but are as it were para-

sitical upon it. The haughty man is himself his own idol; but the modifications of this idolatry are very numerous—varying from the most unsparing tyrant that ever bathed a throne in blood, through an endless line of other tyrants, getting less and less, but not "beautifully" less, until they merge in the man whose belly is his god, and who offers sacrifice to the very lowest of his animal gratifications. One would be apt to regard the distance between turbaned tyranny and this as a mighty stride; but really they are much nearer to each other than many other modifications of Man that appear to have a closer affinity; and the difference of them is difference of accidental station, and not difference of real character. It will be recollected that the most outrageous tyranny, and the lowest debauchery, very often in the same personages, were the twin-serpents that finally strangled the glory of Imperial Rome; and we may add that, where the first of these is found the second is seldom very distant.

This is the most antisocial of all the perversions of pride. The noblest form that can be given to pride is very generally without a counsellor; but the haughty man has neither companion nor friend. He despises the whole of society; and they, unless he is a ruler of slaves, with the sword of the executioner at his nod, pay him with abundant interest; and even in spite of all the instruments of his power, the blood of his victims springs up in daggers around his couch; so that, be his might what it may, he is always more miserable than he is mighty; and when the rank or

name is lower, the might may be less, but the misery is not—in all characters of the kind, it is the utmost that they are able to bear.

Vanity, in all its forms, is less blameable than haughtiness, but it is more contemptible; for, although we can hold the haughty tyrant in the utmost detestation, the feeling we have against him is much too deep for contempt. The vain man is social, that is, he courts the applause of others for that which is the idol of his vanity; and if the world will but worship that to his mind, he will pay them for it according to his ability, even to the worshipping of the idols of their vanity. Thus, while the haughty man "can bear no brother near the throne," the vain man is not happy if he is without one; and in all the modes of vanity, the vain associate for the purposes of mutual and reciprocal praise. One half of the fashionable associations which spring up in society are, in truth, owing to this very amiable, but somewhat ludicrous scion, which the weakness of human nature grafts upon the stock of pride. This is, of course, not the fundamental principle of society; but it is a counterfeit, which resembles it not a little in some particulars. The benefit to be derived from mutual assistance, and of union in the case of an effort, is probably the basis of society at its first forming; and among the associated vain, "Every man helpeth his neighbour, and sayeth to his brother, Be of good courage."

Vanity exists in an almost endless number of shades, from an amiable weakness to a very exquisite degree

of the ludicrous. Indeed, the lighter shades of it are not easily distinguishable from that love of the applause of society which is not only a virtue in itself, but the cause, or at all events the strengthener, of many of the social virtues. Perhaps there is no man who may not have vanity of some kind; for even those high characters to whom we have alluded, that have no haughtiness in their exalted offices, have often some vanities in smaller matters—in matters too small for calling the more exalted parts of their characters into action; and he who has neither pride nor vanity in carrying an important measure in the senate, or so conducting a warfare as to bring about an honourable and lasting peace, may yet be vain of a favourite horse or a favourite hound. So also the profound scholar or man of science, who looks upon that by which he equally enlightens and adorns mankind as the mere routine of every-day business, may be vain of a particular book, or a particular instrument, or even of some mere point of personal appearance. We once knew a very able and eloquent man of science, who was withal no Adonis in his personal appearance, and who yet dyed his hair, which began to be grizzled, with such copious applications of nitrate of silver or some such preparation, that the evidence of the fact flowed down his cheeks in parti-coloured streams after he became heated in company.

We are apt to look upon such matters with an eye of derision; but the probability is, that society is under considerable obligations for the course of vanity being directed into these comparatively trifling chan-

nels. If the vanity were to settle upon the higher pursuits of these illustrious men, it might put a stop to their progress there; whereas, by retiring to the little matters we have mentioned, it leaves all that is great in them to continue in vigorous operation, for the increase of their own well-earned fame, and the real and permanent advantage of society. We find that, when men of small calibre have succeeded in the production of a little something, they run about in society setting forth its merits, and begging approbation for it, they never, by any chance, can produce any thing superior to it.

These various modes of vanity also contribute vastly to the happiness of society, by distributing the sweet incense of praise to a greater number and variety. The number that can arrive at the very highest excellence, either in knowing or in doing, in planning or in executing, must always be very limited, and if the world had no praise but for them, it would be a gloomy world indeed. But the distributive kindness of benignant Heaven has "tempered the blast to the shorn lamb," so that there is no distinction, personal, acquired, or possessional, but which shall get some one to be vain of it, and some other one to apply the unction of adulation to the vanity; and, in this way all are made happy, and each is made happy at the smallest cost to himself, and with the greatest advantage to the whole.

Such is a very brief outline of the nature and tendency of the chief of those immediate emotions, which bear so strongly upon Man and Society that

they may be said to comprehend all the philosophical grounds of the social compact,—at least all those that depend upon the feelings of men towards each other. We have gone into the analysis and illustration of them a little more fully than we originally intended; for which our only apology is, that when one writes upon such matters, it is difficult to know when to stop. Notwithstanding all that we have said, we feel that we have barely enunciated the different subjects, if indeed we have gone that length; but our limits will not admit of any thing further. There still remain to be considered many more complex emotions, which in part arise out of these, variously modified by the habits of parties, and by trains of reasoning, and reminiscences of the past and anticipations of the future. These, as they are all more or less identified with the intellectual habit, are of much more difficult analysis than those upon which we have remarked; but we shall make a few, and a very few, observations on them in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V.

SOCIAL EMOTIONS—RETROSPECTIVE EMOTIONS.

THE RETROSPECTIVE EMOTIONS are, of course, those which relate to what is past, simply with regard to its effect upon the state of our minds at present, and without any regard to the future. They relate, of course, chiefly to events which have happened and actions which have been performed, though they may also relate merely to thoughts which have passed in our minds; only, the emotions connected with them are very slight if they have not some allusion to actions.

Emotions of this kind may be divided into three sections, according to the actors by whom the events to which they relate are felt or believed by us to have been brought about; and whether the emotion may come under one or another of these three sections, there can be only two apposite modifications of the emotion itself: it may be pleasurable to us, or it may be painful. The degree of pleasure or of pain will, of course, depend on the nature of the particular emotions; but one of them it must be in some degree or other.

The three ways in which actions can be performed, or events brought about, are these: First, they may not take place in consequence of the instrumentality of us or of any other human beings,—as, for instance, there may have been a very pleasant day when we were on a pleasure excursion in the country; or there may have been a storm, accompanied by lightning and thunder, and the lightning may have injured us, or some of our party. Whatever may have been the result in this, or in any similar case, in which the pleasurable or the painful result was wholly the effect of causes over which no human being could have any control, it is very obvious that no merit or blame could attach to us or to any other human beings, how much soever we may rejoice or be sorry at the event. Secondly, we ourselves may have been the actors in all that happened either for weal or for woe to ourselves or to others; and it is perfectly evident that, in this case, all the weal or the woe,—the feeling of all the happiness or all the misery which the event brings, must be our own; and that we have none to praise or to blame in the whole transaction, whatever it and its consequences may have been, but ourselves, and ourselves only. Thirdly, there are actions and events brought about solely by other men, which may be the cause of wonder in us. These emotions are, of course, social; may be of the most lively description, according as we are, or even feel ourselves to be, affected by the events, and they may be in the same degree either pleasurable or painful.

Emotions of this kind, as they are not produced by

immediate objects of the senses, but are produced by the return of former mental states, in memory or suggestion, may not in many cases be so vivid as our more immediate emotions, but they are of more permanent nature, and when they are in themselves calculated to be very pleasurable or very painful to us, they have more influence upon the rational part of the character, and by that means upon the relation in which we stand to our fellow men, and our conduct to them.

Even in the first section of these emotions, those in which no praise or blame is due to us or to any other human agents, the emotions may still be social in their objects; and in those cases the *gladness* or the *regret*—for we may use them as the appropriate names of the emotions—will partake a good deal of the nature of our sympathies, only they relate to the past, not to the present. When we ourselves, or rather that which has happened to us, is the cause of the emotion, the gladness or the regret may still, as a mere feeling, be regarded as allied to sympathy, only it is sympathy with ourselves in this case, in like manner as it is sympathy with others when the weal or woe of the event is to them.

We mentioned that these retrospective emotions have more permanent influence than the merely immediate ones; and, the tendency of gladness is to produce a cheerful habit, while regret tends to produce one which is sad and gloomy. These feelings are the sunshine and the shadow of human life, both in the individual and in society. They are not

the light and dark sides of things, as those are spoken of in ordinary observance; for these relate to the future, and it is the beam of hope which enlightens the side of whatever object it falls upon.

The gladness and the gloom of which we now speak are the lights and shadows of the past drawn upon the present; and as these are the shadows of what actually has been, there is a feeling of truth in them which makes an enjoyment of the pleasurable ones far more complete than the pleasure of any thing which is future, and upon which the die has yet to be cast.

Leaving out of view great and unusual events, and all subjects which weaken the stronger emotions, the common enjoyments of life and society may be said to consist in those lights of gladness and shades of regret; and, as they are the contrasts of each other, the proper distribution of the two makes life far more interesting than it would have been had it consisted of one unbroken glare of gladness from beginning to end. There are some persons whose lives are spent in perpetual smiles and garrulity, as if they found no woe in the world either of their own or of anybody's else. But such are characters of mere froth and surface, incapable alike of those nobler feelings and nobler deeds, in which the true honour of our nature and the full performance of our duty lies.

What should be the proportion of light and shade, so as to make the world the very best both for amusement and for enjoyment, is a problem of which no general solution can be given that will suit all men, or

even all classes of men; for that which is gladness or gloom to one man, may be perfect indifference to another; and that which occasions deep regret in the fastidious, might be productive of merriment among minds of another character. In order, however, that the effect may be both most agreeable and most beneficial to individuals and to society, there should be a *chiar' oscuro*, or grouping of the lights and shadows of life, much in the same way and for the same reason as this is necessary to give a powerful and pleasing effect to a picture. An incessant shifting from gladness to gloom makes the character, whether of individuals or of their aggregate or average in society, frivolous and insignificant. It is like a spotty picture, all frittered down into fragments, so as to present no breadth upon which the eye can rest till the mind is properly affected. The parallel of the picture, and what the lights and shadows of the past ought to make the present in life, is so close, that one has only to examine what constitutes a delightful picture in the distribution of its lights and shadows, and we may be sure that an analogous distribution of gladness and gloom in life will make it the most delightful both to the individual and to society. We are to remember, however, that it is not the mere fact of having the gay and the gloomy colours upon the palette which gives the charm to the picture; it is the skill of the artist in the distribution of them.

Even so, in the case of life, it is not the mere events of the past which can give the peculiar charm to the present in life. The painter must bring out the effect

here, the same as in the other case. The past is gone, and gone for ever, and we can never again be partakers in the joys or the sorrows which are recorded of it. Even if we mix the deepest personal interest with it, that which can raise us to the pinnacle of exultation, or sink us to the depths of despair, the reality cannot come back to us. All that we can have of it is the mental lights and the mental shadows, or rather, the mere materials of which those are to be formed; and what the resulting picture shall be, whether the most enchanting and spirit-stirring, or whether the merest common-place daub, depends upon the act of the mind in the painter; and, before any mind can be a master in this universal art of painting—this limning of the tables of our own daily and habitual enjoyment, and taking our part in that of the society to which we belong, the mind must be skilled in its art, which it can only be by long and careful experience and study.

Take an instance:—Two men shall go the same excursion, or undertake the same adventure in company with each other, in quest of information and pleasure. It would be the same were they in quest of any thing else; but we take that case, as it is a simple one, and there are objects of the senses to which reference can, if necessary, be made. Well, the two companions set out together, travel the same roads, see the same sights, stop at the same hotels, meet the same characters; and, in a word, they are as much identified as if one of them were a *fac-simile* of the other. But hear their separate accounts when

they return. The one shall give you nothing but a few disjointed scraps,—an overcharge here, a bad dinner there, a squabble with a postilion, a misunderstanding with a fellow traveller, and other items of the "miseries of human life," which excite in you strangely mixed emotions of pity and laughter. The other shall, in scarcely more words than his companion, fling you upon the canvas the whole route, with all its circumstances and its attributes, as vividly as though you saw it with your own eyes; and you shall be in raptures with it, and haply the more so the less you have been accustomed to such mental delineations; and you shall set out on the same tour, enjoy it with the keenest pleasure, and become a lover and enjoyer of scenic effect during the whole of your after-life.

Instead of this being a purely imaginary case, it is one of which there are many instances, not in the matter of pleasure tours only, but in almost every department of human life. As an illustration, we may mention the vast number of visitors which the description of Loch Katrine, in Scott's "Lady of the Lake," has drawn to that part of the Scottish Highlands, though, if we except the Trosachs and a small portion at the entrance, the lake is one of the tamest in the Highlands of Scotland; and not for a moment to be compared with the grandeur of Loch Tay, or the picturesque wildness of Loch Maree.

It is those feelings of the past—those lights and shadows reflected from that upon the present—which are the grand stimuli in the arts, the sciences, and all

that calls forth the powers of human nature, and renders Mah useful and delightful to Man—reciprocations which give to variety all its interest and all its fascination. It is this which makes the labour of life no burden, and its reverses and cares no misery; and we cannot but admire that beautiful adaptation of our nature, which has made this, which occupies so much of our time and forms so much of our enjoyment, so little connected with the more powerful of our feelings.

It is this love of the light and shade of the past thrown upon the present, which gives so much interest to the news and gossip of the day, whether that gossip come in the ordinary conversation of man, or be

> "Registered, to fame eternal,
> In deathless pages of diurnal;"

and though, like all matters in which there is much of general excitement, this may often be abused, yet it is, upon the whole, highly valuable; and though many persons may idle away upon this gossip time which *might* be better employed, yet we are not warranted in saying that it necessarily *would* be so; for the probability is that they who make a business of this, would be worse employed if they were to be deprived of it.

The force of this will be seen by any one who chooses to notice how the tide of the minds of most men ebbs and flows in concert with that of the newspaper. If there is a war, or any matter of great excitement, men are all upon the *qui vive*; and the

impulse which they receive from matters in which they have no personal interest carries them on in their own private matters: so that, if the war—for we shall take that as the maximum of excitement—does not come locally upon those in its present and actual destruction, the stimulus which it imparts to every thing among them may even more than compensate the expense—although there is, of course, no compensation to those who must endure the misery. Matters of minor import,—a contested election, an atrocious murder, or any thing that has a powerful effect upon the feelings, also produces an excitement which is, like the other, transferable to the occupations of men. On the other hand, when all is still, where there is no public squabble and no atrocious crime, one may find not a few of the human race moping with yawns and sadness, and complaining that "there is absolutely nothing." Now, in abstract truth, the world would be all the better if there were never a war, or murder, or disputed election either; and yet from the pleasure and stimulus which these things give, and the loose condition of many when there are none of these, one would be tempted to fancy that there is a compensation even in them, whereby society, taken as a whole, gains as much on the one hand as it loses on the other. These are matters, however, which do not well admit of analysis on the principles; and therefore we must judge of them by the results.

In these observations we have considered the retrospective emotions generally, in what manner soever

may come back to our mind alone as a simple suggestion; but our own act is bound to this consciousness that it is ours, and the one cannot come without the other.

But there is a farther analysis to be made before we can understand the power and effect of conscience, in the common acceptation of the term. There is a moral feeling inherent in Man—a feeling which, like all our feeling, may be abandoned, or perverted, or improved according to circumstances; and though at the time of the committing of any act, our other feelings may, by their greater vividness and power, prevent the mind from getting to the state of the moral feeling then; yet we can no more destroy this moral feeling than we can destroy the feeling that we are ourselves, or that the act we do is our own. No act of ours can be absolutely indifferent to this feeling; and therefore the consciousness that our act is our own, always brings with it in suggestion the feeeling of the right or the wrong of that act.

In the reminiscence—the return to the mind of any act of our own, there are three parts or mental states, which are so inseparably connected, that no one of them can come to mind without both the others; and no two without the third one. The mere suggestion,—the simple fact that such an act has been done, comes to the mind as a mere portion of remembered knowledge; and in so far as this part of the process is concerned, if the act were the same, and our knowledge of it the same, it would be perfectly the same whether done by one party or by another.

So also in the moral feeling toward it, and which has reference to the nature of the act itself, and *none whatever* to the party doing it, our moral approbation or disapprobation would be precisely the same, whoever were the doer, or whether the act were really done or only planned and meditated. Those two parts of the compound state would, were there no third one, bring home no very lively feeling of the act to us. But the third part, the unalienable feeling that the act, and the moral qualities of the act, whatever these may be, are our own, brings the whole home personally to us; and can give us more heartfelt joy, or keener anguish, than any thing that can otherwise occupy our minds. To give the full force, the one way or the other, there must indeed be a prospective emotion blended in the train of the others, or arising out of them; but without this, the bare retrospect may be very delightful or very distressing.

There is probably no man who can survey the whole of his past life without emotions of regret; and even the most depraved of mankind has something upon the remembrance of which he can dwell with satisfaction. We must, therefore, take the character for classification according as the one or the other predominates. If the favourable surveys predominate, we say that the man has an approving conscience, or a good conscience, and if the opposite ones prevail, we say that he has a condemning conscience, or an evil conscience. The good conscience is a source of happiness to him that feels he has it, and the bad conscience is a source of misery; and both the happiness and the

misery are to the parties themselves only, so that they can neither be hurt nor healed by any thing from without.

In order to bring conscience into operation, either the one way or the other, it is not absolutely necessary that there should be an actual deed done. Were this essential to give conscience its effect, there would be small good to society; and to the individual there would be nothing but misery. But the moral feeling arises on the contemplation of a future act, in the same manner as it does on the observation of a present or the memory of a past one; and when we meditate the act, the ever-wakeful feeling that that act, with all its qualities, shall be ours, cannot be kept back. From this it will be seen that conscience, in the strict sense of the term, is not the feeling which decides the good or the evil—the moral quality, whatever it may be, of that which is done or meditated. This is done by the moral feeling, which has reference to the quality of the act only, and which, abstractedly speaking, decides the cause of it whether it be ours or not. But conscience—the consciousness that it is ours, brings it home to us in a personal, and therefore a far more vivid manner than if it were the act of any one else. The moral feeling is therefore the important part of the matter; and it depends on qualities which may of course be made the subject of inquiry,—so that this feeling admits of cultivation. The mere consciousness that the act or the intention is our own, applies equally to all cases, whether they be morally approved or disapproved; and it admits

of no cultivation, and needs none. For a man to reason whether an act were his own or not, would be just about as absurd as for him to reason whether he were or were not himself. It appears to be the compound nature of the whole process, and the confounding of the mere conscience with the moral feeling, which have led to so many mistakes upon this very important matter.

It will readily be perceived by any one who chooses to reflect, that if our judgment of right and wrong in act and intention, had rested solely upon our own conscience, it would have had a very narrow as well as a very unstable foundation. Our conscience is a very simple matter, and it is a matter that has reference to ourselves only, and it cannot, in the nature of things, have reference to any one else. Therefore, if it had been the moral judge, we should have had as many standards of morality as we had people to deal with. But our Creator has ordered matters otherwise: and given us a standard of morality in our intercourse with our fellow-men, which is the same in the case of them all, as it depends on the actors themselves, and not on the parties by or to whom they are done. By this means our moral judgment is placed on a social basis, not a selfish one; and, as the principal part of our moral actions—indeed, we may say, the whole of them,—have reference to our fellow-men, it would have been an anomaly had the foundation of morals been otherwise.

In the case of intention, or the planning of any action, our moral feeling is just as strong in itself,

and our conscience is as certain to bring it home to us, as when we reflect upon the act after it has been done, and feel the most bitter remorse at having done it. But still there are desires and other emotions, which prevent the prospective operation of conscience from bringing home the guilt of an error or a crime so forcibly to us as the retrospective emotion brings the remorse. The preventive power of conscience in bringing home the moral feeling to us, in time for preventing us from doing wrong, is of course a prospective emotion; and as such, the consideration of it can be better brought in afterwards.

Independently of all prospective emotions,—of all hopes or fears of the future, our retrospective feelings of our own conduct may be either very pleasing or very painful to us; and, in so far as personal happiness or misery is concerned, it requires no future to reward the meritorious or punish the guilty. Of course we speak not now of the relation between Man and his Maker, for in that view of the subject Man can have no merit. We speak of virtue and its opposite, as between man and man; and in this sense there may be, indeed must be, either merit or demerit in every human action which is of any importance to society. Were this not the case, the enactment of laws, and the whole system of rewards and punishments, would be absurd; and it is for this very purpose that this moral feeling has been implanted in our natures, for, in respect of his relation to his God, Man can have no moral feeling.

We mention this, because some religionists have

confounded the two; and, in their misguided zeal for what they fancied to be religion, have gone about to sap the foundation of morality. We do not say that any punishment which can be inflicted upon Man for a crime against society, can take away the eternal punishment of that crime. That punishment is the remorse of the guilty mind—the only punishment which the mind can suffer, and it is enough; and, as no human interference can in any wise blot out the memory of a guilty act, the punishment of the mind remains the same after the ultimate penalty of the law is inflicted upon the body, as if the perpetrator were living honourably and unsuspected in society. Again, as no human interference can take away the eternal punishment of the guilty mind; so no effort of the party, or of any one in his stead, can stay the mental infliction until death, or even for one single moment. There are many of the more hardened in iniquity and in ignorance, who mock at futurity; and it were moral injustice if these could stay the mental punishment for even an hour of this life. The law which God has written in the heart of Man partakes, however, of the perfect justice of all the divine laws; and therefore, the morally guilty as against Man, or Society, in the present world, has "the arrow of the Almighty within him," from the very instant of the perpetration of his crime; and, as no man can be continually intoxicated to stupor with tyrannical power, with sensual indulgence, or with any thing else, it is highly probable, nay, we may say morally certain, that, whatever may be the external appear-

ances, the guilty pay dear in their minds for their indulgences, even while they are in the present life; and that, too, in each moment as it passes, without the slightest allusion to the future — even to the daily to-morrow of our common reckoning of time.

Such is the avenging power of that law of nature which the Almighty has written upon the human mind, even in its very constitution, that when the bad man, armed with power, is in the act of doing the very worst that he can do upon his victim, it is very difficult to say who is the sufferer, even at that very moment. The tyrant may be bad as tyrant can be, but still he is a man, and all his better feelings as a man are the slaves—the dungeon captives—of that one archtyrannical passion to the domination of which he has given them up; and the agony of these may be, and often—perhaps always—is, unspeakable torment compared to the merely physical suffering that he can inflict. The physical wheel often "comes full circle" upon those monsters of our race, and they pay in the sight of men for the cruelties they have perpetrated; and do this amid the gratulations and shoutings of the spectators, that retribution has been made in their sight. And we grant that, as a warning to others, this public and physical vengeance is useful, and *may* deter others from following the same course. But, if we had the means of viewing the mind as we can view the body, and could note the state of things there, we should find that, even when the blood curdles at the mere tale of his atrocities, the veriest

monster of our race is an object of pity and commiseration.

In the majority of cases, the very horror that they excite prevents the perpetration of deeds which are ostensibly and glaringly cruel in their external demonstrations; and it may be said with truth that, unless in some state of mental hallucination, no man ever deliberately planned one of these atrocities without having previously gone through a progress of iniquity. That which is sometimes called the passion for pleasure, but which in truth is the lust of criminal indulgence,—though not indulgence violently against nature,—is the usual commencement; but, when the course is once fairly entered upon, the desires get the momentary advantage of the moral feelings, so that the party is beyond the means of ordinary escape before he is aware of his error; and even if he does awaken to it, he is apt to find himself in the thraldom of companionships through which it is not easy to break. There is also a withering of the mind, produced by the sense of the depth to which the party has fallen, which prevents him from regaining the path of virtue; and though the path of vice may be painful to him, he has not strength or resolution to escape from it; so seductive is the beginning, and so dangerous the course of criminal indulgence.

There is one other circumstance connected with these feelings of retrospect which may be just noticed; and that is, the effect which they have upon a man's bearing and conduct, and through these upon his prospects and progress in society. If the result is

self-approbation, the effect often is to make the individual cheerful, pleased with himself and every one else; and as the subject of his approbation,—the act for which he is thus pleased,—has, as we have endeavoured to show it must have, a reference to society, he naturally feels a gratitude to that society, and a disposition to win yet greener laurels in its service. The man who finds himself reproved by the retrospect, is in a very different situation. He is cast down and dispirited; and his feeling also is that the cause of this unpleasant feeling is connected with society. This produces an aversion to society, and consequently a slight degree of estrangement from it, which has a tendency to sink him still further than he is already sunk, both in spirit and in usefulness. To common observation, the influence of these different results of self-retrospection often pass unheeded; but they are of very great importance in keeping individuals in the path of virtue, and also in making them love society, associate with the more virtuous part of it, and thus advance in honour, in usefulness, and in all the elements of which the social happiness of Man is composed.

We have now to notice the third section of the Retrospective Emotions, namely, those which arise from our considering the past conduct of others, of which conduct we ourselves may or may not have been the object, according to circumstances. Of these there are only two, the opposites of each other,—*gratitude*, for good which we feel to have been done; and *anger*, for evil; but each of these admits of many degrees, to some of which particular names are given.

Gratitude has some resemblance to Love, and Anger has some to Hatred; but there are differences between them, besides the mere difference in point of time, or in Love and Hate being immediate, and Gratitude and Anger being retrospective. Love is an emotion simply toward its object, without regard to any act which that object may have done; whereas, there must be good done before we can be grateful. So closely are they related, however, that in some cases the difference between them is little else than one of time. The original and simple emotion of love is nothing more than the pleasure which we derive from the contemplation of the subject which excites it; and whenever this becomes a matter of recollection with us, there is a feeling of gratitude for the pleasure. We may feel gratitude, however, where there has not only been no love antecedent, but where the antecedent feeling has been the opposite; and in this way, one whom we absolutely hated may, by some kind action to us, compel our gratitude, even more than we would feel bound to give if the object had been one that we loved. There is thus always some mental process,—some comparison of the nature of what is done with some sort of standard,—before we can have the emotion of gratitude, whereas we may love an object without knowing why.

The distinction between hate and anger is nearly of the same kind: we may hate we know not why, but we always have, or fancy we have, cause when we are angry; and the feeling of anger always has reference to something done; whereas the hate is to the

object itself. If, however, we consider the action as apart from the actor and the fact of its being performed, and regard it merely as a subject of thought, it may be either loved or hated, according to our feeling of the nature of it; but, in the abstract view, it cannot be the subject either of gratitude or of anger.

There is yet another distinction, equally applicable to both pairs of analogous emotions, which will perhaps convey still more clearly the idea of the difference between them. We can love an irrational animal, or a subject which is inanimate, but we cannot with propriety say that we are grateful to it. We love the horse that has carried us many a mile without stumbling; we love the apple-tree which is so beautiful in its blossom, and so abundant and choice in its fruit; we love all that gives us pleasure in nature; but we cannot, with any propriety of language, say that we are grateful to any thing inanimate—to any thing that cannot understand and appreciate our gratitude. Gratitude is, in fact, a votive emotion,—a rendering of the service of our affections, and we cannot offer it but to something capable of receiving it. It is the same with hate and anger. I may hate a silly or a vicious book, but I cannot be angry with the book, though I may be with the author for the act of writing it. I may hate any thing whatever, the knowledge or the thought of which gives me pain; but I cannot be angry with it, unless I have the mental conviction that it can understand and feel my anger. We can love that which is perfectly passive, and from which

we derive pleasure by our own feeling or our own act; but if it goes no farther than this, we cannot be grateful to it; we are grateful only to that which gives us pleasure by its own act. We owe our existence, and all the sweets of our existence, to the Being who made us; and, therefore, our gratitude to Him ought to be universal. But, besides this universal debt of gratitude to our God, we can owe no gratitude save to our fellow-men. We are grateful to the physician who restores us to health from a dangerous disease; but we cannot be grateful to the medicine which he prescribes. We are, or we ought to be, grateful to the man who does us any good, be it what it may; but we cannot be grateful to the good itself, for this plain reason—that it cannot receive our gratitude.

It is the same in the case of anger; we cannot—rationally at least—be angry with that which cannot understand and feel our anger; and therefore, the only rational subjects of our angry emotions are human beings. Persons of vulgar minds very often confound the proper subjects of hate and anger. They are angry with that which can in no way feel their anger; and, in consequence of this confounding of the emotions and their objects, they are often guilty of outrages which would be perfectly ridiculous, if they were not practically mischievous. One would naturally suppose that this confounding of things could be a vice only of the most neglected of the vulgar—of the merest outcasts of society, so to speak. Such, however, is not the case; and this fact

shows that it is not to nominal station, but to proper training and example, that we are to look for the presence of the virtues, and the absence of the lowest and most degrading of the vices. That ungovernable violence and untrained vulgarity of temper, which leads its unhappy possessors to confound the proper subject of anger with those against which no anger can rationally be felt, by no means confine the effects of their rabid passion to what would be legitimate objects of hate, even with those who have hate as one of their characteristic or governing emotions. When the furor is upon them, they discharge the effects of it indiscriminately around; and when they are impotent against what stimulates them to rage, or ignorant of any real stimulus, they show the *vigour* of their passion in the abuse of those whom they have not only reason to love, but whom they do love in the lucid intervals of their wretched life, and their magnanimity in the destruction of every thing that comes within their reach.

Gratitude is one of the most pleasing of all our feelings; and it is one which both our interest and our duty demand of us to have in continual exercise. There is no condition of life that can be elevated above gratitude, and none that can be sunk below it. The foundations of it are so intimately connected with our very nature, and our place in creation, that it ought to be permanent with us in all the changes and vicissitudes of life, let them be as great as they may. Our other feelings answer particular purposes, and have their excitement and their repose upon

particular occasions; but this one should hold steadily on with us, in prosperity and in adversity, through good report and through bad.

In the waywardness of our ignorance, this is probably the feeling which we are most apt to neglect; and yet it is the one which is especially binding upon us at all times and under all circumstances. Cheerfulness and melancholy, love and hate, sympathy and indifference, and all the rest of our contrasted feelings, will at times alternate with each other; but in even the most stormy moods of any of the other emotions, gratitude ought still to be our pilot. We may be spoiled of all our earthly possessions; we may be oppressed, persecuted, cast into prison, and doomed to ignominy and exile, all through the malignity of others; we may be stricken down by disease, we may be wounded by the treachery of those upon whom we have bestowed unmixed and unwearied kindness; but still, in each and all of these, and in any thing more than these which can be laid upon us, we have cause for gratitude. We ought to be grateful to our Creator for having given us being, and made us rational creatures, capable of knowing and enjoying; and we ought to be doubly grateful to Him for having made known to us the way of salvation and eternal happiness. This is a source of joy which the world can neither give nor take away, and which ought therefore to be our constant stay in the furnace of life's affliction, as well as in its most flowery path.

This gratitude to God is not the only gratitude by which we ought constantly to be affected, but it is

the chief and the foundation of all the rest; and if we have it in full and constant exercise, there is really nothing in the world by which we ought to be cast down. When we reflect calmly and seriously upon the relation in which we stand to our God in the character of our Redeemer from eternal misery,—from that misery which, but for the interposition of his gracious mercy, we must, from the very constitution of our nature, have suffered, we cannot fail to discover that for this we have more cause of gratitude than if we had been perfect creatures, that had no need of salvation and deliverance. Whether we could have remained in this perfect state, is a question which we need not, and indeed cannot, discuss. All that we can say is, that such a state is perfectly incompatible with the nature of beings who have no knowledge but what they derive from experience, and who never know by anticipation what a day may bring forth. This, however, we do know, and can understand,—that Man, as he is now constituted and placed in the world, is far happier in the feeling that God has redeemed him, than he would have been under the feeling that he was perfect in himself, and needed no salvation. In that case he would have had no stay for his mind, but would have been at the mercy of every emotion to which the circumstances wherein he was placed could give rise. A perfect control of circumstances would be essential to the happiness of a perfect man; and this control is quite incompatible with the nature of a finite being. Therefore a perfect man could not hold the place which Man holds in the

world,—and if he could, it would be continual misery to him.

This is a doctrine which is not often stated, and it is one for the want of which the systems of theologians are often exceedingly ragged and absurd; but it is a doctrine which is absolutely and indeed necessarily true. We can, of course, have no practical demonstration of it, for there are no perfect men in the world; but we have analogical illustrations which show us pretty clearly how the demonstration would go if we could obtain it. The self-sufficient—those who believe that they are always in the right,—so far from being the happiest of mankind, are the most habitually wretched. All that differs from them is wrong in their estimation; and this includes all the rest of men and a very large majority of things. That which we fancy to be wrong is always disagreeable to us; and thus, go where he will, or meet with whom he may, the man who is right and righteous in his own estimation meets with nothing but subjects of offence and censure. He sees no beauty and no virtue; and therefore he feels no love, no gratitude,—none of those kindly emotions in which alone the pleasure of life consists, and the absence of which turns it into one scene of retributive torment. Such a man is under the constant dominion of the very worst passions of human nature, and therefore he is equally miserable in society and unworthy of it.

Now, as the belief of any thing, when it is complete and habitual, has precisely the same mental effect as the reality, it is quite evident that an actually

perfect man would have lived in the very same misery as the man who supposes that he is perfect; and consequently, strange as it may seem to those who have not thought of it, perfect men could not have lived comfortably in society—could not have lived in society at all. "What! then," it may be asked, "is the frailty—the vice of human nature, the bond of human society!" Of the "frailty," we say *yes;* but of the "vice," we say that it has nothing to do with the matter at issue. We speak not of moral offences, for these have always the power of making the ill-doer miserable, and at some times in all cases, and at all times in some cases, they exercise this power. We speak of Man's relation to his God; and of Man's constant source of support, in gratitude to God for goodness which is eternal, and high above all human power, or price, or praise.

The very consideration of this, while it affords to Man the constant exercise of the delightful feeling of gratitude, makes him love society, and seek help from that in every case in which he feels his own weakness. We have, in the early chapters of this volume, gone at some length into the nature of the obligation which every man is under to society, as well as that which he is under to God; and what we now state is the moral application,—the habitual pleasure which he ought to have in the enjoyment of gratitude for both.

If these, our foundations of general and habitual gratitude, are firmly established in the mind, he who has them can never be miserable, but will at all times be in fitting mood for every duty and every enjoy-

ment. Not only this, but he will be alive to all the little gratitudes which the pleasures of nature, of social intercourse, and of occupation are calculated to excite: life will go cheerily on with him in all its departments and its modes; and we need not add, that he who does all things cheerily must do them well.—Such is the emotion of gratitude, and such the pleasure and the profit which we all might, if we would, derive from its general and from its temporary exercise.

But all our emotions are liable to perversion and abuse, and to this, gratitude forms no exception. We believe that, if gratitude to God and to society is habitually and properly felt, it will keep all our emotions in proper order, and the emotion of gratitude among the rest. This, however, is more than we can realise in our own case, or hope for in the case of others; and therefore, we must "keep our hearts with all diligence" in the case of gratitude as well as in that of our other affections. Our gratitude may be misplaced; and if we discover that it has been so, that will weaken the emotion in us; so that, if we once err in being grateful where gratitude ought not to have been felt, our next and necessary error will be not feeling grateful when we ought. There is also a spurious feeling, which may be termed a "beggar's gratitude," and which is particularly injurious to the character. This is that grateful return for substantial favours, which makes the receiver of such favours indolent, just as a beggar is lazy after an alms, or a predatory animal after a full meal. This species of gratitude is very common among those who are born

to fortunes; and there are many not absolutely beggars, who become the more helpless and wretched themore that is given to them. These may be as much pleased with the mere act as those others upon whom it has the most beneficial effect; and therefore gratitude, like all things else, is not be judged of by the mere momentary feeling, but by the effects which it produces upon the character and conduct. These are indeed the ultimate tests by which the good or evil of every thing must be tried, for that which does not make a man better cannot be a virtue.

Anger is, of all our social emotions, the most painful to ourselves, and the most offensive to others; and yet the indulgence of it is more apt to become a habit than that of any of the rest. The reason is obvious—or at all events it is easily pointed out. It is a common observation, that they for whose anger the fewest care, are the most frequently angry; and in this lies the whole of the explanation. The veriest outcasts that attend the markets for the purpose of picking up a scanty living by the performance of the meanest offices, are remarkable for the readiness and violence of their anger; and as we advance higher in society, the habitually angry are always the worst at their trade or profession, whatever that trade or profession may be. No matter for the pretence which he may set up, for a man who is often angry, is always in reality a bungler; and, however the domestic brawler may pretend to be a notable, she is always in reality a slut.

The case cannot be otherwise: it is not to the mere

anger which those against whom it is directed pay any deference,—it is to the cause of the anger; and if in common judgment that cause is inadequate, the angry party always appears degraded by the passion. There is not a more contemptible phase of human nature than a violent paroxysm of imbecile anger from a trifling cause; and if this is repeated, the whole dignity of the character is gone in the estimation of every one who knows the fact. High rank or important office in no way diminishes the contempt which we feel for those who give themselves up to the external display of this emotion. An angry duchess is a far more humiliating display than an angry fish-woman: a queen in a fury—if fury could be predicated of so exalted a personage, would shake the loyalty of the beholder to its very foundation; and an enraged parson would do more real injury to religion, than a waggon-load of infidel publications.

Even when the power of the party is such as to cause the anger to be dreaded, that does not take away the contempt. It may make men conceal the outward expression—the contempt which they fail not to exhibit at the wrath of the powerless, but it fosters a deeper passion. The rage of the feeble does not alarm the fear or stir up any of the prospective emotions of those who behold its display; and therefore it merely excites the immediate emotion of the ludicrous or the pitiable, according to the condition and character of those by whom it is seen. When, however, the man of power rages, there is an emotion of a very different kind. He has got the bolt of

destruction in his hand; and from the violence of his passions none knows exactly against whom or against what it may be launched. Therefore there is a general fear among those who know of it, and a general sympathy with each other; and these produce indignation and disgust, which only rankle the more deeply the more necessary that their present concealment is to the safety of the parties. The desire of avenging is the next emotion to which these lead; and thus the angry tyrant always produces a desire of vengeance upon him, whether he may ever be overtaken by that vengeance or not.

This is true of all tyranny—of all anger armed with power, whether the extent of that power be great or small, public or domestic. An angry parent never has an obedient child, an angry master a faithful servant, or an angry man a trusty friend. Thus, every one who indulges in this passion suffers a double misery; first, in the actual pain which the passion inflicts, without any regard to the consequences; and, secondly, in the degradation in the opinions of society which is always attendant upon it. No man of any thing like decent character indulges in the stormy display of this passion of his own accord; but there are provocations which very few men can bear, and therefore the best practical rule is to avoid opportunities of anger. No man can avoid having the feeling, for the natural feeling is good and proper; but it ought never to become what is usually termed a passion—we ought never to allow our anger to take such possession of us that we lose the power of com-

parison, and of discerning between right and wrong. If we do, we are sure to repent it when the passion subsides; and we are as sure to have acted wrong, if we have acted at all while under its influence. This is true in every case, let that which excites our anger be what it may; but it is especially important when the anger is raised by something that has been done to ourselves.

Still, the very anger, the excess of which so unfits Man for society, and so degrades him in it, is a social emotion—an emotion implanted in the nature of Man for his own good and the good of society jointly. If Man had been solitary, the emotion of anger could not be displayed, and thus could not have been said to exist—as an emotion which nobody feels is but another name for no emotion at all. We sometimes say, indeed, that we are "angry" with ourselves for certain deeds or omissions; but this is merely an abuse of language, for what we really feel is regret, and not anger. Even in our eternal state, whatever may be the nature of our communications there, and whether our portion shall be weal or woe, there will be no scope for anger,—it will be wholly gladness in the one case, and wholly despair in the other.

Anger is thus wholly a social emotion; and when exercised toward the proper objects, and on the proper occasions, it is an emotion of the greatest value to society. As gratitude is the bond of society, so anger is the governor; and when the members of any society are what they ought to be, public indignation is a power enthroned high above all regal dignity. It is,

as one would say, the vicegerent of the Almighty, which says, in a voice which will not be gainsaid, that no individual of the human race shall oppress or tyrannize over the rest. Even here, however, we must beware of the counterfeit; and, indeed, in all cases, anger is an emotion of such power, that it requires to be watched with the utmost vigilance. We must not confound the honest indignation of the well-informed public with the clamorous rage of the infuriated mob. The latter is as disgraceful to society as that intemperate anger of which we have spoken is to the unhappy individual who is its victim; and in its consequences it may be far worse—worse, indeed, than the utmost which the most demoniac of individual tyrants can perpetrate.

The line of distinction between them is, however, so clear and definite, that it can hardly be mistaken. Public indignation, even when it is so powerful as to make the thrones of oppression rock to their very bases from one end of the civilized world to the other, it is yet calm and dignified, and does no wrong,—is never the aggressor, even against those by whom it is excited. It partakes, in so far as any thing human can so partake, of the solemn majesty of Him who implanted it in the nature of Man; and though it is terrible in its demonstration, it is slow and reluctant in its actual vengeance. With the furious excitement of the mob, the case is widely different. That is the mere froth upon the surface of society, [illegible] and fro by every gust of the wind, and [illegible]er and thither by every working of the

waters. The more that the mob-exciting orator lies, so that he is loud enough in his brawling, the greater is his chance of infuriating his audience on to madness and to mischief. Nor need we be in any hesitation about the reason of this; for, the mischievous and the mindless are the audience of such pests, the one prepared to lead and the other to follow, by brute obedience, in all that even demon can desire. Thus, when they are aroused, the bloodhounds of all denominations are unmuzzled, and each is upon his own particular slot, under cover of a public purpose, and therefore safe from that detection which would find them out and betray them if they dared to go the tithe of the length in their private capacities. This is, in fact, the greatest bane of society, to the same extent and for the same reason that honest public indignation is its greatest blessing. It is far more mischievous in free countries than in those under tyrannies, even when it does not go the length of overt public outrage; and perhaps the British Islands suffer more from this mob movement than from all other political causes.

From this, its most extensive type, we can learn and can trace both the beneficial and the baneful mode of anger, down to those individual outcasts with whom we began. In every stage and degree, the proper measure is salutary in the prevention of mischief; and when that measure is exceeded, the actual injury done is much greater than that which the proper measure would have prevented. Even in the most justifiable cases of anger—in those in which it may be regarded

as a virtue—for every emotion properly directed is a virtue—we must beware of its commencement. It is an emotion which eats into the mind like a canker; and, therefore, though at the first our anger may be justifiable, or even commendable, in nature changes if we keep it too long. For our own comfort, therefore, as well as for the peace and happiness of that society of which we are members, the interests of which are our interests, and the esteem of which is necessary to our pleasurable and profitable existence, we should be guided by the maxims of the volume of inspiration in being "slow to anger," and especially in "not letting the sun go down upon our wrath."

The emotions of which we have given an outline in this chapter are the leading ones which have their causes or excitements in that which is past, and their effects upon our present state, and our capacity and disposition for acting. As such, they bear directly upon our social intercourse; and the reception with which we meet among our fellows, depends not a little upon the temper of mind in which we appear. Therefore, for the sake of our place and respectability in society, we ought as much as possible to cherish the pleasurable emotions, and repress the painful ones. We ought also to do this for our own sakes,—not merely to avoid the pain of the turbulent emotions, which is always far more than a counterbalance to any advantage, even momentary and imaginary advantage, that we can derive from them, but unfits us alike for the planning and the executing of any thing useful.

Short maxims are often better for practical purposes than long lectures, and there is one which applies here:—"Never regret or be angry at what can be helped, or what cannot be helped;" for the first only hinders you from helping, and the second prevents you from setting about something else which you are capable of doing.

CHAPTER VI.

SOCIAL EMOTIONS—PROSPECTIVE EMOTIONS.

THOUGH, as body, Man lives in the present only, yet, as mind, he lives much more in the future. In this he differs from all the other inhabitants of the earth; and this alone, although there were no other, would be sufficient evidence of the existence and even of the immortality of mind. The providence of bees and other storing animals has often been brought forward as evidences of conscious care for the future upon their part; and the same has been extended to the ant, which lays up no store of food, and to birds and insects, which select or prepare fit places, or nests or niches, in which their young may be brought to life and fostered till able to shift for themselves.

But truly, there is not any care for the future, or any knowledge of the future, revealed in even the most curious of these animal provisions. Trees, grasses, plants of all kinds, are just as careful for their seasonal appearances and their progeny, as those animals which are the most celebrated. No bee or other insect makes finer or more elaborate protections for its young than the deciduous trees do for the pro-

tection of their buds; and there is just as much intention and care in the flower preparing itself for the bee, as in the bee preparing itself for the flower,—that is to say, there is none whatever in either of them, or in any case which we can observe, either in the animal or the vegetable world.

The whole of this famed knowledge of the future, and *knowledge* of what it is about, both as respects the present action and the future purpose of that action, is the misapplication of the analogy of Man. In general, we believe that this is well meant—that it is intended to set forth, and if possible to magnify, the wisdom and goodness of God in creation. But it has the very opposite effect: it destroys the beautiful uniformity of the law of the material creation, and calls in other *intelligences* between the Creator and his works—a sort of idols of the fancy, which are a mockery equally of that which is made and of the Maker. Is not the rotation of the earth upon its axis the grand cause of day and night? and do not all the productions of nature obey the alternation of these? Is not the inclination of the earth's axis to the plane of its yearly revolution the cause of the changes of the seasons? and do not all the production of the earth,—animal and vegetable,—obey the viscissitudes of these, according to the exact degree of their variation in different latitudes and localities? Shall we say, then, that the earth has a *knowledge* that day and night, and summer and winter, are to alternate with each other? Does the rolling orb, the motion of which is so rapid that, if we could stand by

while it passed, it would be invisible, — does it, in thoughtful consideration of the growing and living motes upon its surface, kindly put them to sleep in the evening, and awaken them in the morning; and does it blight them with the blasts of winter, and refresh them with the breezes of summer, in full knowledge and intention of so doing? The bare supposition of the one or the other would be enough to startle the veriest dotard of those worshippers of small animals, who expatiate about the foresight of a fly, and the skill of a caterpillar; and yet, the cases are exactly parallel,—nor can there be found, in the whole compass of physical nature, a single instance of which the same may not be said with equal truth. It is only saying that God made them; and that, true to the infinite wisdom and power which we cannot, from the simple contemplation of them, fail to predicate of Him, they are all perfect. The mathematical and mechanical skill of the common bee, in constructing its cells of the maximum capacity and strength, in the minimum of space and with the minimum of materials, has been adduced as a proof of the skill of that insect in the differential calculus. But the curve in which the bole of a tree springs from the root, and which is imitated in light-houses that are exposed to violent action of the winds and waves, depends upon a far more intricate problem than the simple one of maximum and minimum which the bee is said to solve; and yet nobody ever gave an oak credit for its skill in mechanics.

To the animals there is no past and no future; and

the same may be said of Man, in as far as the mere body is concerned. If we have lived for any considerable time, our past body—not only one but many past bodies, are scattered to all the winds of heaven; and if we shall live a considerable time longer, the bread which is to form part of our future body is not yet sown as wheat. The body comes and goes, and can have no remembrance of the past or anticipation of the future. There is not an atom of that body which was the corporeal instrument of the hero of Waterloo, in the present corporeal Duke of Wellington; and the august person of the future sovereign of these realms is at this moment growing out of the soil, living on the earth, flying in the air, or swimming in the water —without the slightest anticipation of the greatness and the glory of which it is one day to be the substantive symbol.

In the case of mind, it is widely different. With mind, there is no receiving or giving out of any kind or portion of substance. We know nothing of the essence of mind, because that does not in any way come under the cognizance of our senses; but we do know that, whatever its essence may be, that must remain without change, from the moment of its creation, to all eternity; and that, whatever may be its essence, that essence needs no growth and no renovation, and can be subject to no exhaustion, fatigue, or decay. Hence, the present moment, which is the only life that we know of the human body, or of the body of any animal, as identical, is a mere point in time as compared with the life of the mind,—a mark

between the past and the future, and nothing more, while the body, as living and sentient, has neither past nor future.

With mind, the momentary present is the mark between the known of life and the unknown; for, though the mind has prospective emotions, it neither has nor can have any prospective knowledge. Knowledge, being obtainable by experience only, has no source but in the past, or in so far as, reasoning upon the principle of cause and effect, we can make the past a mirror in which to see the present image of the future. This analogy of like causes in like circumstances, uniformly producing like effects, without any regard to the mere difference of time, is the guide of our conduct in every thing, and the source of all our prospective emotions; so that these emotions, though they have reference to the future, do not, and cannot, originate there. The body has no care for the future, because it has no memory of the past upon which such care could, by possibility, be grounded; and it is solely because the mind has such memory, that it has emotions which are prospective as to the future.

Though the foundation of this analogy, by means of which we make the past a mirror and guide to the future, is the actual experience of the past, yet the analogy itself is a matter of belief; and, although there are some men, of no mean pretensions in philosophy, who affect to undervalue, or even to mock, at belief, as a most visionary and unreal matter, as compared with what they call reason and experience, yet reason is in truth nothing else than belief, and without

belief experience could be of no use whatever. Take the very simplest case that can be adduced:—A man was relieved from certain uneasy sensations by taking food yesterday, or any number of past days; he feels the same uneasy sensations to-day; and he wishes to take food in order to be relieved from them. But this is, in truth, nothing more than a case of mere belief. The man cannot bring the bodily sensation of hunger from which he was relieved by food yesterday, into juxtaposition with that which he feels to-day, so as that the judgment, consequent upon the direct and simultaneous observation of any one of the senses, can be passed upon the two. Yesterday's feeling of hunger, and of the relief of that hunger by taking food, are not *sensations* to-day. They are not felt by the body in any sense. They are merely mental suggestions, called to memory, as we say, by the sensation of to-day. Therefore, the analogy is not perfect — not the comparison of "quantities of the same kind," which is essential to a perfect, or mathematical analogy—an analogy which requires no assistance from belief. The one member of the comparison is a bodily sensation, presently felt; the other is a mere mental remembrance, in which the body is not affected at all; and therefore we cannot say, as matter which could be mathematically demonstrated, that what was a relief in the one case, must, of necessity, be a relief in the other. We *believe* that it will, and it is the constitution of our very nature so to believe; and this is all that we can say about the matter.

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From this, its most extensive type, we can learn and can trace both the beneficial and the baneful mode of anger, down to those individual outcasts with whom we began. In every stage and degree, the proper measure is salutary in the prevention of mischief; and when that measure is exceeded, the actual injury done is much greater than that which the proper measure would have prevented. Even in the most justifiable cases of anger—in those in which it may be regarded

as a virtue—for every emotion properly directed is a virtue—we must beware of its continuance. It is an emotion which eats into the mind like a canker; and therefore, though at the first our anger may be justifiable, or even commendable, its nature changes if we keep it too long. For our own comfort, therefore, as well as for the peace and happiness of that society of which we are members, the interests of which are our interests, and the esteem of which is necessary to our pleasurable and profitable existence, we should be guided by the maxims of the volume of inspiration in being "slow to anger," and especially in "not letting the sun go down upon our wrath."

The emotions of which we have given an outline in this chapter are the leading ones which have their causes or excitements in that which is past, and their effects upon our present state, and our capacity and disposition for acting. As such, they bear directly upon our social intercourse; and the reception with which we meet among our fellows, depends not a little upon the temper of mind in which we appear. Therefore, for the sake of our place and respectability in society, we ought as much as possible to cherish the pleasurable emotions, and repress the painful ones. We ought also to do this for our own sakes,—not merely to avoid the pain of the turbulent emotions, which is always far more than a counterbalance to any advantage, even momentary and imaginary advantage, that we can derive from them, but unfits us alike for the planning and the executing of any thing useful.

Short maxims are often better for practical purposes than long lectures, and there is one which applies here:—"Never regret or be angry at what can be helped, or what cannot be helped;" for the first only hinders you from helping, and the second prevents you from setting about something else which you are capable of doing.

CHAPTER VI.

SOCIAL EMOTIONS—PROSPECTIVE EMOTIONS.

THOUGH, as body, Man lives in the present only, yet, as mind, he lives much more in the future. In this he differs from all the other inhabitants of the earth; and this alone, although there were no other, would be sufficient evidence of the existence and even of the immortality of mind. The providence of bees and other storing animals has often been brought forward as evidences of conscious care for the future upon their part; and the same has been extended to the ant, which lays up no store of food, and to birds and insects, which select or prepare fit places, or nests or niches, in which their young may be brought to life and fostered till able to shift for themselves.

But truly, there is not any care for the future, or any knowledge of the future, revealed in even the most curious of these animal provisions. Trees, grasses, plants of all kinds, are just as careful for their seasonal appearances and their progeny, as those animals which are the most celebrated. No bee or other insect makes finer or more elaborate protections for its young than the deciduous trees do for the pro-

tection of their buds; and there is just as much intention and care in the flower preparing itself for the bee, as in the bee preparing itself for the flower,—that is to say, there is none whatever in either of them, or in any case which we can observe, either in the animal or the vegetable world.

The whole of this famed knowledge of the future, and *knowledge* of what it is about, both as respects the present action and the future purpose of that action, is the misapplication of the analogy of Man. In general, we believe that this is well meant—that it is intended to set forth, and if possible to magnify, the wisdom and goodness of God in creation. But it has the very opposite effect: it destroys the beautiful uniformity of the law of the material creation, and calls in other *intelligences* between the Creator and his works—a sort of idols of the fancy, which are a mockery equally of that which is made and of the Maker. Is not the rotation of the earth upon its axis the grand cause of day and night? and do not all the productions of nature obey the alternation of these? Is not the inclination of the earth's axis to the plane of its yearly revolution the cause of the changes of the seasons? and do not all the production of the earth,—animal and vegetable,—obey the viscissitudes of these, according to the exact degree of their variation in different latitudes and localities? Shall we say, then, that the earth has a *knowledge* that day and night, and summer and winter, are to alternate with each other? Does the rolling orb, the motion of which is so rapid that, if we could stand by

while it passed, it would be invisible, — does it, in thoughtful consideration of the growing and living motes upon its surface, kindly put them to sleep in the evening, and awaken them in the morning; and does it blight them with the blasts of winter, and refresh them with the breezes of summer, in full knowledge and intention of so doing? The bare supposition of the one or the other would be enough to startle the veriest dotard of those worshippers of small animals, who expatiate about the foresight of a fly, and the skill of a caterpillar; and yet, the cases are exactly parallel,—nor can there be found, in the whole compass of physical nature, a single instance of which the same may not be said with equal truth. It is only saying that God made them; and that, true to the infinite wisdom and power which we cannot, from the simple contemplation of them, fail to predicate of Him, they are all perfect. The mathematical and mechanical skill of the common bee, in constructing its cells of the maximum capacity and strength, in the minimum of space and with the minimum of materials, has been adduced as a proof of the skill of that insect in the differential calculus. But the curve in which the bole of a tree springs from the root, and which is imitated in light-houses that are exposed to violent action of the winds and waves, depends upon a far more intricate problem than the simple one of maximum and minimum which the bee is said to solve; and yet nobody ever gave an oak credit for its skill in mechanics.

To the animals there is no past and no future; and

the same may be said of Man, in as far as the mere body is concerned. If we have lived for any considerable time, our past body—not only one but many past bodies, are scattered to all the winds of heaven; and if we shall live a considerable time longer, the bread which is to form part of our future body is not yet sown as wheat. The body comes and goes, and can have no remembrance of the past or anticipation of the future. There is not an atom of that body which was the corporeal instrument of the hero of Waterloo, in the present corporeal Duke of Wellington; and the august person of the future sovereign of these realms is at this moment growing out of the soil, living on the earth, flying in the air, or swimming in the water —without the slightest anticipation of the greatness and the glory of which it is one day to be the substantive symbol.

In the case of mind, it is widely different. With mind, there is no receiving or giving out of any kind or portion of substance. We know nothing of the essence of mind, because that does not in any way come under the cognizance of our senses; but we do know that, whatever its essence may be, that must remain without change, from the moment of its creation, to all eternity; and that, whatever may be its essence, that essence needs no growth and no renovation, and can be subject to no exhaustion, fatigue, or decay. Hence, the present moment, which is the only life that we know of the human body, or of the body of any animal, as identical, is a mere point in time as compared with the life of the mind,—a mark

between the past and the future, and nothing more, while the body, as living and sentient, has neither past nor future.

With mind, the momentary present is the mark between the known of life and the unknown; for, though the mind has prospective emotions, it neither has nor can have any prospective knowledge. Knowledge, being obtainable by experience only, has no source but in the past, or in so far as, reasoning upon the principle of cause and effect, we can make the past a mirror in which to see the present image of the future. This analogy of like causes in like circumstances, uniformly producing like effects, without any regard to the mere difference of time, is the guide of our conduct in every thing, and the source of all our prospective emotions; so that these emotions, though they have reference to the future, do not, and cannot, originate there. The body has no care for the future, because it has no memory of the past upon which such care could, by possibility, be grounded; and it is solely because the mind has such memory, that it has emotions which are prospective as to the future.

Though the foundation of this analogy, by means of which we make the past a mirror and guide to the future, is the actual experience of the past, yet the analogy itself is a matter of belief; and, although there are some men, of no mean pretensions in philosophy, who affect to undervalue, or even to mock, at belief, as a most visionary and unreal matter, as compared with what they call reason and experience, yet reason is in truth nothing else than belief, and without

belief experience could be of no use whatever. Take the very simplest case that can be adduced:—A man was relieved from certain uneasy sensations by taking food yesterday, or any number of past days; he feels the same uneasy sensations to-day; and he wishes to take food in order to be relieved from them. But this is, in truth, nothing more than a case of mere belief. The man cannot bring the bodily sensation of hunger from which he was relieved by food yesterday, into juxtaposition with that which he feels to-day, so as that the judgment, consequent upon the direct and simultaneous observation of any one of the senses, can be passed upon the two. Yesterday's feeling of hunger, and of the relief of that hunger by taking food, are not *sensations* to-day. They are not felt by the body in any sense. They are merely mental suggestions, called to memory, as we say, by the sensation of to-day. Therefore, the analogy is not perfect — not the comparison of "quantities of the same kind," which is essential to a perfect, or mathematical analogy—an analogy which requires no assistance from belief. The one member of the comparison is a bodily sensation, presently felt; the other is a mere mental remembrance, in which the body is not affected at all; and therefore we cannot say, as matter which could be mathematically demonstrated, that what was a relief in the one case, must, of necessity, be a relief in the other. We *believe* that it will, and it is the constitution of our very nature so to believe; and this is all that we can say about the matter.

What we have adduced is a very simple instance, and one which refers to sensations that are of every-day occurrence, but it is quite conclusive; and if an instance taken from sensation, and one in which there is no moral influence one way or another, be thus conclusive, we need not call in the aid of any one of a more complicated or intellectual nature.

The fact is, that all our judgments and all our emotions, deducible or arising from the past and applicable to the future, are dependent on belief, and on belief only, for that which, in any way, binds the past to the future, and makes the present the point of passage from the one to the other. We believe in the uniformity of all the observed and understood laws of nature; we believe in the uniformity of the results of the same processes in art; we believe in the same consequences of the same actions in ourselves; and, without this belief, which may be said to be universal, our past experience would be of no possible use to us in any respect whatsoever. Once destroy this belief in us, and we should thenceforth be incapable of performing a single action, with any anticipation of what might be the result of that action. Even they who, in words, deny this belief, still continue true to it in every action of their lives; and thus gainsay, in all that they do, the doctrine of which they are such strenuous advocates in their speeches and in their writings.

The view of the analogy of the past and the future, which we have endeavoured to give in these remarks, as plainly and practically as we can give it, is abso-

lutely necessary to anything like a right understanding of our prospective emotions. This necessity comes from the fact of all these emotions having their causes in the past, though the view, so to speak, which they hold out, is wholly future. They have a powerful influence upon our present state, as well as upon our future plans; and therefore they are, in some respects, the most important of all our emotions.

Like the rest of our emotions, the prospective ones are divisible into two great classes: the one of an inspiriting nature, and the other having a tendency to depress the mind, and, in extreme cases, to unfit it for all action. The broad distinction of the two classes is that of emotions which stimulate us to actions, and emotions which restrain us from actions. The names by which they are usually distinguished from each other are *desires* and *fears;* and they cannot, though they are the opposites of each other in their effects upon our conduct, be classed, the one as pleasurable and the other as painful, as is the case with the greater part of our immediate and retrospective emotions. So far from desires being always pleasurable, they are often more painful than fears; and so far from these two classes of emotions having contrary objects, the very same object often excites both desire and fear. So often is this mixture of those emotions the case, indeed, that there is perhaps seldom any very strong emotion of desire which is not accompanied by some degree of fear. Not only this, but fear is actually a species of desire, or of something very similar. Desires simply mean that there is a craving or want to

be supplied; and, in this sense of the word, when we fear, we desire, or are anxious to escape, or be saved from, that which we fear.

The reason why the prospective emotions are less definite than either the immediate or the retrospective, is easily understood. The subjects of the immediate emotions are before us at the time when the emotions are excited, and we consequently know them as being, according to our feelings, something fixed and definite. The subjects of the retrospective emotions are even more certain than those of the present ones. They are all past; and thus, however our feelings with regard to them may alter, they are all, in themselves, unalterable. Neither the one of those classes of emotions nor the other depends, in any way, upon belief; and, therefore, there is a certainty about them which we cannot find about anything which is future. The future, whatever it may be, and how strong soever may be our belief or our emotion concerning it, is always, to a certain extent, contingent. We may believe ever so confidently—and we cannot, if we understand the matter, withhold the utmost confidence of our belief—that, in like circumstances, a like event must take place; but the perfect similarity of the circumstances is a matter in which we never can have absolute confidence, and this alone involves everything future in some degree of uncertainty. This uncertainty is, of itself, a source of emotion, and of very strong as well as very complex emotion; and thus it keeps us upon the rack, and is very often greater agony to us than the realization of the very fear that occasions it.

Our prospective emotions are, like all other emotions, beneficial when they are properly regulated; and, as some of the stronger ones have much more reference to society than they have to the individual, the proper regulation of them partakes more of the nature of a social duty than of mere personal prudence; though, as we cannot do our duty to society, in the manner in which it ought to be done, without, in the first place, doing our duty to ourselves, personal prudence ought never to be lost sight of in any one case of these emotions. It is in the adjustment of what are called our *selfish* and our *social* feelings, so that each may be in their due proportion to the others, that the difficulty in this matter lies; and this is a difficulty for the proper adjustment of which no specific and permanent rules can be laid down—by Man. Society is, in itself, continually changing, and changing the more rapidly the more advanced it is in civilization, so that, taking it in all its bearings, the best adjustment that could be made would become antiquated in a short time.

That there are some fixed principles by which our prospective emotions may be in so far regulated, is true; but it is equally true that the emotions themselves often become too strong for these, and even cause us to lose sight of them altogether. Not only this; for our habits have a very powerful influence upon these emotions, and so have the circumstances in which we are placed; and so powerful is the influence of them, that, in extreme cases, it changes the complexion of the emotion altogether, so that, in cases

which do not involve any very great moral consequence, that which is evil in one man may be harmless, or even actually good, in another.

The object of every desire is some good, real or imaginary, according to the nature of the case, and especially to that of the party influenced by the desire; and the imaginary good may be, and very often is, a real evil. Naturally, we shall suppose that the desire is always for that which is really good, and practically, it no doubt appears so to the party, in even the most extreme case which is within the limits of sanity; but as all future good—all futurity, indeed—is matter of belief, not of certainty, the whole turns upon the nature of the evidence upon which this belief is founded; for, according as that evidence is perfect or imperfect, right or wrong, so must be the belief and so the desire. Our natural ignorance is the grand cause of imperfection in the belief. The infant, in the age of its most complete ignorance, has its belief in the fitness of substances for food regulated solely by their immediate impression upon the senses; and as men of all ages are children in that which they do not understand, the desires of the ignorant are chiefly directed to the immediate gratification of the senses, without much regard to future consequences to others, or even to themselves.

This can scarcely be regarded as vice on the part of those who do it; for, morally speaking, there is no more vice in the man who goes wrong through absolute ignorance, than there is in the wind and the waves which cause a ship to founder at sea to the loss of all

on board. As against society, however, the consequences, whether they fall upon the party himself or upon others, have precisely the same effect, as if they were vices in the moral sense of the term; and therefore society is equally interested in their prevention.

There is another social result of this ignorance of the consequences of desire, which is well worthy of notice,—namely, that in proportion as the majority of society is the more advanced, and abounds the more in objects captivating to the senses, the ignorant portion of that society become the more improvident, and the more addicted to crimes against property, although their more turbulent emotions, as against each other, may be diminished in nearly the same ratio.

In order rightly to understand this, we must bear in mind that mental and moral ignorance may be as complete in the most refined and enlightened society as in that where the majority are as ignorant as they. The objects of sensual excitement—the only excitement of which the very ignorant are susceptible—are, however, greatly multiplied. Thus there is an increase of temptation to a vast amount,—an amount equal to the whole improvement of the society, while of the moral means of resisting that temptation there is no increase whatsoever. The ignorant savage in the wild forest has little to tempt his desires of sensual gratification; and the consequence is, that all his emotions have fair scope, and he is really as virtuous, after his fashion, as those who lead the *ton* in cultivated society are in theirs; and, according to the absolute moral standard, he would rank a little higher.

But, in civilized society, the ignorant lose that which constitutes the vantage ground of the savage. All the honours and distinctions of society are tabooed to them; and though there are some that escape by what may be called favourable accidents, yet the natural tendency of this state of things is to throw the ignorant upon the gratification of the senses, as their only means of enjoyment; and we may be sure that the natural state of things will be that of the majority.

The results in which the arts of civilized and cultivated society show themselves, all tend to increase the temptation, without any increase of the restraint. Of course the ignorant can see none but the physical results; for, if they could appreciate the spirit of the enlightened part of society, they would be of that part themselves,—be of the learned, not of the ignorant, whatever might be their possessional wealth or poverty. But the physical results of improvement, whatever that improvement may be, are all that can be perceived by the ignorant; and, consequently, in their estimation, these constitute the whole of the improvement. The enlightened or instructed man can see the mental and moral advantages of such improvements,—the ignorant man can see nothing but an increase of the means and objects of sensual gratifications; and thus a very serious comparative injury is done to him, not the less serious for being unintentional, and even unconsidered, on the part of those who thus multiply his temptations, without any increase of his feeling of the necessity of restraint.

It may be said,—for we believe it is the general

opinion among the more wealthy and influential ranks of society, whose knowledge of human nature has no necessary tendency to increase in the same ratio as their influence, whether that be the influence of rank and office, or simply that of wealth,—it may be said that these matters can be regulated by penal laws; but they who say so only proclaim how very little they know about the subject. If space will admit, our purpose is to say a few words upon legislation in another chapter; but we may, in the mcantime, remark, that a penal statute is the very worst preventive of crime that could by possibility be devised. The natural feeling of every man revolts at the thought of the bondage; and thus the statute has no moral influence whatever, but rather the contrary. If the punishment which the law awards be great in proportion to the crime, which is very apt to be the case, then the daring are actually up in arms against the statute, and glory in the breach of it. It may be, that, in some cases, although certainly not in all, this may be the triumph of a bad feeling over a law which is both intended and believed to be wholesome in its operation. But even this matters not; for the unreasoning part of the public sympathize with, and stand up for, one who dares the law, upon the very same principle that the common history of nations makes heroes the chief subjects of its eulogy, without the slightest regard to those outrages and atrocities of which heroes have been, in all ages, the necessary instruments. So much for the misdirection of the desires from ignorance.

But this is not the worst, or nearly the worst; for

education *the wrong way* does far more mischief than even the very extreme of ignorance, in its simple and direct operation. We say its simple and direct operation; for, though the mention of it may seem a paradox, there is an indirect operation of ignorance, in which it actually plays the schoolmaster; and its scholars are probably more willing and apt, as well as more numerous, than those of wisdom. The fact is, that it has a more excitable part of human nature to deal with; and it also has the assistance of more numerous, more willing, and, upon the whole, more powerful auxiliaries.

This follows from the fact that the emotions are not, like knowledge and reasoning, acquired by experience, but inherent in the very nature of Man; and, therefore, the more ignorant any man is, his emotions are the stronger in proportion to his whole character. Study and speculation of all kinds are inconsistent with the operation of the stronger emotions, especially with those more malignant forms of them which take possession of the mind, and rankle there. Persons of information and taste, and even the *virtuosi* who find their occupation and pleasure in cherishing a few curious scraps, which are probably of no earthly use, have their minds, in great part, occupied by these matters; and thus, even upon the supposition that the minds of all men are originally the same, the ignorant man must be chiefly under the influence of his emotions.

But the prospective emotions, whether they be desires or fears, are not simple feelings of our nature,

like those immediate emotions which belong to Man in his individual capacity, and which have no reference in them to the past or the future. There is, indeed, one state of mind,—one peculiarly distressing to the indolent, which can scarcely be said to amount even to one of these very simple emotions. It is *ennui*,—a state for which there is no very appropriate English name, but which, in some parts of the island, is not unaptly termed "know-not-whatishness." If we could give a definition of a mental state which is at once so painful and so insignificant, we would call it "the desire of desiring;" for the mind is in a state of the most painful anxiety, without being able to fix the desire upon any one object. The indolent are at all times troubled with this; and it is one of the chief causes which drives them to dissipation. We doubt whether there is any mental means by which one who lapses into this pitiable state can be immediately relieved from it; and probably some smart bodily labour is the best of any that can be named, and an objectless walk will do something, provided that it is a smart one.

Ennui cannot, however, be, with any propriety, classed among the desires; for, though the absence of occupation, mental or bodily, is the cause of affliction in that pitiable state, there is no desire of such occupation, so strong as to amount even to a wish. If there were a wish, that wish would increase to a will, and "the will would find a way." Where there is a desire, even in its simplest degree of a wish, there is always more than a mere feeling,—there is a desire for some object, on account of some property of that

object, which we believe would conduce to our happiness, if we could attain it; and this implies a mental process,—a knowledge of the object, a comparison of our state without the object and our state with it, and a conclusion that the one state would be better than the other; and it is upon this conclusion that the desire is founded. In the case of fear, the mental process is the same, only the conclusion is drawn the other way from that which leads to a desire; for we believe that our happiness would be greater by our escaping from that which we fear. Up to the conclusion which determines whether our prospective emotion shall be a desire or a fear, the mental process is therefore the same; and the almost endless varieties both of our desires and our fears are occasioned by the differences of the subjects which excite the emotions, and of the parties in whom they are excited.

The subjects which are mentally compared, and from which the conclusion is drawn, which gives rise to a desire or a fear, according to the result of the comparison, may be both future, or the one of them may be future and the other present, or even past; but the one to which the emotion attaches must always be future. We may desire a continuation of the good, or fear a continuation of the evil, of yesterday, or of any former time, as well as that of to-day; and we may desire a new happiness, or fear the loss of a happiness or the infliction of a misery.

But though, in every instance of desire or fear, there is a mental comparison and conclusion—one step, at least, of a process of reasoning—this is not quite the

same as in our purely intellectual reasonings for the discovery of truth. In them, if our minds have not been blinded by improper views of matters, we have no bias either way; and thus, in so far as our knowledge goes, we judge and decide with perfect equity. Leaving out of view what we may have acquired from education or habit, we have nothing before us but the subject upon which our judgment is to be given; and thus we can examine the case entirely and clearly. In the comparison which leads to an emotion it is not so. In that, we do not act as impartial judges between subjects which are equally indifferent to us: we are judges in our own cause; and this is the reason why far more care is requisite in such cases than in those of ordinary intellectual judgment. The real subjects of comparison, are our state with, and our state without, the object of the emotion,—how we are to be bettered by that which we desire, or injured by that which we fear; and, as this is not a comparison of subjects, but of states of the same subject, the comparison is not of so perfect a nature as in cases of purely intellectual reasoning. Besides this, one of the subjects of the comparison is always future; and, as such, unknown to experience. Hence, the comparison is that of a reality with a belief,—things which are not of the same kind with each other, and which, therefore, do not admit of direct logical comparison, but must be compared with each other by means of some standard or medium which can be applied to both. Our feeling—our desire of happiness—is the only medium of comparison that we can have in such cases; and this is a very

variable, and by no means a safe one. It is variable not only according to all the differences which can exist between one individual and another, but in the same individual; and it is so in consequence of so many circumstances, that they cannot be reduced to any general law.

These circumstances render it utterly impossible to reduce the philosophy of the emotions,—that is, of the prospective emotions, to anything like a system. That which is an object of desire, and of ardent desire, with one man, is often an object of perfect indifference, or of absolute fear, with another; and the same contrariety of emotions often happens to the same individual at different times, or under different circumstances; and all this may take place without the parties being able to assign the slightest reason why it should be so,—other than the very vague one, that mankind have no control over their desires, or over their fears. An army who are panic-struck, and run from small danger in one instance, and advance exultingly to face danger which is tenfold greater in another, can give no reason for their conduct in the one case or in the other; and an individual feels nearly the same difficulty in explaining why his emotions, and the conduct to which those emotions lead, should be so very different at one time to what they are at another.

After the habits are formed—and they are formed at a much more early period of life than many people suppose,—after the habits are formed, they have a very powerful effect upon the prospective emotions. The

reason is obvious, though this is one of the cases in which it is difficult to say which is the cause and which the effect. The peculiar kind of mental state to which the party is most accustomed, is always the first to rise in suggestion as the subject of comparison with anything new; and for this reason, the very same subject or event which leads to a virtuous emotion in one man, leads to a vicious emotion in another; and so on, through all the varieties of human character, and of the habits which give to that character those distinctions which make it known to others. Thus, if a painter, a poet, and a man whose mind was engrossed by the acquiring of possessions, were all to come and inspect the same beautiful place, they might perhaps be all captivated with its beauties, to the very same degree of intensity, but each would be captivated in a very different manner. The poet would look upon it as a subject of versification, to embellish, or to be embellished, according to the measure of his personal vanity; the painter would, much in the same manner, view it as a subject of art; and the man of possessions—of "acquisitiveness," as the cranial philosophers phrase it—would simply wish it were his own. Change the subject, and change the character and habits of the men, to any extent that you please, and you will find that the emotions constantly vary with the habits. David Garrick, the celebrated actor, is said to have been as inordinate in his love of money as he was successful in the representation of human character and human passions on the stage; and Leonard Euler, the analyst, was equally celebrated

for his power of mental calculation, especially after the loss of his sight had deprived him of the external helps. Now, it is said of each of these very great men,—for they were both very great in their way, though some admire the greatness of the one, some that of the other; some admire, and some despise both,—it is said of them that they displayed the leading habit very strongly in the very article of death. It is reported of Garrick, that when a doubt arose as to whether he had actually departed this life, a purse of guineas was jingled at his ear, upon which he instantly showed signs of vitality, of which there had been none for some time before. In like manner it is said, that when the friends who stood round the death-bed of Euler were in doubt as to whether they had finally lost him or not, one whispered in his ear, "What is the cube root of ——?" naming a pretty large number; and the expiring calculator almost instantly faltered out the answer.

We mention these two instances merely for the purpose of showing how very ready the suggestion of habit is, even when we can scarcely imagine anything to call it up but a mere notice to the body, when that has almost ceased to be sentient. But, as such is the case in these extreme instances, how much more must it be the case when the body is in all the vigour of its sensations. In the case of a confirmed habit, it must then be too strong for any resistance of a merely intellectual or reasoning nature; and the man of confirmed habit must have his prospective emotions, and the actions consequent upon those emotions, following

the bent of the habit, against all mental resistance on his own part, and in defiance of ordinary human laws.

It must not, however, be supposed, that this power of habit over the emotions and the actions is, in itself, an evil; for, on the contrary, it is of the greatest good both to individuals and to society; and the only caution which it requires is the utmost care in the formation of the habit, which, as we have had occasion to remark again and again, takes place so very early in life that the fault, if fault there shall happen to be, falls rather upon those who have the early management of the individual than upon the individual himself. If bad habits are formed, and allowed to be confirmed, the consequences may be very serious, both to the individual and to society; and there are difficulties in the case, because experience has shown, by many very striking instances, that excessive tending and absolute neglect lead to nearly the same results. In the former case, the party grows up with no character or mind of his own; and in the latter, he takes up that character which is most broadly displayed, and therefore most easily found, in the society in which he happens to be placed. From the nature of the case, the over-tended youth is placed in the more perilous situation of the two; and unless he is tended through life—kept in some sort of leading-strings by others—he has every chance of injuring himself, and doing no good to society. He is not left to depend on his own decision; and therefore, when a desire or a fear is excited by any present cause, whatever that cause may be, he

wants that member of the comparison which the suggestion of a man of more independent mind would at once supply; and thus he is a mere thing of impulses, and carries his babyhood with him through life,—

"Pleased with a rattle, tickled with a straw."

Society swarms with such characters; and they are neither confined to the humbler classes of society, nor most numerous there. If they do not fall into absolute vice—of which, however, there is very considerable danger—they are of some use in society, if it is only in spreading the mole-hills which their fathers have pushed out of the earth, in pursuing the subways of accumulation.

The individuals who are left to form their own characters, are, upon the whole, in more peril of having strong emotions misdirected, which may lead to ruin, while the characterless, who are led, tend more to frivolity. This depends much on circumstances, however,—namely, upon the temptations to which they may be exposed; and perhaps we may state, as a truth to which there are few exceptions, that unless the mental neglect is accompanied by the necessity of physical self-dependence, the neglected party seldom turns out well. They who are well fed and clothed without any exertion on their own parts, and at the same time mentally neglected, are never good for much, either to themselves or to anybody else; and this is one of the chief reasons why the common charity-schools are such nuisances—as the majority of those who have anything to do with children that

have been fed and clothed—we cannot say educated—at them, find them to be.

In large towns, and generally in places where there is much population and wealth, and in consequence many temptations to crimes against property, the totally neglected in early life are beset with dangers from which it is not easy to escape. But this is not the fault of themselves or of the neglecting, but of the situation in which that takes place. Whenever vice of any kind is systematically practised as a trade, those who are engaged in it are, like the members of other trades, always anxious to get apprentices, as they can have the services of these much cheaper, and also more faithfully performed, than they can probably have by the experienced and hardened in iniquity. Those parties cannot, in general, find apprentices with consent of parents, in places where they are known; and unless under peculiar circumstances, and by the practice of a good deal of craft, they cannot succeed by advertisement. Hence they are under the necessity of lying in wait for and seducing into their service those children that are neglected by their parents; and these become in time proficients in iniquity, and are sent out to seduce others. This is a very serious evil; but it is an evil for which, hitherto at least, nothing like an adequate remedy has been found.

In remote country places, where the temptations are fewer, and crimes and criminals are more easily detected, those neglected children, who would be ruined in towns, often rise to greater eminence, in their way, than others who have more attention paid

them. One reason of this is, that they see only the better side of society on the part of those who are older than themselves. People of all ranks, from the very highest to the very lowest, carry matters more circumspectly before the world than they do, at times at least, in their domestic retirement. This does not necessarily involve in it the slightest hypocrisy or intention to deceive. It is a tribute which individuals pay to society,— a natural and necessary tribute, without which the association of man with man would be not only disagreeable, but absolutely intolerable. Children of necessity see much of the domestic habits of their parents; and thus, in many instances, they have at least a chance of seeing society under a less carefully regulated aspect than if they saw the external phase of the world. It may be said that paternal kindness and counsel can counteract this, and we admit that it ought, but that it actually does so is very much *secundum quid*. If temptation is not in the way, we are inclined to think that the moral feeling may be kept in greater vigour by those who are left to form their own characters, provided that there is at the same time the necessity of being occupied. This is a subject, however, which involves so many elements, and depends so much upon circumstances, that nothing very positive can be said upon it, neither are there, perhaps, two individuals who arrive at the same conclusion, even though they study it with equal attention and equal freedom from any preconceived hypothesis.

The point to be arrived at is, that the good which men desire with sufficient earnestness to make them

act upon the desire should always coincide as nearly as possible with physical good and moral good; and conversely, that which they fear, so as to abstain from, should coincide as nearly as possible with physical evil and moral evil. The knowledge of these standards, by which the emotions ought to be regulated, is therefore the essential part of the matter. It is really in this knowledge that the fitting of Man for society consists; for the mere technical knowledge of science, art, or business, is comparatively easy and straight-forward, as it does not necessarily involve any emotion by which its progress can be disturbed. The whole of it conduces, or ought to conduce, to our physical and intellectual good; and it has in itself no natural or necessary connexion, either with moral good or moral evil.

Physical Good is a matter of knowledge rather than of feeling; and though, from the connexion of individuals with society, it assumes a sort of social character, yet it is essentially individual. Society requires that its members should promote and in no wise hinder the physical good of each other; but the best interests of society, as well as those of the individual, require that each man should pursue his own physical good as the grand business of life.

Our physical good is merely a general name for all our enjoyments, both bodily and mental, during the whole course of our lives. We cannot say that even the most wretched of the human race are destitute of physical good, for it is good to be alive; and, if we are in a sane state, we would, even when we complain in

words that we are weary of life, resist or fly from death, if that were to make its appearance. There is a little fable of a cottager's wife, which is not unapplicable here. The good woman had the best of husbands; and he was in bed very sick of a fever, and at the point of death. When she fancied that all hope of his recovering was gone, she sat down, covered her downcast face with her hands, and wept bitterly, and prayed earnestly that death would take her, and spare her beloved husband. While she was in the deepest flood of her affliction, and the highest fervour of her prayers, a domestic bird as black as jet stalked into the cottage, and pecked her pretty smartly on the bare arm. She instantly looked up, saw the bird, and, never doubting that he was the last enemy, she started to her feet, seized the broom as a weapon of defence, and shouted, "Get away from me! I am in perfect health; but look on the bed there—there is he whom you want, and who is nearly ready for you: take him and begone." This is very likely; and we have known instances of apparently intending suicides, being dashed into the water as they stood on the bank, and instantly making successful efforts to save themselves by swimming.

The desire of life is, indeed, one of the strongest and most necessary of all our desires; and so far from being diminished by the desire of immortality, and the full assurance of hope that we shall be eternally happy, the desire of the present life is rather increased by these; and this is one of the cases in which the desire is, in considerable part, the means of its own

fulfilment. An increase of the present life is no abridgement of eternity, for that will be just as long if we suppose it to be begun millions of years hence, as if it had been begun when Man was at first created. We ought also to bear in mind, that the present life is our only opportunity for acquiring that experience in knowledge and in feeling which is to be our bliss or our torment for ever; and that therefore it will be the measure of that happiness or misery. Long life, therefore, is the fundamental element of physical good, according to which all the rest will be regulated.

But what is long life, and what the standard of its duration, to a being like Man, consisting of a mortal body and an immortal mind? In so far as the mere body is concerned, we can measure its life by the rotation of the earth on its axis, by the revolution of the same in its orbit, or by any other material revolution which we believe to be uniform. This material standard will not, however, apply to the mind; for, to the mind, all time is of equal length, and it costs us no more effort to reflect backward to the creation of the world, or forward to its final scene, than it does to reflect upon the last or the next moment. There is, therefore, one measure of life for the body—a measure which is common to all natural things of fleeting duration; and there is another measure of it for the mind; and, as the mind is the Man, it is according to the mental measure that we must estimate life as a physical good.

What, then, is the mental measure of human life? It must be in something that we know of the mind;

and all that we do know, or can know of it is, that it can perceive, and think, and feel; and that the single efforts of those mental exercises occupy no measurable portions of time. Mental activity is therefore the proper measure of life; and not the mere days by the sun that the body is upon the earth. A long memory is the reality of a long life, without any necessary reference to the years which the body lives. But, although the memory may in some cases be short though the years are long, yet, with equal mental activity, the years do become a measure even of the mental life; so that, independently of the present life, the weal or the woe of eternity will vary with the number of years. Not only this, but, as experience is our only guide, the longer we live the better are we able to understand what to be done, either for our own good or for that of society, and the more clearly can we perceive the intimate relation which subsists between these. It is true that, after a certain portion of life has elapsed, the body becomes less capable of exertion than in the earlier period; but even this is, in great part, owing to ourselves, for very old men generally retain their bodily activity to the very extremity of life; and when the bodily activity is thus kept up—for in most cases it is a keeping up dependent upon the conduct of the parties,—the mental energies are kept up along with it. This is what we might expect, for, as the mind in itself can know no decay, its perceptions and its emotions cannot be weakened with age.

This points out to us the general means by which long life, in years, in enjoyment, and in usefulness,

may be best attained; and it is very pleasing to find that these are also the means by which our duties to society can be best performed. Equal action of the whole Man, in his compound nature, is the secret of long life, and also of usefulness and of enjoyment. If we confine ourselves to mere mental abstraction, our bodies not only become useless, but our abstractions become dreamy and theoretical, and of no real use either to ourselves or to others. Man is so constituted that the mind never can work well unless the body, in some way or other, works along with it. Hence, a mere scholar or philosopher, who mews himself up in his study, his laboratory, his museum, or whatever else it may be, is much more nearly allied to the fool and the sot than he would be willing to believe. He wants the observation of the senses to give new impulses to his mind; and his own little track gets worn to so deep a rut, that out of it he cannot get, and in it he can see nothing but the dingy results of his own delving.

On the other hand, if the body only is occupied, the mind,—the emotion of which cannot rest even though the intellectual faculties, as we may call them, have scarcely awakened into exercise,—never fails to lead the body astray by some means or other. Sensual indulgence and perfect indolence are the alternations here, or if there is any other tendency, it is to an alternation of the two. The accounts which we have of the monastic orders, at the time when the country abounded with them, afford a good illustration of what has now been said of those who are bodily

between the past and the future, and nothing more, while the body, as living and sentient, has neither past nor future.

With mind, the momentary present is the mark between the known of life and the unknown; for, though the mind has prospective emotions, it neither has nor can have any prospective knowledge. Knowledge, being obtainable by experience only, has no source but in the past, or in so far as, reasoning upon the principle of cause and effect, we can make the past a mirror in which to see the present image of the future. This analogy of like causes in like circumstances, uniformly producing like effects, without any regard to the mere difference of time, is the guide of our conduct in every thing, and the source of all our prospective emotions; so that these emotions, though they have reference to the future, do not, and cannot, originate there. The body has no care for the future, because it has no memory of the past upon which such care could, by possibility, be grounded; and it is solely because the mind has such memory, that it has emotions which are prospective as to the future.

Though the foundation of this analogy, by means of which we make the past a mirror and guide to the future, is the actual experience of the past, yet the analogy itself is a matter of belief; and, although there are some men, of no mean pretensions in philosophy, who affect to undervalue, or even to mock, at belief, as a most visionary and unreal matter, as compared with what they call reason and experience, yet reason is in truth nothing else than belief, and without

belief experience could be of no use whatever. Take the very simplest case that can be adduced:—A man was relieved from certain uneasy sensations by taking food yesterday, or any number of past days; he feels the same uneasy sensations to-day; and he wishes to take food in order to be relieved from them. But this is, in truth, nothing more than a case of mere belief. The man cannot bring the bodily sensation of hunger from which he was relieved by food yesterday, into juxtaposition with that which he feels to-day, so as that the judgment, consequent upon the direct and simultaneous observation of any one of the senses, can be passed upon the two. Yesterday's feeling of hunger, and of the relief of that hunger by taking food, are not *sensations* to-day. They are not felt by the body in any sense. They are merely mental suggestions, called to memory, as we say, by the sensation of to-day. Therefore, the analogy is not perfect — not the comparison of "quantities of the same kind," which is essential to a perfect, or mathematical analogy—an analogy which requires no assistance from belief. The one member of the comparison is a bodily sensation, presently felt; the other is a mere mental remembrance, in which the body is not affected at all; and therefore we cannot say, as matter which could be mathematically demonstrated, that what was a relief in the one case, must, of necessity, be a relief in the other. We *believe* that it will, and it is the constitution of our very nature so to believe; and this is all that we can say about the matter.

the accuracy of our knowledge. As knowledge is thus the foundation of our acquaintance with physical good, we cannot, in that, properly, be said to have any natural feeling of that implanted in our minds, neither have we any single nameable emotion which prompts us to the pursuit of this physical good; for, on the contrary, it is the means, at least one of the means, by which we regulate, or ought to regulate, our other emotions; and if we were alone in the world, and had no relation to society, this physical good would be the only good that we should have any occasion to pursue.

Moral Good is that by which we ought to regulate the pursuit of our physical good, so as to do justice to the rest of society at the same time that we do the best for ourselves; and the opposite of this moral good is, of course, *Moral Evil.* Moral good is not, like physical good, the result of knowledge; for knowledge still continues to be what was said of it at the first,—the knowledge of "good and evil." This is the reason why those who have treated of the moral and social condition and relations of Man have propounded so many and so opposite theories of the foundation of moral and social obligation; and also why the laws which have been, and continue to be, from time to time enacted for the moral and social government of mankind, are so frequently inadequate to their intended purposes.

At first sight, at least as matter of reason or argument, the physical good of every individual appears to be in direct opposition to the physical good of every other individual with whom he may happen to come

into contact in any of the intercourses of life. The man who has an estate appears, at first sight, to have appropriated a portion of the common bounty which God has given equally to all men, and for the enjoyment of which he has equally fitted all men,—to the manifest injury of all men who have not the estate. It is the same with every possession which one man can have and another man be without; and yet this very inequality of possession is the foundation and bond of society—the chief means whereby tribes and nations are gradually raised from the privation and misery of savageism, to all the comforts and elegances of the highest stage of civilization and refinement. In the very common relations of buyer and seller, there seems, at first sight, to be a perfect opposition of physical good, or, which is the same, of interest. It is, you will admit, the interest of the buyer to get the object of his purchase at the lowest price to which he can possibly reduce it by cheapening and higgling; and it is the interest of the seller to obtain the very highest price that he can. Persons of illiterate and vulgar minds act upon these views of the case; and it is no uncommon thing to see them higgle as long about a single penny in the price of some trifling commodity as each of them might earn sixpence in the practice of some other occupation; and whatever may be the rank in life of the parties, there is not a more certain evidence of vulgarity, meanness, and ignorance, than this same higgling. A man who, whether as buyer or seller, does not know the worth of his

commodity, and does not abide by the estimate of that worth, is a pest and nuisance.

But this is not the whole length, or nearly the whole length, to which the exclusive pursuit of his own physical good would carry each individual of the human race. That would extend to the taking of the price without giving the commodity, and the taking of the commodity without giving the price, by any means, forcible or fraudulent, by which the object could be accomplished. There might, indeed, be this difference: that the man of mere desire and impulse would take the forcible means,—snatch that which he desired whenever he saw it; while the crafty calculator of his own physical good would watch his opportunity, and steal it. The first would, in order to accomplish his object, murder, with bold and daring hand, those who stand in the way of it; and the other would administer poison, or lie in wait, or lure another, to assassinate.

It is useful to glance at the progress of society, and observe how these propensities—without some degree of which no society has ever existed—change from class to class, and from the one propensity to the other, in the different stages. In very rude states, the strong are, almost to a man, robbers and murderers, and the weak are thieves. When men in a much more advanced state take up their abode in the neighbourhood of these rude beings, they do not bring the savages to civilization. The native vices remain; and they are aggravated by acquired ones, such as the love of intoxicating liquors, under the influence of which

all the savage passions rage more fiercely than ever; and the consequence is, that the savage hordes waste away, and leave the land to the more civilized.

The first founders of kingdoms were the most powerful ruffians, and the early sceptre was the bludgeon or the spear. The heroes or demigods of almost every heathen nation appear to have been the more successful and notorious robbers and murderers; and it is probable that, after they had been sufficiently darkened by the mist of time, these were the materials out of which the poets fashioned the gods. In times comparatively recent, the barons were not only professional robbers, but the victorious and noble deeds celebrated by the minstrels in their halls, were perpetrations of lawless and atrocious outrage, just as if the glory of mankind had consisted in nothing save the destruction of each other by the most cruel means. There are yet displays of this false theory of glory in all wars, whether civil or international, and symptoms of its existence in many instances where absolute hostilities do not break out. To come still later: men of honour were highway robbers, or, at all events, highway robbers looked upon themselves, and sometimes considered themselves, as honourable men,—as the proper descendants, through various generations and phases, of the gods of Olympus, or of any other gods of human invention. When the baron ceased to be a petty tyrant, the highwayman ceased to be a gentleman; and we have now no highway robbers in England, save footpads of very low order, who are daring and lost enough to be villains, and have not

talent enough for successful thieves. The instances of these are but rare; and theft, in its various modes, but in what mode soever it may assume, always perpetrated by the mean in spirit, and the ignorant in all knowledge worthy of man, is the general type in this age of multiplied enjoyment and extreme luxury.

Such is a very faint sketch of one of the forms of moral evil, through a considerable range both of time and of the progress of society; and the variety of characters is immense, from Jupiter to Peter the Jew, who kidnaps and tutors young pickpockets, and receives stolen goods, at a small fraction of the value, in one of the filthiest of holes in that most abominable of all cesspools for the accumulation of the blackest dregs of human society, Field-lane, Holborn-hill, London. How a city so wise allows of such maculation as this, would be a perplexing point upon any hypothesis which professed to be based on reason; but we suppose that the plea is, that "the law allows it, and the court awards it;" for laws and courts are sometimes so contrived as to prosecute the detected offender, and yet conserve the offence, as a means, perchance, of future renown and employment; but of this we have no occasion particularly to speak, and it is not a subject upon which one would very willingly speak without occasion.

Moral good does not directly contribute to the gratification of any one of our desires, either of those impulsive desires which rise immediately when their objects present themselves in sensation or in thought, or of those desires, regulated by reason, which have

always in view our physical good, both in this world, and in the next—if we are duly impressed with the latter. It has reference to actions only, and not to the actions themselves, but to certain qualities of them, and not to these unless the actions are performed by human beings. Moral good cannot therefore be, in itself, and abstractedly from all consideration of human actions, the object of any desire, though we may desire that we ourselves, or that others, should act virtuously,—that is, in accordance with moral good. This is the reason why moral good is called *virtue*,—a word which denotes an energy and not a substance. It is also the reason why there have been so many and so opposite hypotheses respecting the nature and origin of virtue. A mere list of the chief of these hypotheses may be useful to those who are but little conversant with the philosophy of Man, inasmuch as one or another of them is, more or less, to be found in what may be considered the very best works upon this department of philosophy.

The first hypothesis which we shall mention is that which makes the commands of rulers and the enactments of legislators the original and only foundation of virtue; which says that, in themselves, all human actions are indifferent, in the same manner as the actions of irrational and inanimate nature; and that they become virtuous only when they are agreeable to the command of the law, and vicious only when they are in opposition to the same. This is the doctrine which is maintained, and maintained with much acuteness, by Hobbes, the Malmesbury philosopher; and it

is the foundation of the plea, we cannot call it the argument, for the "divine right of kings." That this hypothesis is philosophically absurd, and practically mischievous, is almost self-evident; for it presupposes that certain individuals of the human race have perceptions of virtue, merely from the accidental circumstances of their holding, or being born to, certain offices; but that the rest of menkind have no such perceptions. Not only this, but that the heir-apparent has not this perception of virtue until he is seated on the throne; and when a reigning monarch is dethroned, he loses this perception. Napoleon, for instance, was a perfect judge of virtue and vice while he remained on the throne of France; but when he went to St. Helena, he had no discernment of right and wrong, farther than Sir Hudson Lowe, his gaoler, was pleased to school him. So also, although a monarch cannot make this faculty descend to any of his children, he can confer it upon anybody, however worthless or immoral, by the simple act of granting a peerage. In like manner, a member of the Commons' has no capacity of distinguishing right from wrong, any farther than the existing law tells him, so long as he is in his counting-house in the city, or at his seat in the country; but the instant that he enters "the House," the mysterious inspiration comes upon him, and he is competent to take his part in the abrogation or the enactment of any law; and whatever he says—if he happens to be in the majority—*is right*. The argument which the Freethinkers propounded to Martinus Scriblerus, that "so many unthinking members com-

pose one thinking system," went a good way; but this legislative and executive origin of virtue goes a great deal further.

It is, of course, only in their official capacity that all who command or legislate are gifted with this perception of virtue and vice, or moral good and evil; for, in their private relations, they have not an idea of the kind; and although strange, it is yet strictly true, that off the throne our most gracious sovereign has not the slightest knowledge of right and wrong; and that the senator, when he is out of the house, is not more a moral agent than a donkey!

Such is the direction which this hypothesis takes when we follow it out only a very little way; and we doubt not that the reader will think it absurd enough. It is quite evident, however, that this hypothesis involves the doctrine of private and social licentiousness to the utmost extent possible; and that while, in expression, it resolves all virtue into the command and the law, it sets the natural feelings of every man against both. We have said that it is the foundation of the doctrine of the divine right; and we know what were the consequences of that doctrine while the dynasty of the Stuarts was on the throne of England. It is the old "Tory" doctrine; and was, not *very* long ago, faithfully and forcibly epitomized by a very learned, but very militant prelate of the English Church, when he stated, in the House of Peers, that "the people have nothing to do with the laws but to obey them." Whether the same doctrine is still maintained by any party, we have no direct means of ascer-

taining, even though the inquiry were worth our while; for the political fancies of the present day seem to have but little philosophical basis one way or another.

The remaining hypotheses, of which there are many, have this much in common, that they consider the foundation of virtue as a matter which is in some way the result of observation, of reasoning, or of both. Now, we admit that we require the aid of observation and reasoning for the guidance of our moral feeling, just as we do for that of all our other emotions; but still, this is the training of the emotion, not the origin of it. A farmer may obtain a better crop by proceeding upon the experience which he has acquired, than a man ignorant of farming can obtain from the same field; but no experience of the farmer can obtain a crop without seed. It is the same with every emotion,—experience can turn it to the proper account; but unless the emotion previously exists, experience has nothing to work upon, and consequently it can do nothing.

We repeat, that knowledge and experience are necessary for the regulation of our feeling of moral good and evil, so necessary that, without the constant exercise of them, the emotion would be a bane to us, and not a blessing, in the pursuit of our temporal good; but still, the emotion which our experience guides, is as essential as the experience that guides it. Indeed, were it not for this feeling of moral good and evil, of virtue and vice, of right and wrong, or of any other names by which the qualities which excite it to approval or to disapproval may be called, our experience

and reason would be solely directed to the pursuit of our own physical good, without the slightest regard to the injury which we might thereby do to others; and thus, the foundation of society would be destroyed, and man would be set against man in incessant and interminable warfare. It is by losing sight of the distinction between the guidance of the emotion and the origin of it, that all the false hypotheses have been devised; and we may remark that the whole of them belong to the same school of error, which attributes all the forms of matter to matter itself; and supposes that "developement"—a word which they do not appear to understand—in time changes simple or primordial matter into a rock and a limpet upon that rock, and yet again changes the rock into a field of corn and the limpet into a man.

The second hypothesis which we shall notice is that which resolves all virtue into hypocrisy. We love the praise of society, and we love to profit by society; and for the sake of this praise and this profit, we disguise our real propensities, and make some sacrifices of those indulgences which would be our constant practice if the eye of society were not upon us. Of all the systems which have been propounded, this is the one which places human nature in the most odious light,—in a light so odious, indeed, that it has much more of the character of a satire upon human duplicity and depravity than of a sober theory of human nature. The notes to Dr. Mandeville's "Fable of the Bees" contain the *developement* of this hypothesis, and the argument, if argument it can be called, for its general

truth. There is no reason to suppose that, in the framing of this hypothesis, Mandeville had the slightest intention of teaching hypocrisy and licentiousness; and therefore it is natural to conclude that he narrowed his view to all that was bad in human nature, and framed his hypothesis accordingly. This is rendered the more probable by the fact, that they who live in worthless and abandoned society come to nearly the same practical conclusions as the hypothetical ones of Mandeville; but if he had gone to the society of the abandoned for his type, and taken it fairly from them, his conclusion would have been very different. So far are even the most abandoned associations from practising a hypocritical show of virtue towards each other, that they, among themselves, exult in their vices, and applaud the most that member of the gang who is most daringly and desperately wicked; and if they practise dissimulation, by putting on the appearance of virtue, when they come publicly in contact with the more virtuous part of society, that is in itself a virtual admission that even they have not entirely lost the feeling of virtue or moral good, how much soever they may have departed from the practice of it. The "honour among thieves," of which we often hear, and which is too often mentioned for being a sarcasm or a mere saying, is another proof that there is some remains of virtue even in those whose daily profession and practice is vice; and we have heard that, when one of these outcasts from virtuous society practises his vocation upon another of the gang, he is expelled and shunned as much as an ordinary villain is by

decent society. We have heard a story told—relating, of course, to times long before the memory of the present generation—that there once was, somewhere in the eastern part of the city of London, a professional man who acted in the capacity of a "thieves' attorney,"—that is, he bullied the magistrates, suborned witnesses, and did all that could be done to swear the administrators of justice into the belief that a rogue in fact might be a very good man in law. By these means it is said that he acquired so much money that he came at length to civic honours, though, of course, of but inferior degree,—which shows, by the way, that a man may rise to honours by the zealous discharge of most dishonourable services; but with that we have no immediate concern, for were it a point which we were called upon to establish, we should find other means than these. But to the point:—A catechumen among the stealers from dwelling-houses had watched his opportunity, and stolen a valuable bracket clock from the abode of the attorney. This he carried to the rendezvous of his gang, in Rosemary-lane, or somewhere else, and exhibited it in triumph as a rich reward of the morning's prowling. Many of the veterans had seen the clock, and knew the owner: the *esprit du corps* came upon them, and they first belaboured the erring thief, and then made him carry the clock back to the owner, and apologize for the mistake. Thus, even from the most abandoned part of society, we can obtain a refutation of the very pernicious hypothesis of Mandeville.

But there is no need of going even thus far for a

refutation, for the hypothesis refutes itself in the very terms in which it is stated. If we hope to recommend ourselves to the good graces of mankind, surely the best way of doing it is to exhibit to them that which they themselves like. Therefore, if all mankind were essentially, in the habit and very constitution of their nature, vicious, they would not be pleased with even the semblance of virtue. On the other hand, if there were the slightest truth in the hypothesis, mankind would seek carefully to conceal from each other every action which could in any way be, according to our common notions, construed into a virtue; and not only display their real sins in the broadest light, but set up false pretences to more glaring ones than any which they practised, or were capable of practising. So much for what may be regarded as the hypothesis of universal licentiousness and deceit.

The third hypothesis which we shall enumerate is that of what may be called "the extrinsic origin of virtue." According to the abettors of this, there is "an eternal truth," a "rule of right," a primordial "fitness of things;" and human actions are virtuous when they agree with this, and vicious when they do not. Now, our perception of this fitness of things must either be virtue under another name, or else it has no application to Man, and indeed no meaning. That there is a "fitness" in all things, animate and inanimate, we do not deny; but this fitness has nothing to do with the moral qualities of human actions. A parrot is fitted for living in trees, and an ox for grazing the herbage of the fields; and it is a violation of this

fitness to confine the parrot in a cage, or to shut up the ox in a stall and fatten it for the butcher; but surely no man in his senses would maintain that there is a moral guilt in any one of these. All human art is, in fact, a departure from the natural fitness of things; and yet every one feels that there is not vice, but virtue, in the diligent and judicious practice of the useful arts. The "fitness of things" can therefore mean nothing but the propriety of human actions; and if the art be new to us, we cannot tell, by any process of reasoning, whether it be proper or improper, until we have seen how the event turns out; but this is too late, because, if mischief is done, it cannot, of course, be prevented. Now, if we had no feeling of the moral good or evil of an act, until that act were performed and we could judge of it from the consequences, it is evident that our morality would be of no use to us. It is upon the emotion, that the moral restraint or the moral inducement must bear; and thus, that which is required is something more immediate in its operation than a process of reasoning. Our own physical good is generally, if not always, either directly or indirectly, the foremost subject in all our thoughts and processes of reasoning; and it is also the origin of by far the greater number of our desires, at least of all of them that arise out of subjects of judgment and experience; and, that we may not injure others in the pursuit of this good, we require to have something besides our own interest to regulate our desires. A feeling is the only inward monitor of this kind that we can have, and this feeling is anterior

to all thought and knowledge of our own interest, or of anything else, and it applies to every human action, and to nothing else; and instead of this feeling having any relation to the fitness of things, it does not apply to things at all, but is strictly confined to persons.

The fourth hypothesis is, that *utility* is the measure of virtue,—is, in fact, virtue itself. This is the hypothesis upon which Hume builds his system of morals, and builds it with great acuteness and subtlety. It is also an hypothesis which is most convenient for shallow reasoners, and therefore it is much more widely diffused and prevalent than any of the others. So prevalent is it, that almost all those who, at the present time, set up pretensions to the title of social and political philosophers, are *Utilitarians*,—men who look upon human virtue, and human nature itself, as mere chattels, estimable at what they actually bring in the general market of the world, and no more. In some respects, this is a fallacy of the same kind as that which considers virtue as in accordance with truth, or the fitness of things. Like that, it assumes a standard extrinsic of Man himself, with which standard he, by a common process of reasoning, compares that which he wishes to do; and, if the result of the comparison be that the act is in accordance with the standard, the action is performed, as virtuous; but if it disagrees with the standard, the action is abstained from, or, if performed, it is vicious. "Truth," and "the fitness of things," are expressions of so very vague and general a nature, that, unless we bring them to particular instances, we can understand little

or nothing about them. They are qualities, and not subjects; and therefore there must be subjects of which they are qualities before we can form any judgment concerning them. Nor is this all; for in every case where we arrive at a conclusion or judgment by means of a comparison, we must have a known standard of judgment; and therefore, in order that we may judge of moral truth or fitness, we require that very feeling of virtue, the place of which these, or either of these, are supposed to occupy. Such is the essence of the hypothesis of those who, as Pope expresses it,—

> "Take the high *priori* road,
> And reason downward till they doubt of God."

The Utilitarian hypothesis agrees with this in having a standard, but it takes "the *posteriori* road," and makes the virtue of all actions to depend upon their consequences; for we must, of course, wait the event, before we can ascertain whether an action is to be useful or not. Utility is a well-sounding name, however, and it falls in very readily with the views of vulgar and illiterate minds, who can imagine no enjoyment of human life, but such as can be purchased with money. If this were the case, all that we admire the most in human history would be transferred to the category of vice; for though we feel joy in the contemplation of those who succeed in a good cause, we feel a higher emotion for the virtue of those who resist oppression to the death.

If what we call moral good, or virtue, were nothing but utility under another name, then they could not

but be identified in every possible case. The atmospheric air is of more real utility to the human race than all the acts of beneficence that ever were performed, or than all the saints and martyrs that ever lived; and therefore, according to this hypothesis, the atmospheric air holds the foremost place in virtue. So also, a favourable season is of more use, and an unfavourable season of more injury, than any one man in the country, let him be habitually as good or as bad as he may; and yet, even the most moon-struck of the almanac-makers never thought of calculating the virtues and vices of the weather. It is true that attempts have been made to exorcise a storm by bell, book, and candle, and that some bishops have fulminated the anathemas of the church against destructive flocks of migratory pigeons; but these are the means by which craft perpetuates superstition, and no man, in the fair and free exercise of his understanding, ever imagined the possibility of moral good or evil in anything but human actions; and yet no one can deny that the substances and the events of the physical world are full of utility,—so full that, though mankind have been extending the knowledge of that utility for thousands of years, the discovery is yet very far from being completed.

But virtue, as compared with utility, is yet farther narrowed; for we do not measure the virtue and the utility of human actions by the same standard. So far from this, that there are many virtuous, and highly virtuous, actions, which are of little or no real use; and there are many of the most useful actions of mankind

which are not only not regarded as virtuous, but which were actually vicious in the original intentions that led to their performance. The arts of reading, writing, printing, and the various collateral ones which put us in possession of the knowledge of former ages, and of the outline of what all nations are doing at the present time, have been brought to their present perfection by the acts of many individuals; and yet we never think of calling them virtues. It is because our agriculturists and our manufacturers are so attentive to their respective employments that we are so well appointed in all the necessaries and luxuries of life; but it is no virtue in a farmer to attend to his crops and his stock, and it is no virtue in any man to bring to market the best commodity that he possibly can; for the object in each and all of these cases is to get the honour and the reward which are attendant upon success.

Indeed, when we once dissect away the entanglement of the sophistry with which its grand abettor encircled his doctrine, we come to a conclusion the very opposite of that which he draws,—namely, that if a perception of utility is the motive of any action, in so far there is no virtuein it at all. In that case, it would be superfluous, because the perception of the utility is quite enough without it; and it is a law of the nature of man, as well as of all else in creation, that where one motive or one principle suffices for any purpose, two are never given. Our calculations of utility have all a direct or an indirect reference to our own physical good; and our feeling of moral virtue is not given us for the furtherance of that, but

for our guidance in society, so that we may pursue our own good without injury to others.

So far, therefore, is the calculation of utility from being virtue, or the foundation of virtue, that the direct tendency of the system of the Utilitarians is to destroy all moral feeling, and reduce the whole intercourse of the human race to the cold calculation of bargain and rule. It may at first sight appear a little strange that so acute a reasoner as Hume should have been betrayed into so gross a fallacy as that which is the foundation of the Utilitarian hypothesis of morals. But Hume was fond of paradoxes; and he was much less an adept in analysis than in the synthetical rearing up of a system. His "virtue," means moral good; and his "utility," means physical good; and these, though not always opposed, are sometimes opposed, and never in any one instance the same. Moral good, or its opposite, is an immediate feeling, arising from the simple perception, or thought of its subject, without any train of reasoning between the perception and the emotion; and though we may reason it down, stifle it by passion, or overcome it by habit, it comes free and unbidden as the light of the sun. It is impossible to see, to hear, or to read of human misery or suffering, without feeling an emotion towards the relief of that suffering; and it is just as impossible for us to hear or to read of the perpetration of cruelty against man, without an emotion toward relief or rescue, and an emotion of hatred toward the oppressor. We never pause to reason about utility in these cases; nor does the fact of there being no

possible utility in the case, of itself abate our emotion. The tale may come from the earliest volume of human history, it may relate to the most contingent future, it may be a mere fiction, or it may be a thought of our own that comes across us, in which we ourselves are in no way parties. But, come in what manner soever it will, so that it comes with the proper force of expression, the emotion arises; and we exult in virtue and detest vice, where there can be no possible allusion to utility. There have been many instances of those, who were only a few hours before or after engaged in the perpetration of crimes, shedding tears at the recital of some well-told tale of injustice and oppression toward helpless innocence. So strong, indeed, and so indestructible is this feeling of moral virtue, that, in extreme cases, the most depraved of mankind will act in obedience to it, without knowing that they are so acting. The abandoned of mankind can still retain a degree of admiration for virtue in others; and the homage which they thus pay to it is not paid to "the unknown god."

The fact is, that the moral feeling is an original, general, and inherent capacity in human nature; and though it may be stifled by passion, by conduct, by improper society, and by many other means, it can never be destroyed. And, in those hours when there is no perpetration or thought of crime, and no companion to take part in present debauchery or the planning of future mischief, it will arise in its strength, and make the most stout-hearted in guilt quake and tremble, even more severely than if all his iniquities

were detected, and the ministers of justice were inclosing him round so that he had no means of escaping the vengeance of the law. Fear is the utmost which the present can threaten, as to take place in the future; and as the cause of fear is always an internal one, the mind may be so manned against it, as to dare it to the extremity of danger. In merely physical courage, the malefactor may march as firmly to trial as the soldier marches into battle; or he may mount the scaffold with the same physical boldness as the soldier mounts the breach in storming a fortified place; but no guilty man can play the hero in the face of his own moral feeling. If that is awakened, his physical daring is gone, and he is in the dust—

"Exhausted, spiritless, afflicted, fallen."

Hence there are many who, when they are brought forth to suffer for offences against the law, are under far greater pain than Man can inflict; and quite insensible to the deadly preparations, and to the idle crowd, whom the love of strong emotion, or some worse motive, collect to witness the revolting scene. If the guilty could destroy this moral emotion, they might go on with impunity; for the bitterness of death—of mere physical death, is soon over; but this moral feeling is eternal as the mind itself; it cannot be stifled in the disembodied mind, but will form the barb and venom of that dart which will rankle for ever and for ever.

It may be proper to notice here, as one of the most beautiful instances of design and execution, in the adaptation of Man to society, for the mutual and

reciprocal good of himself and others, how the physical good of the individual and the moral good of society promote each other, and, though they aim apparently in different directions, yet conduce to the same result. Though the feeling of virtue does not pause to calculate upon utility, or upon any result whatsoever, yet it so happens that a virtuous course of life is the one which conduces the most to the physical good of the individual, and ensures him the most abundant measure of earthly happiness that he can possibly obtain. From the indestructible nature of the moral feeling, the man who offends against that feeling never can be thoroughly happy. He stands condemned in his own estimation; and, as he is in habitual consciousness of guilt himself, he is in constant apprehension that this guilt may be known to others; and therefore he never has that frankness and freedom in society without which society cannot be enjoyed. "The wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are as bold as a lion," is a truth confirmed by every-day observation. We do not allude so much to the man who associates with the worthless, or to the man who commits an occasional crime which may bring him under the cognizance of the law, as to him whose life is one succession of mean and small transgressions, which the law does not reach, and which the rest of mankind so little notice or suspect that he is not driven out of society on account of them. He who has entered into the association of the systematic breakers of the law, estranges himself from the rest of society, comes abroad only in the way of

his profession and under a mask; and this mask he can afford to wear in his public hours, because, when he unbends himself to such enjoyment as a man of his character can have, he needs no moral restraint, as the applause which he wins there is in the ratio of his guilt, not of his innocence. The occasional crime, especially if it is an atrocious crime of passion, such as murder, under the extreme exasperation of revenge, or under the strong temptation of some great prospect of acquisition, is generally such torture to the party himself, that it drives him out of society. He may wander into some distant place, where he is wholly unknown, and where even the rumour of that which he has perpetrated never may reach, even as a common piece of news; and he may conduct himself, not only in such a manner as to be above all suspicion, but he may win, and by his conduct deserve to win, a high place in the estimation and confidence of that society into which he has come. But still, the arrow of remorse is within him for that which he formerly did, and the more he is esteemed, it only rankles the more grievously; so that, after the lapse of many years of apparently virtuous and honourable life, he shall return to the place from which he fled, and shall confess his crime, and render himself up to justice, as an only though a vain hope of escape from a burden which is too grievous to be borne by human strength.

The man of habitual mean and small deviations from virtue, whose offences are rather against the honour of society than the enacted laws of his country, has not the resource either of the one or the other of those to

whom we have alluded. He continues still to associate with the virtuous part of society; and thus, like the man of occasional crime who becomes a member of respectable society in a place where he is not known, he feels within himself that he is unworthy of those with whom he associates; and, unlike the man who has been guilty of one atrocious crime, he has no single means whereby confession can give him a clean breast, and he can offer himself a sacrifice to the law. We do not mean to say that confession, in any sense of the word, can take away guilt, or that the death of a criminal by the hand of the public executioner can, in any way, be an expiation for the crime of which the sufferer has been guilty. The whole punishment part of the matter is nothing else than a partial continuation of the old practice of atonement by sacrifice; and the sanguinary laws of the moderns have merely come in the stead of those gods of human imagination to which our rude ancestors immolated their human victims. But still, if the surrender of himself to the officers of that law—we will not say justice, to which the life or the liberty of a man may be forfeited, is not an act of expiation, whereby reparation can in any wise be made to the party injured, or the conscience-stricken can, in any wise, be relieved from the moral burden of his guilt, yet the confession and surrender are acts of magnanimity, and acts of this description always afford temporary gratification; and thus it, for the time, relieves the mind by withdrawing it from the agony of the remorse, and giving it relief for the time, in the contemplation of this act of magnanimity.

It is rather a curious fact in human nature, but it is a fact, that guilt always longs for an expiation as a means of relief; so that the punishment which Man can inflict is a relief, though only a fancied relief, from the greater torment of the inward consciousness of those deviations from virtue, of which the world takes no cognizance.

The man who has not even this false and imaginary relief of confession and surrender is yet more miserable. He is tolerated in honourable society, and it sometimes happens that that society does him honour. The sins of this paltry creature are generally "wiles of winning," little frauds and dissimulations which may be practised from day to day without suspicion on the part of more open and honourable men. In the aggregate, both of the proceedings and the proceeds, their amount may be considerable—greater both in moral guilt and pecuniary acquirement than any single robbery; but yet, the individual items of which this aggregate is made up, may be all so mean and contemptible, that the party dares not, for shame, confess any one of them, but must bear in his own mind the burden of the whole, without any means or possibility of relief.

This is a condition of mental torture to which it is difficult to imagine any parallel. The small vices of the party have raised him to a situation, the mere name of which brings him into daily contact with men of honourable minds, and he comes into their society with perfect consciousness that, if he were properly known, he would be despised and scouted. This leads

him to the practice of an habitual deception, which destroys his peace of mind, and he must have recourse to the most frivolous means to hide him from the ever-haunting goblin of his own disquieted mind.

A man of the character which we have been attempting to describe may arrive at wealth, for it is the inordinate desire of wealth which is the foundation and cause of this meanness; and we may add that the desire of wealth is, in itself, one of the most contemptible desires by which any human being can be actuated. It is what may be called a second-hand desire—a desire of that power over other men which, from his own insignificance as a man, the party feels he has no means of obtaining but by purchase.

How very different it is with the man who feels within himself no moral accusation. He has his whole mental energy always at his free disposal, so that he can turn the entire bent of it upon any subject or enterprize in which he engages; and by having it thus free, he has far greater chance of attaining to eminence than the man who, even if his situation and connexion in life are more favourable, is habitually disturbed by the reminiscences of paltry vices. There have been instances of men of turbulent passions, and even of men who have been guilty of occasional outbreaks of passion, of very reprehensible nature, who have nevertheless attained to great eminence in science or in art, and thereby have rendered to society services which, in the end, far more than compensated for their occasional outbreaks; but we are not aware of any one instance in which a mean man, habitually

addicted to small vices, arrived at any kind of eminence, unless the possession of wealth dishonourably acquired can be considered as such. We do not make these observations from any desire of excusing immorality of any sort; but merely to show that he who lives in the continual violation of morality, even though it is only in small matters, is the most contemptible of characters in a social point of view, and the most successful outrager of his own happiness. Therefore, though our greatest good upon the whole is not the foundation of our feeling of moral good, or virtue, yet the constant practice of virtue is the surest means of procuring the greatest good for ourselves, in every sense of the term, and with regard both to the present world and to the eternal future.

The fifth hypothesis of the foundation of virtue, or moral good, which we shall mention, is that of *Sympathy*, which has its most able—we may say delightful expounder in the justly celebrated Dr. Adam Smith. His "Theory of Moral Sentiments," is one of the most delightful books in the English language, or indeed in any language; and the only exception which can be taken to it is, that the theory upon which all his exquisite reasonings are founded is not true. But, while we are in justice bound to say thus much against it, we are at the same time bound to say, that if it were possible that there could be an error worthy of a great man, the error of Dr. Smith's hypothesis is of that description. According to this hypothesis, we do not immediately approve of the virtuous action, or disapprove of the vicious one; we consider the

circumstances in which the party is placed, and then we consider what would be our own feelings if we were placed in the same circumstances: and if the result of this comparison be that we would have acted as the party has acted, we conclude that the action is virtuous; but, on the other hand, if we would not have acted as the party has acted, we conclude that the action is not virtuous. According to this hypothesis, therefore, it is not any merit or demerit in the agent, or any quality of the action, which makes us feel that the action is morally good or the reverse, it is the agreement or the disagreement of what is done with what we ourselves feel that we should have done had we been placed under the same circumstances. This, to say the least of it, is a very lax system of morals, —a system which would give origin to as many kinds of virtue as there are habits and dispositions among men; and according to it, deceit and falsehood would be as much virtue among men of one character and habit, as truth and honour are among those of another. Thus, for instance, a man may be placed in a situation of the most unbounded confidence in respect to the property or even to the life of another man; and though there are men, and we hope the great majority of men, who would act honourably in both these respects, yet there are some men that would appropriate property if committed to their charge, and even take away life if it stood in the way of the accomplishment of their purposes. Now, supposing two men of these opposite ways of thinking on the subjects of property and life to contemplate a third

man acting in such a situation as that which we have supposed. If each of these were to approve or disapprove of the conduct of the man in the situation of responsibility, according to what he himself would do in the same situation, then the virtue of each of these would be the vice of the other. Now, though virtue or goodness is merely a quality, and a quality of which we judge by immediate feeling, and not by any process of reasoning, yet the very same action cannot be both virtuous and vicious at the same time, from the mere circumstance of its being thus sympathized with by two men of different characters. Virtue, whatever it may be in itself, cannot at the same time be its own opposite, neither can any quality be changed by two men thinking differently of it. There is a little satirical caricature, in allusion to some scientific dispute, executed by De la Beche, which is no bad illustration here. It represents two "learned Thebans," who have gone out in quest of the productions of nature, each with a fowling-piece in his hands, and the one with rose-coloured spectacles and the other with blue. They have come to a tangled and marshy place, overshadowed by trees, upon one of which sits an owl, in an attitude of composure worthy of the chosen bird of Minerva, and with an eye bent upon each of the rival naturalists. "What a beautiful rose-coloured bird," says the one; "Rose-coloured!" rejoins the other, "why, my dear sir, the bird is as blue as indigo;" and if the sympathy of mankind were the only standard of virtue, we should have the same action as variously defined as the owl is by the two

spectacled connoisseurs. There is this much further in the caricature, which is quite apt to the case in hand. It is the spectacles only that occasion the differences perceived by the two naturalists; for if they had seen with their own eyes, they would have both remarked that the bird had the same tawny and mottled plumage which every one who has seen an owl knows that it exhibits, without the slightest tinge either of rose-colour or indigo blue. Just in the same manner, an action may appear in the cerulean blue of virtue to the sympathy of one man, and in the blush of vice to that of another; while to the moral feeling of both it would appear the same, and very different from what it did to the sympathy of either. Had it been possible for the talent of an author to give truth to a false hypothesis, Adam Smith would certainly have given truth to this one; but he has not succeeded in this; and where such a master both of philosophy and language has failed, it would be vain for any other man to make the attempt.

The sixth and last of these false hypotheses which we shall mention, is that which is usually called the *selfish* hypothesis, and which may also, without impropriety, be called the *sacerdotal* one. This is the hypothesis of rewards and punishments,—that according to which mankind are to be bribed and beaten into the practice of virtue. If this had been an hypothesis unknown to vulgar practice, and propounded by some single philosopher upon the authority of only such reasoning as he could have adduced in support of it, all the kings and priests, and the whole drove, great

and small, of those who school, and rule, and lecture mankind, would have been up in arms against him, and he would have been denounced with tenfold more fury than was ever poured on the devoted head of a man who dared to differ from the vulgar consecrators of the anathema and the gallows.

We waive, in the mean time, the religious consideration, as the essential part of that between Man and his God; and waiving this, we ask any man of common understanding, how he can reconcile it with the idea of the wisdom and goodness of the Deity, which no man can fail in drawing from a very slight survey of the works of the creation,—how he can reconcile it with the perfection of all the other works of God, that Man should obviously be made for society, and should have powers and capacities which can be brought into exercise only in society; and yet that he should have in his own nature no principle to guide him in that society, but that the rest of mankind must bribe or whip him into the sense and perception of even his first and simplest duties to them? In a perfect creation, commanded into being by an all-perfect God, what shall we say of such an anomaly as this? Is God incompetent or unjust; or are they who hold the doctrine out of their senses?—"The fall of our first parents by eating the"—— The fall of a fiddlestick! What imaginable business has that to do with the adaptation of Man for society in the present life? If that event had not taken place, would the human body have lasted for ever, at the same time that it required to be supplied with food, and consequently

changed its substance in the very same way as human bodies do at the present time? The fact is, as we have endeavoured to explain in another chapter, that this relates to the obvious impossibility of a finite creature, acting upon his own experience—as Man must act, otherwise he could not be Man—and yet yielding perfect obedience to an infinite law, which could not be done without infinite knowledge: and therefore, physiologically considered, Man is the same now, both in body and in mind, as he was at the moment of his creation; and an infant newly born is as innocent as Adam could possibly have been. If Adam disobeyed a positive commandment, then that was Adam's actual transgression; but the "fallibility," so to call it, was in his nature *before* he fell, otherwise he could not have fallen, notwithstanding the temptation of all the serpents and all the Eves that fancy can imagine.

Therefore, notwithstanding all the ignorance, all the false logic, and all the worse-motived mystifications in which this doctrine of the Fall of Man has been involved, we must still regard Man as the creature of God, endowed with powers and capacities corresponding to the situation in which his Maker has placed him; and in this view of him we shall proceed to inquire whether rewards and punishments are the only incentives to virtue,—that is, whether or not good is or is not mere selfishness in the individual.

We shall take the system as defined by Dr. Paley, who is as remarkable for popularity and pleasantness of detail, as he is for errors in the foundations of all his theories. *Virtue*, according to Paley, consists in

"*doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and* FOR THE SAKE OF EVERLASTING HAPPINESS." This passage is so very important,—as embodying the essence of the theory in very few words, that we have marked it in italics, and the last, or *motive* clause, in small capitals, in order the more strongly to draw the attention of the reader.

That *active* virtue consists in "doing good to mankind," is true; and it is also true that our doing this is "in obedience to" what Paley calls "the will of God;" but it is not true that "obedience to the will of God" is the motive of human virtue; for that is a matter of knowledge and not of feeling. We know nothing of the will of God; and, indeed, "will," in any ordinary sense in which we can use or understand the term, cannot be predicated of the Almighty without a very near approach to blasphemy. "Will," in all senses in which we use it, has respect to the future, and with God there is no future—all things are present. Therefore, "the will of God" is an expression which has no meaning, unless we understand by it the feelings of nature and the precepts of revelation. If we throw it upon the former of these, we are sent to the human mind in search of the motive to virtue; and if we throw it upon the latter, then men would be virtuous in proportion to the extent of their biblical knowledge, which is manifestly not true,—some of the meanest villains upon earth are not only well read in the Bible, but have the words of it constantly in their mouths, and that *for the express purpose of hypocrisy and deceit*. Now, if there were any

talismanic effect in the Bible, every one who read it would act virtuously as a matter of necessity.

Paley, of course, felt this,—felt that the ground he had taken would not bear him out; and therefore, he added, "and for the sake of everlasting happiness," which alters the complexion of the assertion altogether, and makes it totally inapplicable to virtue. Let us take the case as it stands, and examine it a little. A man does good to mankind, for a few years in the present world, "*for the sake* of everlasting happiness," which implies, as clearly as words can imply, that, were it not "for the sake" of the everlasting happiness, the man *would not do the good.* Now, is not this a mere matter of bargain, and a bargain in which the man has greatly the advantage; for he has to do the good during only a few years, and only occasionally during them, and he is to get everlasting happiness in return? Admitting, for the sake of argument,—for in truth the admission cannot be allowed—that a man could actually enter into a bargain of this kind with the Almighty,—that he could say to his God, "I will agree to do good to mankind, as occasion may require, during the years of my activity upon earth, provided that you will give me everlasting happiness when this life is at an end,"—and that thereupon a bargain were struck,—where would be the virtue—the moral good—on the part of the man? We know that all allusion to a bargain of this kind is impious; but the impiety is not ours, it is embodied and cloked up in Archdeacon Paley's definition, and we only bring it out in its real character. It were

well if this were done in the case of all those cloked impieties of which there are so many in the phraseology of certain pretending religionists.

Admitting that Man knew the will of God, and could obey it, is he not bound to do so without any condition, upon the simple consideration that he is God's creature? Nay, let him do his best, and he is a debtor to his God up to the present moment, and he must become more and more a debtor for every additional moment of his life. Admitting, then, that all his actions are as virtuous—as morally good toward mankind as human actions can be, where is he to find the price of everlasting happiness? In this singular definition — and though singular, it is common— Paley's theology is as bad as his philosophy. "Virtue, or moral good, is selfishness; and Man is his own saviour," are the two immediate corollaries from the plain meaning of the definition; and "Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy" is one of the few books upon this most interesting of all subjects which one finds in the hands of general readers.

The hypothesis of Paley, which appears to be a common one among divines, is what may be termed the *theologico-selfish* hypothesis; and it differs from the simple selfish system of the lay philosophers chiefly in bringing in everlasting life as the motive to virtue, while they stop at mere worldly interest: but the philosophy is not mended by this unnatural alliance, and the divinity is entirely out of place,—is, indeed, not divinity at all, but a collocation of unmeaning words.

This selfish system, though the very enumeration of

it is a virtual denial of all morality, has been the favourite one with the trainers and governors of mankind in all ages. It is begun in the nursery, and continued through life. The infant gets a sugar-plum for being "a good child," and is beaten, or threatened with a beating, for being "naughty;" the schoolboy gets a prize if he—or his parents—please the schoolmaster, and if he is idle or vicious, he is flogged or disgraced; the "good" rector becomes a bishop, the "stiff-necked" one dies a curate; and so on through all the gradations of society; and it often depends upon circumstances whether the reward is given to the worthy or the worthless.

Now, there is really not a jot of virtue—of moral good—in the whole of this. It all proceeds upon the *quid pro quo* principle. Man is schooled, from his cradle to his grave, in the craft and mystery of keeping his thoughts steadily upon the *quid* which he expects, all the time that he is fagging at the *quo*. Need we wonder, therefore, that there is so much selfishness in the world, and so little real openness and honesty of character? Every man is taught to consider his own physical good as not only the grand object of his existence, but as the only object which is worthy of his attention; while the real principle of virtue—the natural feeling of right and wrong—is utterly neglected in practice, and written out of existence in theory. While the system of rewards and punishments continues to be almost the only one that is taught, preached, legislated upon, and practised, we cannot expect much improvement. The foundation of virtue

is a feeling which acts instantaneously, and waits for the calculation of no consequences; and it instantly vanishes if either reward or punishment is so much as hinted at. The bare allusion to either the one or the other of these throws Man upon his selfishness; and although this selfishness is not necessarily, or, in the majority of cases, vice, it certainly is not virtue. Even religion itself, in so far as it involves the deliverance of man from eternal wrath, and gives him the full assurance of faith in eternal happiness, is not virtue. This is a mere calculation of consequences; and if the truth were forcibly brought home to the very worst man upon earth, he would be more powerfully affected, and would fear the punishment and desire the happiness more ardently than a better man. There is no devotee half so fervent in his zeal as a man who has been notoriously wicked, provided that he is properly frightened with the torments of hell; and this is the principle upon which the church obtained so large a share of the possessions of this world. But still, all this giving of largesses is not virtue, neither is it religion; for it is perfectly compatible with the very worst character. Besides, there is always some suspicion about giving to the church, or to "pious uses:" it reminds one of him who essayed to "purchase the Holy Ghost with money."

If, however, the religious feeling is of the proper kind,—if it comes not by the selfish stimuli of desires and fears, but "in the power of the spirit," the result is different. True, it makes no noise as the other does: it comes upon the mind, in all its affections, as

"the peace of God," calming all that is turbulent, and restraining all that is inordinately selfish, and thus giving scope to virtuous feeling, which that feeling cannot have under any other circumstances. The hope of eternal happiness, and the fear of eternal misery, are both softened down by a nobler and far more delightful feeling. The contemplation of the goodness of our God, who, of his own gracious pleasure, and without merit or knowledge on our part, has created us, preserved us, and redeemed us, comes upon the mind as a subject of admiration immeasurably greater than all those actions of men which are so pleasing to virtuous feeling; and "the love of God" fills our minds, and raises the moral feeling high above all emotion and all desire. Under this feeling, every duty becomes a pleasure; and we find reason to be grateful, in all conditions and vicissitudes of life. Be they what they may, they are met with gratitude; and, whether our course be smooth or rough in physical estimation, we run it with gladness and joy. It is not the hope of reward,—it is not the fear of punishment; for both of these are future emotions, and involve some uncertainty, which is always painful: it is gratitude for what has been done, and love and veneration for the doer, which become the habits of the mind; and the feeling toward God is, "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him."

Such is the power of genuine religion upon the mind and conduct of man. It is not the mere pardon of sin, for a criminal may give thanks for pardon one hour, and commit a fresh crime the next: it is delivery

from the guilty desire—the sanctification of the spirit —the raising of the moral feeling into the foremost place among the affections, as the ruler and governor of the mind; and when this has once taken place, human laws are perfectly superfluous in their moral bearing; for there is a guide within far more powerful and perfect than all the codes that ever were enacted by human legislators. In every country, however, there are many points of legislation which have little or no moral bearing, one way or the other; and as the feeling of moral virtue, which religion elevates to its proper rank in the character, involves love of country, or a branch of general philanthropy, or the love of man, a religious man will always yield ready and cheerful obedience to these. But, as the love of man would be a mere name if it were not followed by the desire of good to man, there is no reason why a religious man should yield passive obedience to laws which are either faulty in principle or injurious in practice. On the contrary, genuine love of country necessarily involves the desire that all the institutions of that country should be as pure and as useful as they can be made. In short, a man who is imbued with the true spirit of religion will naturally be at all times a reformer, but never a rebel; he will improve, and he will pull down if that is necessary to improvement, but he will never destroy.

Whether it might or might not be possible, by any means which are at present known, or which may hereafter be discovered, to bring this power of religious feeling to bear upon the minds of the whole, or

the majority, of the human race, we pretend not to say. We can say, however, that it has not yet been done; and not only this, but that the progress of society in this genuine feeling of religion, appears to bear, and we may say actually does bear, no measurable proportion to their progress in those arts and sciences which concern the present life only. On the contrary, there is a manifest falling off, which becomes more and more conspicuous every day. The cause of this, though an important inquiry, would obviously be a difficult one, and therefore we shall not enter upon it; but the fact is too broad and glaring for concealment. We have abundance of religious pretence;—of church-building, and cant, and of trading and other societies, the members of which get gain and glory,—such glory as can be gotten by these means; but really one meets with very few who are actuated by genuine religious feeling, or even who have the slightest knowledge of what it really is. Thus, we may still say of mankind, as was said by an ancient religionist, that while they are lifted up at the one side, they fall down just as much at the other.

If we were to offer an opinion upon this very important subject, we should be inclined to say that it is chiefly owing to what we call improvements in matters of knowledge. That is now reduced to a catalogue of mere results, which any one who can read can learn by rote as easily as he could learn a baby-rhyme or a ballad. For more ease in the application, this ready-reckoner of knowledge may be as convenient as the ready-reckoner of prices is in the shop; but both have

a very pernicious effect upon the mind. As the ready-reckoner supersedes all necessity of knowledge of arithmetic, so those tinctures and essences of science, which are not always distilled in the purest or most perfect alembics, supersede the necessity of thinking; and thus, while mankind are every day getting more and more expert in practice, they are getting more and more out of the capacity or habit of thinking,—a species of change which is certainly not much for the better. We do not mean to say that every man who has occasion to apply a truth in science or a principle in art, should demonstrate or trace it from the very beginning; but we do say that every man ought to be practised in thinking and reasoning, otherwise he can neither be a useful nor a safe member of any society, whatever his station and employment in that society may be.

In a country like Britain, where necessity compels the great majority of the people to be almost constantly occupied in manual labour of some kind or other, there is nearly the same difference to reconcile between the mercantile value of the individual as a labourer, and his moral value as a member of society, as there is between the physical and the moral good of the individual, in an ethical point of view. It is for the interest of trade, and also of the individual, in so far as mere handicraft dexterity is concerned, that the principle of the division of labour should be carried to the utmost extent,—that masters should have the superintendence of single trades, and that the different operations of detail should be performed by

separate individuals. So far as the cheapness and quality of the things produced are concerned, there is no limit to this division; and not only this, but the more that human labour can be withdrawn from merely mechanical labour, and mechanical power substituted in the place of it, it is the better for all parties. Workmen are sometimes apt to think that this is not true, and that they are ill-used when machines are introduced to supersede their labour; but this arises from ignorance, and ignorance which is wholly or chiefly the result of that mechanical occupation which prevents them from exercising that very moderate portion of thought which would enable them to come to much more rational conclusions upon the subject. It is perfectly evident that, if a man is continually occupied in doing what could be done by the power of falling water, of animals, or of steam, giving motion to a certain quantity of machinery, the man works only as the physical power and the machine, and his mind is perfectly neglected. This is the result to which the division of labour tends; and the man who does nothing but what is mechanical, becomes unfit for judging and reasoning, not only upon subjects of an abstract nature, but even upon the common principles of right and wrong; and more especially upon the relation in which he stands to that society of which he is a member.

In times of tranquillity, and of steady progress in the several trades and manufactures to which these observations apply, the evil of them is not felt; but in the case of changes and reverses in the trades them-

selves, and especially in times of political agitation, the danger of a great multitude of what may really be called mindless men, collected together at the same spot, and with their undiscerning emotions at the mercy of any demagogue who chooses to inflame them, have been too often experienced to require any particular illustration. This is a consequence which will always necessarily arise from the division of labour, and the consequent want of exercise in thought, of a number of people collected together, and conversant with little or nothing save the details of their mechanical labour, and the indolence or the dissipation in which characters of this kind are all but necessitated to spend the pauses of their labour.

How to reconcile these differences is a matter of extreme difficulty. It cannot be done by common school education, either that very rudimental portion which falls to the share of the mere operatives in a manufacturing town, or by any extent to which they may be enabled to carry it by libraries, institutions, lectures, or any of the means usually resorted to for such purposes. These matters may be rendered exceedingly useful in as far as the private morality of the parties is concerned; for they not only prevent the leisure-hours from being spent in idleness and dissipation, but they elevate the character, by giving a certain degree of mental exercise. Generally speaking, however, the subjects to which those instructions relate, do not harmonize with the more essential occupations of the parties, and they throw little or no light upon those principles of society, the tendency of which

is to make a man feel contented and happy, and even proud in his usefulness, of what nature or kind soever that usefulness might be. There are no useful rules of conduct which can be directly inferred from the physical sciences, although, when the principles of society are once fully understood, physical science affords some very beautiful illustrations of them; and at establishments of the kind whereof we have been speaking, it is generally thought advisable to proscribe *religion* and *politics* as subjects with which it is dangerous to meddle; and we are ready to admit, that if either the one or the other of these is to be made, as is too generally the case, a matter of wrangling and disputation, the more that it is avoided the better.

Notwithstanding this, politics and religion are the very subjects upon which such parties stand in need of information, and upon which, if they do not, by some means or other, get more information than they now possess, and information of a different character to any to which they appear to have access, there will be no alternative but that they shall retain their present character of a mine in society, ready to be sprung by any one who is daring and dexterous enough to apply the match.

This seems to be an evil quite inseparable from very artificial states of society; and, if it does admit of a remedy, that remedy, if it is to be effectual, must be numbered among the discoveries that have yet to be made. It is quite clear, however, that, until some such remedy, either perfect or approximate, is found out, legislation, in such states of society, must re-

main a matter of extreme difficulty, and one to the blunders of which, fatal as these must be in their consequences, it behoves us to be as charitable as we can. We have entered at so much length into the subject and source of moral good, that we have left but little room for the consideration of particular emotions. This is the less to be regretted, however, from these being detailed at length by most writers upon the subject, and also from there being a considerable similarity in the emotions themselves, and a difference in their objects only. They comprehend, as has been said, the whole of our desires, and of our fears, which fears are also desires, under a different name. They all originate in ourselves; but good or evil to ourselves is not, according to the explanation which we have endeavoured to give of moral feeling, our only objects of desire or fear. The following may be regarded as the principal ones:—The desire of continued life, and the fear of death; the desire of happiness, and the fear of misery; the desire of knowledge, to which there is no fear exactly corresponding. These may be considered as the most immediately personal of all our desires; and yet, when we analyse them, they are all found to have a very considerable reference to society. We desire to live in society, to be happy in society, and to display in society that knowledge which we wish; and if we were to abstract the consideration of society from any of them, the remaining desire would be very faint. Besides these, we have the simple or direct desire of society, and the fear of being deserted and left alone in the world, which is a very painful

emotion, especially when associated, as it generally is, with the fear of helplessness in ourselves. We also desire to have the esteem of those with whom we associate, and the fear of losing their good opinion; and it is chiefly to the operation of this desire, and this fear, that all the courtesies of society are owing. A more intense degree of this forms the desire of glory, or of being admired by that society which we love; and so strong is this desire, that it extends beyond the period of life; for many submit to the greatest hardships and privations, and even to death itself, for the sake of the memory they are to leave behind. The fear of shame is the counterpart of this; and the two emotions together, when duly exercised, lead us to that which is great and noble, and restrain us from what is mean and contemptible. The desire of power is distinct from that of glory, and it admits of subdivision into a direct power, which is somewhat allied to glory, and often associated with it; and an indirect power, which is more allied to meanness, though not necessarily associated with it. The first of these divisions is ambition, or the desire of excelling and commanding others by means of our real or our fancied superiority as men; and the second is avarice, or the desire of obtaining by purchase that which the ambitious man is desirous of commanding by personal greatness. Within proper limits, both of these desires are useful and commendable; but the due regulation of them requires a full knowledge of ourselves and of society. The tendency of ill-regulated ambition is to tyranny and oppression; and unless the ambitious man stops in time, he very generally falls a sacrifice

to the violence of his own emotion. The tendency of avarice is toward injustice, or at all events to a degree of narrowness and meanness, which greatly diminishes both the esteem and the usefulness of its possessor; and when it is carried beyond a certain length, the avaricious man actually includes himself in that society towards which he wishes to be parsimonious; and denies himself the ordinary comforts of life for the mere purpose of accumulating wealth; and as he approaches this stage, he loses sight of that power of which he at first desired the means, and limits himself to the means instead of the end. We also desire the good of society upon very nearly the same principle as we desire to enjoy the esteem of it; and it is in consequence of this desire that we perform our public duties, from the very humblest of these to that patriotism which makes a man sacrifice his life for the good of his country.

Of these desires, if they are duly regulated, there is not one which can be said to be malevolent, though they may all be abused in the extent to which they are carried; but there is one desire which is always malevolent, though sometimes necessary, and that is, the desire of injury to those whom we hate, or of revenge, as it is usually termed. As the direct object of this emotion is always mischief to somebody, we require to be much more on our guard against it than against any of the others. We sometimes have just cause to be angry; but if the anger remains, and settles down into implacable hatred, we should watch the progress of it with the utmost solicitude.

CHAPTER VII.

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

THE social institutions have for their object the instruction and the regulation of mankind; but the instruction part may be looked upon as an afterthought, upon which much less attention is bestowed than upon that which relates to governing or regulating. This is the most important matter connected with Social Man, and yet it is one in which there are very few first principles upon which anything like a compact or comprehensible science can be founded. One reason of this appears to be, the impossibility of tracing social government to its origin. Societies are always *mended* from time to time, but they are never *made*. We may form theories of the origin of society, just as we form theories of the origin of language, and those theories may have different degrees of probability; but the very best of them are either altered copies of society as it exists or has existed, or they are mere fancies of the framers.

It cannot well be otherwise; for we know of no source from which the data necessary to the formation of a society could be obtained, but in another society.

Therefore, it must have grown up by a series of experiments,—of trials and errors; and, of course, its future progress must go on in nearly the same way, though after a long time the successful experiments may be generalized into a sort of imperfect maxims. There is another difficulty, for society is in itself progressive, and therefore the maxims which answer very well for a regulation at one time, are not applicable at another; and thus the very principles have to be ascertained by temporary experiments.

All these difficulties, too, arise from the nature of the subject itself, on the supposition that those who frame the regulations have perfect will and capacity of dealing with equal justice toward all ranks and classes of the society. This, however, cannot be the case, not perhaps even in a single instance; or if it did occur, it would be by chance, or we may almost say by miracle. Waiving the question of intention or will on the part of those who make the regulations, there is a source of inequality in the application of those relations of which they never can get the better. When, indeed, the structure of society is very simple, and the only distinctions are those of master and servant, leader and follower, or tyrant and slave, as the case may be, and where there are scarcely any distinctions between the different members either of those who rule or those who obey, the case might be understood, and the interests of the parties might be equitably adjusted to each other. It so happens, however, that this limited classification belongs to very rude and ignorant states of society only,—that in

these states, Man is the chief possession of Man,—that in most instances the governed have no voice in the regulation, and that they have no resistance to make other than physical resistance, or direct rebellion, which is, under all circumstances, a hazardous experiment, and one in which mankind, unless goaded on by a rebellious leader, are never forward to engage Therefore, in these states of society, the regulations are little else than the will of the governor for the time being; and consequently, the state of the society will be found somewhere between the limits of patriarchal happiness and despotic misery, according to the character of the ruler.

After society has made great advances, and the members of it have become arranged into so many and so varied classes and ranks, there are new difficulties which arise. This improved state of society is incompatible with any very extreme degree of individual tyranny; because, the human mind never displays its power under the immediate pressure of despotism. Consequently, there must be, at least, some desire of equality in the operation of the law upon the different classes; and, though there may possibly be secret intentions adverse to this, yet there must be at least an ample *profession* of liberality, for the sake of pleasing all parties.

It is not with the intention, however, we have to do, in the mean time; and indeed the intention with which any law or regulation may be framed, is a matter of very minor importance to those to whom that regulation is to be applied. In legislation, as

well as in other matters, the very worst enactments proceed from the very best intentions; and, on the other hand, there are instances in which an enactment which was intended to serve a bad purpose, has actually served a good one. Besides, it does not appear that in the making of laws, the intentions of the parties are very essential points for consideration, whatever they may be in the carrying of those laws into execution, or against parties who violate them.

The difficulty, in the case of highly-improved and artificial societies, lies quite in another direction—in the knowledge which is necessary in order to make any new regulation where it ought to be. The different relations of the people of such a kingdom as Britain to each other, are so very numerous, and some of them are so continually changing, that it would not be easy, nor indeed possible, for the most intelligent man in the country to understand them properly, even though he were to devote his whole life to the study of them. But, we have no reason to suspect that any man will, or can, so devote his life. This would be a most laborious occupation, and at the same time it would be wholly unproductive. A man who could obtain his subsistence, and support his place and style in society, without much labour, would be very unlikely to enter upon such a task as this; and a man who had to labour, or to follow any profession for his subsistence, could not afford to engage in this laborious inquiry. Therefore we may consider it as an established truth, that there is no man in England, or anywhere else, possessed of sufficient knowledge for

enabling them to frame any general law which would bear with perfect equity upon all classes of people in the British Islands.

Every man capable of forming any opinion upon a subject of this kind, must himself belong to, and chiefly associate with, some one class. For this very reason he must have some prejudice in favour of his own class; and though this prejudice may make him misunderstand or overrate both its importance and its interests, yet he will necessarily be much more familiar with the habits, the wants, and the wishes of that class than of any other, and this in the natural course of association, and without reference to any bias or object, to which even the most fastidious could find fault.

If we were to suppose a collection of delegates from all ranks of a society, from the sovereign to the parish pauper, to meet for the purpose of concocting a law, we should still be no better than in the case of a single individual who went about the business with the same honesty of purpose as we shall suppose to actuate the assembly of whom we speak. Indeed, there would be no chance of such an assembly coming to a conclusion which would embody their general sentiments, or bear equally upon all. For, in the first place, the same influence of superior rank over inferior, as controls the whole of society, would control the delegates of whom we speak; and, in the second place, if we are to suppose that each speaks out his sentiments in favour of his own class as another does, we do not see how they could by any argument come to any general conclusion at all. If they were taken from a limited number of

classes, unanimity would become easier in proportion as the number of classes became more limited, though, even if they were all chosen from one class, perfect unanimity could not be expected. Then, as the number of classes were diminished for the sake of the unanimity, the application to the whole of society of that upon which they agreed, would be narrowed by all the classes left out; and this not with any reference to intentional doing of wrong, but for the want of knowledge, which the parties cannot, in the nature of things, obtain, or understand if they were to have it told them.

Therefore, it really does appear, that there are no means of obtaining the proper men and the proper knowledge, so as to be able to frame a law which will bear with perfect equity upon all classes and denominations of men, in a society so very varied as that of the British Islands. What is bad in the existing regulations, will naturally tell in the effects which it produces; and the want of new regulations may also be, in part at least, palpable to observation. But still, neither in the one of these cases nor in the other, is the discovery of the injurious regulation, or of the injury from the want of a regulation, perfect. Neither the one nor the other can by possibility tell upon the whole of society, or even on any considerable portion of it, at any one time; and therefore, whether it is the evil of a regulation, or the evil of the want of a regulation, which is complained of, there is no knowing whether obedience to the voice of the complaining party might not do injury to all the rest, and thus

indirectly hurt the complainers themselves. There is another point worthy of our attention here, and that is, the strong disposition which people have to place their little individual grievances upon the back of any great public grievance which happens to be making a noise at the time, and they do this the more readily the less they understand about the nature and reality of the public grievance. This is a very common practice with mankind; they always attach a sort of mysterious importance to that which is vaguely understood, and they do so very much in the ratio of their vagueness of understanding. Superstitious persons are never afraid of ghosts and spectres on an open common, or in broad daylight; but thick groves, dark caverns, vaults and dungeons in ruins, and scenes of darkness generally, are peopled with subjects of alarm. It is much the same in the case of those subjects of social regulation which strongly affect the public mind. They produce the effect always in the inverse ratio of the degree in which they are understood, and in that of the capacity of the parties to understand them. Hence, when a popular clamour is raised against an existing regulation, or in favour of a new one, there are a thousand ideal things mixed up with it; and the desired object is sought as a fancied relief from a countless number of personal sufferings and annoyances, with which it has no more connexion than it has with the succession of events on the most distant planet in the solar system.

Our limits will not suffer us to go at any length nto the subject of social institutions, and therefore

we have offered these general observations on the extreme difficulty which lies in the way of the right conducting of those institutions, so as to keep them in the nearest possible accordance to the varying states of society. We have supposed that the will of doing for the best is not wanting; and we believe that, in most modern instances at least, want of will has been by no means the general cause of failure. Want of knowledge is the difficulty; and that difficulty is the more insurmountable from its extending to the men and the means by which the knowledge is likely to be obtained.

A glance at the progressive history of British legislation will show any one the extent of these difficulties, and how rapidly they increase as the activity and the interests of society multiply;—only, in taking this glance, we must be careful not to confound two causes which, though they combine in producing the same effects, are yet different from each other. A new law, whether of repeal or of original enactment, has two distinct bearings, one upon the general mass of the statute-book, and the other upon society. The statute-book is very voluminous; its parts are exceedingly varied, sometimes contradictory of each other, and almost always enveloped in a thick crust of words. Nobody will read the statute-book for amusement, and as few will do so as a matter of general education; and thus, it is not too much to say that, of those who successively compose the legislature, whether in the Lords or the Commons, there is not one in twenty who has a general-outline

knowledge of those laws which he is called upon to alter or to augment. This ignorance would probably be unavoidable under any circumstances; and formed as the British Houses of Parliament are, it is absolutely unavoidable. It is true that there are lawyers among the number, but all lawyers do not either con the statutes at large, or consider the bearing of a law upon the general weal of all classes of men in the country; and, besides this, it is said, and there *may* be truth in it, that lawyers are fond of laws with loop-holes, as these let fees in and clients out.

The bearing of the new enactment upon the interests of the different classes of the people, is a subject upon which the legislature are, if possible, more ignorant; and though inquiries, and tedious and expensive inquiries are often made upon particular points, yet these are seldom extensive enough, and as they are usually instituted with a view to the carrying into effect of some preconcerted measure, there is always some chance that there shall be a bias toward that measure running throughout the whole of the investigation.

By these means, the members of the Houses are thrown mainly upon their respective parties in politics, as that by which themselves or their measures shall stand or fall. This is very much the case, whether the matter at issue be of general or of local interest. We do not see, in the present state of things, how this dependence upon political party can be avoided. There are no fixed standards, by which they can be guided in almost any one matter,—even in those

matters which, one would suppose, could be determined upon purely physical grounds. Thus, for instance, if the matter upon which they have to deliberate and decide is so simple a matter as two new lines of road from one place to another, there is no standard to which both of them can be referred. Now, the application to the legislature is necessary in such cases only to make sure that money which is levied or otherwise obtained from the public, shall be applied to the greatest possible public good; and, that the money shall not be squandered, is only one part of the parliamentary duty,—the other, and perhaps the more important one is, that the accommodation which the public receive in return for their money, shall be the very best which, under the circumstances, it is possible to obtain. This is by much the most serious part of the business; for a judicious public improvement will very soon pay its own cost, but if a public work is once constructed in the wrong place, or according to the wrong plan, it becomes a burden rather than a benefit.

Now, if there is a want of any standard, by which to ascertain which is the best in these local matters, how much more serious must be the injury of not having a standard in those general matters which affect the whole country, or at least numerous classes in all parts of it; and yet it does not appear that in these important matters there is any standard attainable; but that, on the contrary, every new measure, how well soever it may appear in theory, has to be tried before its real value can be ascertained. This ne-

cessity of experiment becomes more and more urgent every session; and acts of parliament of the present time require much more revision and amendment after they have been tried than used to be required many years ago.

For a long period, indeed, and up to times comparatively recent, when an act was once passed, there it remained, and little or no question was raised about its propriety or its impropriety. It was an act of parliament—a statute which had passed the legislatnre, and received the assent of the sovereign, and that was deemed enough.

Such is not the case now; and why is it not the case? Have the members of the Houses become less perceptive and patriotic than they of those former times? Certainly not. They have partaken in the general enlightenment, have abandoned the idea of their infallibility, and have followed the custom of all rational men, in proceeding by experiment in those cases where they have no fixed and unalterable principle to guide them. This may often be done with more words than are necessary, and with more wrangling and party feeling than are quite seemly; but, taken altogether, it is unquestionably an improvement, the strongest proof of which is, that, under the exercise of it, the country advances more and more every day, in every art and in every enjoyment.

The greatest improvement of all is, that legislators begin to discover where their labours can be useful, and where they cannot; and therefore they have, upon most subjects, abandoned the old and mistaken

notion that they could by these enactments directly promote the industry, the wealth, and the happiness of the people. This they cannot do; but they have still a field in which to win glory, by removing many remaining obstructions which the ignorance of their predecessors left in the way, and by restraining those interferences of one class with another, which, unrestrained, are calculated to do mischief; and which are therefore legitimate subjects of regulation.

It might seem that we should here enter upon an analytical investigation of the several social institutions, for instruction, for regulation, and for the relief of those who are ill able to help themselves; but the consideration of these, or any of them, would bring us in contact with subjects of wrangling, which we wish by all means to avoid.

THE END.

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